Cultural Integration in France

Yann Algan, Camille Landais, Claudia Senik*

27 juin 2010

1 Introduction

The French Republican Model appears as a polar case among the different cultural integration models. Dating back to the French Revolution and the Third Republic, France has a long secular tradition imposing restrictive attitudes on the expression of religious and cultural identity in the public sphere.There is however growing concerns that this model, despite its claimed egalitarian and universalism, fails to integrate the new immigrant minorities. The most illustrative example is the 2004 ruling against the display of conspicuous religious symbols in school, mainly targeted to Muslim schoolgirls who wished to wear the hijab. The main consequence of this refusal to acknowledge any minorities has been an inability to know whether the reality of equality matched the rhetoric of perfect cultural integration. While views on national identity and the integration model are very strong-held in France, the evidence base are rather weak. The goal of this chapter is to fill this gap.

Immigration has a very long history in France since the late nineteenth century (Noiriel, 1988). In the 1920s, France was ranked second (after USA) as the country with the highest share of immigrants, reaching 7% of total population. In the early 2000s, as most as 25% of the population has some immigrant background, from the first, the second or the third generation.

Table 1 reports the composition of the immigration population according to the most recent dataset, the French Labor Force Survey, for the period 2005-2007. It distinguishes the sample proportions of native French, first-generation immigrants, and second-generation immigrants. Around 90.2 percent of the sample consists of natives, 6.5 percent are first-generation immigrants and around 3.3 percent are second-generation immigrants. First-generation immigrants mostly come from the

*Yann Algan : Sciences Po, Cepremap, yann.algan@sciences-po.fr. Camille Landais : UC Berkeley, Cepremap, camille_landais@berkeley.edu. Claudia Senik : Paris School of Economics, Cepremap, senik@pse.ens.fr.

Maghreb (44.1 percent), Southern Europe (24.8 percent), and Africa (11.3 percent). These proportions are slightly modified for second-generation immigrants, the share of people with origins from Southern Europe is higher (37.4) while those with origins from Africa (5.0) and the Maghreb (40.7) is lower.

Table 1 also shows an evolution in the composition of the immigrant population. Immigration from Southern Europe, in particular from Italy and Spain, has been one of the main inflows since the late nineteenth, with some peaks such as the inflows of Spanish immigrants during the Spanish Civil War. A second wave of immigration from Southern Europe took place in the 1960s and the 1970s, with still an ongoing inflows from Portugal now.

Immigration from Maghreb dates back to as early as the World War I, due to the replacement of the labor force in farms and arm industry. But the main wave of immigration from this region took place after World War II. Immigration inflows come from three main countries: Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco. Immigration from Algeria boomed after World War II until 1958 and the Algerian civil war. Immigration from Morocco and Tunisia took place later in the 1970s.

The group of immigrants from Sub-Saharian Africa is more recent and concentrated on French ex-colonies: Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Mali and Senegal. Another set of recent immigrants is from Eastern Europe and Turkey, with an ongoing inflows from this latter country since the 1970s. Finally, the lowest group of immigrants come from Asia. Most of these immigrants come from ex-French colonies in South East Asian: Combodia, Laotiaand Vietnam. This immigration is rather recent and linked to the retreat by westerners from Asia after the Vietnam war.

France immigration policy is rather pragmatic and dictated by the labor market conditions. First generation immigrants are now accorded permits of various tenure from 1 year to 10 years. Only direct dependants are allowed to follow the head of the household immigrant. Regarding citizenship, Weil (2002, 2005) documents that France is one of the most open countries in Europe. For second-generation, naturalization comes from the right of soil. Any-one born in France is granted with French citizenship, but this right becomes effective most of the time when children are older than 18 years only.

Despite France's long immigration tradition, and the growing concerns about persistent cultural differences with immigrants from Maghreb and Africa, very few studies have provided a quantitative assessment on the cultural integration path. Most studies have rather looked at economic outcomes. Silberman and Fournier (1999, 2007) look at job outcomes and show the persistent employment penalty for second-generation Maghrebins compared to French natives and other immigrant groups (see also Meurs et al., 2006). Fougère and Safi (2007) look at the role of naturalization on employment prospects in France, and find a significant effect. Aeberhardt and Pouget (2007) estimate national wage origin differential by matching

employer-employee data. They typically find that earnings differentials mostly reflect differences in the type of jobs, suggesting the existence of France of occupational segregation rather than mere wage discrimination.

In other social sciences a strong debate opposes the supporters of the Republican model stressing that ethnic origin does not have to interfere with the public sphere (Schnapper, 1991) and those who call for a civil society more open to multiculturalism (Wieviorka, 1996, 2006). But few economic studies have tried to quantify the evolution process of cultural attitudes by waves of immigration and birth cohorts (see Courbage and Todd, 2007 for a seminal study).

This article tries to fill this gap by providing a quantitative assessment of the path of cultural integration in France, and how it correlates with economic integration of immigrants.

2 Data and methods

2.1 Data

We investigate the patterns of integration in France by using three main surveys.

We measure labor market and educational outcomes with the French Labor Force Survey (FLFS), which cover the years 2005-2007. In addition to the traditional information on country of birth of the respondent, the FLFS has, since 2005, provided information on the country of birth of the parents. The FLFS contains information on country of birth for first-generation immigrants at a very detailed level. The FLFS distinguishes between 29 countries or country groups.[1] The FLFS also reports the country of parental birth for the second generation but at a more aggregate level. There are 9 categories: France, Northern Europe, Southern Europe, Eastern Europe, the Maghreb (Arab North Africa), Turkey (Middle East), (sub-saharan) Africa, Asia, and other countries. We exclude the last category as it comprises very heterogeneous populations. This leaves us with seven immigrant groups for our analysis. To facilitate the comparison of the results between first-generation and second-generation immigrants, we aggregate the more detailed countries of birth of first-generation immigrants into the seven broader immigrant categories. The native reference group consists of individuals who are in France for at least two generations, i.e. those who are born in the country and whose two parents were also born in France. First-generation immigrants are individuals born abroad and whose both parents were also born abroad and from the same country of origin. Second-

[1] France, Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Rest of Africa, Asia (including Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia), Italy, Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Ireland, Denmark, Great Britain, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Switzerland, Austria, Poland, Yugoslavia, Turkey, Norway, Sweden, Eastern Europe, United States or Canada, Latin America, and other countries.

generation immigrants are individuals who are born in France but whose parents are both born abroad. We exclude individuals born abroad with at least one parent born in France and individuals born in France with either one parent born in France and the other born abroad or both parents born abroad but in different countries.

We measure fertility rates based on the 1999 French Family Survey ("Enquête Histoire Familiale 1999"). This survey is conducted in parallel with the Population Census and aims at analyzing the evolution of family structures. It consists of a sub-sample of 380,000 adults, and the survey includes several questions about family status and family relationship, country of birth of the respondent, of her relatives (parents, husband/wife), language spoken at home, with children, with parents, etc. In particular this survey is extensively used for fertility studies because it is the only survey to provide with the possibility to compute reliable completed fertility rates.

The French family survey displays three types of information concerning the origins of the respondent. First it contains information on country of birth at a somehow detailed level. The recorded countries are broken down in 16 categories.[2] Second, the survey contains information on the country of birth of the father, of the mother, and of the spouse. The countries that are recorded are exactly the same as for the survey respondent. Eventually, the survey displays information on the nationality (citizenship) of the respondent (at the time the survey was conducted, and at birth). The list of citizenship is exactly the same as the list of country of birth. To compute broad homogenous regions of origins, we aggregated countries as follows: i) France: France, ii) Northern and eastern Europe: "other northern and eastern european countries", Turkey; iii) Southern Europe: Italy, Spain, Portugal; iv) Maghreb: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia; v) Africa: "other African countries"; Asia: Vietnam, Laos, Cambogia, "other Asian countries"; vi) Others: America, "all other countries". Note that contrary to the Labor Force Survey used for the analysis of economic integration, we cannot make a distinction here between individuals from Northern European countries and those from Eastern European countries.

In order to explore subjective attitudes of immigrants, we also a survey "Histoires de Vies", conducted in 2003 by the French national statistical office (INSEE) with other institutional partners. The sample of the survey includes 8403 adults living in France (metropolitan), with a deliberate over-representation of immigrants of the first and second generation. The survey includes many questions pertaining to subjective identity, gender issues and work values. It contains information about the country of birth of surveyed persons, their parents and their living partner (if any). Due to the small size of the sample, we only distinguish four main categories of ethnic origin, aggregating countries into large regions as follows: i) France; ii)

[2] France, Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Africa, Vietnam, Laos, Cambogia, Italy, Spain, Portugal, other northern and eastern European countries, Turkey, other Asian countries, America, all other countries.

Southern Europe: Italy, Spain, Portugal; iii) North Africa or Maghreb: Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia; and iv) Rest of the World (foreign country, but not Southern Europe or Maghreb). We chose to distinguish Maghreb and South Europe as these are the most important sources of immigration in France. For instance, in the 1999 French census, these two groups accounted for 62% of foreign immigrants.

2.2 Specifications

We measure the evolution of cultural attitudes with two main specifications. The first specification compares the outcomes between first and second generation of immigrants:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Outcome}_i = &\sum_j \beta_j \ \textit{Country of origin}_j \ * \textit{First generation immigrant} \\ &+ \sum_j \gamma_j \ \textit{Country of origin}_j * \textit{Second generation immigrant} \\ &+ \sum_k \theta_k \ \textit{Birth cohort}_k + X_i'\alpha + \varepsilon_i \end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

where β_j (γ_j) measures the impact of being a first-generation immigrant (second-generation immigrant) from country j relative to natives. The comparison between β_j and γ_j gives us a sense of whether the second generation immigrant keeps a lot of the cultural traits of the first generation migrant or is closer to natives. Note that this specification assumes that birth cohort and other regressors have the same effect for all country of origins. We have little reason however to believe that trends and temporal shocks on cultural behaviors are equally shared among countries.

Another set of estimates aims at making comparison of outcome between different birth cohorts within each wave of immigrations. With cross-sectional dataset, the specification becomes:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Outcome}_i = &\sum_j \sum_k \beta_{j,k} \ \text{Country of origin}_j * \textit{Birth} \ \text{cohort}_k * \text{Immigrant} \\ &+ \sum_k \theta_k \text{Cohort}_k + X_i'\alpha + \varepsilon_i \end{aligned} \tag{2}$$

where $\beta_{j,k}$ is the impact of being first-generation immigrant from country j and belonging to the birth cohort k, relative to the natives. In this specification, we distinguish between two different groups of cohorts born before 1970 and born after 1970. For all estimates, we systematically restrict the sample to uncensored observations. For instance, to estimate the diversity of ages at first child, we restrict the

sample to women older than 35. For age gap between spouses, we also restrict the sample to women older than 40. This method is convenient but does not enable us to investigate specifications of the form (2).

3 Fertility and Marriage

3.1 Fertility and Age at First Child

We look at two different outcomes in terms of fertility: completed fertility rates and age at first child.

To investigate the impact of ethnicity on completed fertility rates, we restrict the sample to women older than 40 to avoid censoring issues due to younger women not having completed their fertility yet. An alternative solution would have been to include all women regardless of their age and to include a polynomial in the age of the woman as explanatory variables.[3]

Table 2 reports the coefficient estimates associated with completed fertility rates of immigrants relative to natives. Positive coefficients on first generation migrants in the first column of table 2 means that, regardless of their region of origin, immigrants have a greater completed fertility rate on average than native women. Among all immigrants, immigrants from Maghreb, Asia and Africa exhibit the highest fertility rates. First generation immigrant women from Maghreb have on average .56 more children than natives, and immigrants from Asia and Africa have .32 more children than natives. However, this discrepancy seems to be greatly reduced for the 2nd generation of immigrants. Second generation women from Maghreb have only .16 more children during their lives than natives. For second generation women from Asian origins, the difference with natives vanishes completely and is not significantly different from 0. Women born from parents from Southern Europe have even .24 less children on average than French Natives.

To estimate age at first child, we use all women aged 40 or younger and use a censored model to control for women without children at their current age. [4]

[3]Each solution has its assets and its drawbacks. In the first case, we are compelled to look at older generations of immigrants, but we have a perfect picture of completed fertility. In the second case, we rely on functional form assumptions to control for the evolution of fertility with respect to age but one can investigate more recent trends because of the inclusion of younger women. The reason we chose the first specification is that the EHF survey is specifically made for giving an accurate picture of completed fertility, whereas the use of Labor Force Surveys (such as in the UK study for instance) makes it difficult (not to say impossible) to observe accuretaly completed fertility.

[4]In our cross-sectional setting, the censoring point varies across observations. To deal with this issue, we use a censored median regression à la Chernozukhov.

Results are displayed in table 3 and show that first generation immigrants from Africa, Southern Europe and Maghreb tend to have children earlier than natives. Median age at first birth is 1 year earlier for first generation immigrants from Africa, and .23 year and .35 year earlier for women from Southern Europe and Maghreb respectively. Note that these differences tend to persist among second generation women from Africa and Maghreb who still have their first child .35 and .33 year earlier respectively than native women.

3.2 Marriage and divorce rates

We next consider marriage patterns. We compare marriage rates at age 25 [5] for natives and first and second generation of immigrants. We restrict the sample to all men and women aged between 25 and 40. Table 4 displays the results for men and women, and then breaks down the results by gender. Marginal effects at the mean of a probability model of being or having been married at age 25 are reported.

Results show that first generation immigrants tend to marry more and earlier than native individuals. This difference is especially large for individuals coming from Europe and Southern Europe, and for individuals coming from Maghreb. The probability of being married at age 25 is 7.9 percentage points higher for European immigrants, 7.2 percentage points higher for immigrants from Southern Europe and 1 percentage point higher for immigrants from Maghreb. [6] But this difference is greatly reduced for the second-generation of immigrants and even reversed for second generation immigrants from Maghreb who have a slightly smaller probability of being married at age 25 than native individuals (minus 2 percentage point). The next columns of table 4 investigate the same probability model for men and women separately. The main result is that men and women from the same region of origin do not seem to differ significantly in their marriage behaviors. Both men and women migrating from Europe and Southern Europe have a higher probability of being married at age 25 than native French but second generation men and women from these same regions do not have significantly different marriage behaviors from that of native French. Note however that among immigrants from Maghreb, only women seem to be more likely to be married when they are young (with a higher probability of 2.6 percentage point) whereas men seem to marry later. This may reflect the different nature of immigration between men and women from Maghreb, men coming younger and for working purposes and women coming for family reasons (*regroupement familial*).

[5] Marriage rate at age 25 is defined as the fraction of individuals being or having been married at age 25

[6] Note the average probability of being married at age 25 is 27 percent in our estimation sample.

We then look at divorce patterns. We consider the fraction of individuals who ever got divorced. [7] Table 5 shows that divorce rates among first generation of immigrants are very close to that of Natives. But interestingly, it seems that among second generation individuals, divorce rates are greater than that of French Natives. For second generation immigrants from Magrheb for instance, men have a 4.9 percentage point probability of being divorced once married than native French, and this probability is 4.2 higher for women. Along with the evidence of high endogamy rates among second generation immigrants from Maghreb, this may suggest the existence of some cultural tension in the marriage model of Maghrebin communities, with some conservative elements (high marriage and endogamy rates) being challenged by elements of high cultural integration (educational gap, etc) which may explain higher divorce rates.

3.3 Inter-ethnic marriage

This section explores the frequency of inter-ethnic marriage. Table 6 reports the fraction of each community that is married to someone of a different immigration backgrounds. We distinguish three categories: a marriage with a native spouse, a marriage with a spouse who comes from the same country of origin, grouping together spouse from first and second generation, and marriages with non-native spouses coming from a different country of origin. We distinguish the exogamy rates among first and second generation respondents.

The proportion of immigrants whose spouse or partner comes from the same country of origin (either first or second generation) is naturally higher for first generation immigrants. The endogamy rates are equal to 74 percent for 1st generation Maghrebin, 69 percent for 1st generation African, 85 percent for 1st generation immigrants from Turkey or Middle East, and 79 percent for 1st generation immigrants from Asia. When we turn to immigrants from other European countries, the endogamous marriage rate is also higher than marriage rates with natives.

But as Table 6 shows, this endogamy is strongly reduced in the second generation: 23.4 % for South Europeans, 39.3 percent for Africans, 51 percent for Turkish, and 53% for Maghrebins. Maghrebin immigrants of the first and second generation remain particularly endogamous, as compared to other groups. This is confirmed by regression analysis controlling for the individual characteristics aforementioned.

[7] Note that we therefore restrict the sample to individuals married or having been married. To control for possible censoring of younger individuals who may finally get divorced, we include a polynomial in age.

3.4 Spousal age gap

Table 7 reports estimates for the age gap between the spouse, which could capture a gender inequality. Immigrant women of the first and second generations do not seem to get married younger than French natives. Identically, their age at the first child is not significantly lower than that of French natives, except for the first generation immigrants from Maghreb, where the age gap is in average 2 years higher than for native couples; and up to 3.6 years higher when both spouses share the same origin. The age difference between spouses is statistically different for first-generation immigrants from Maghreb, but not for the second generation. However, when one distinguishes endogamous couples (where both spouses come from the same country) from exogamous ones, the difference is persistent and statistically significant, even for second-generation immigrants (the age difference is about 2 years higher than for French native couples).

4 Educational attainment and Gender Gap in Education

Another way immigrants are thought to be different from the French native is the level of education and the attitudes towards gender equality in education. We document these education patterns, focusing on the sample of individuals older than 26 years old and who have left education. Table 8 reports education distribution and the gender gap in education for natives and immigrants.

4.1 Educational attainment

We first measure the gap in educational attainment of immigrants relative to French natives. We measure the evolution of this gap between different birth cohort of immigrants and waves of immigration. We start by regressing the age left-full time education on dummies for the country of origin of first and second generations. Native French are the reference group. The controls are a quadratic in year of birth, time dummies for the different waves of the survey, and region dummies.

Figure 1 reports the educational gap for immigrant men relative to natives. The x-axis reports the coefficients for second-generation immigrants and the y-axis reports the coefficients for the first-generation immigrants. First-generation immigrant men from Africa, Northern Europe and Eastern Europe are 1 or 2 years older when leaving full-time education than their native counterparts, who themselves leave education when they are on average around 18.3 years old. First-generation immigrant men from Southern Europe and Turkey are on average 3 years and 1 year younger than native men, respectively, when they leave education while immigrants

from the Maghreb and Asia are of about the same age. From the first to the second generation, the gap in educational attainment relative to natives becomes negative for most immigrant groups. For instance, second generation immigrants from Maghreb and Africa are 0.3 and 0.4 year younger when they leave the education system. Note however that the negative gap for Southern European men decreases from -2.9 years to -0.2 years from the first to the second generation.

Figure 2 shows that only first-generation women from Northern and Eastern Europe are at least as old as native women when they complete their full-time education. All other groups are significantly younger than both native women and their male immigrant counterparts. Immigrants from Maghreb are almost 1 year younger, and immigrants from Southern Europe are 3 years younger. But there is an important improvement from the first to the second generation in terms of educational attainment, in particular among the groups which were the most disadvantaged in the first-generation. Second-generation Asian women are performing outstandingly well, with an edge of 1.4 years of education relative to native French women. Second-generation women from Maghreb and Southern Europe also catch up almost their educational lag.

Next, we provide a complementary picture of the evolution of the educational gap by distinguishing immigrants by birth cohorts. We focus on second generation immigrants and compare the educational gap relative to natives among the young generation, born after 1970, and the old generation born before 1970. We run two separate regressions for the two different cohorts, taking the native as the reference group for each generation.

Figure 3 reports the evolution pattern for men. Among natives, the average age left full-time education is 20.67 years old for the young generation against 17.83 years old for the old generation, which represents a significant increase of almost 3 years. Relative to natives, the young second generation immigrants are sometimes performing worse than the older cohort. Take the case of immigrants from Maghreb, who have an edge of .11 years among the old generation, and trail back by -.45 years among the young generation. Naturally, this evolution does not mean that the younger cohort is less educated than the old one (in the particular case of immigrants from Maghreb, the younger cohort is one-year more educated than the old one), but the gap relative to the natives has increased. The same is true for immigrants from Turkey. Figure 4 shows the results for women. The evolution pattern by birth cohort is slightly different to the one of their male counterpart. In general, the gap narrows among the young cohort, or remains fairly identical.

4.2 Gender gap in education

We next turn to the gender gap in education. Table **??** presents estimates of the gender gap in education for the main economic minorities for the two waves of immigrations and two different birth cohort: being born before or after 1970. We measure the gender gap by including a dummy women in the regression of the average age left full-time education. We measure the evolution in this gender gap by interacting the dummy women with dummies for first- and second-generation immigrants and the two birth cohorts. The only covariates we include in addition to the controls for immigrant status are a quadratic in the year of birth as well as region dummies and time period dummies.

Table **??** shows that in the benchmark case of natives, the gender gap is about 0.13 years. The gender gap is higher for all the other immigrants, in particular among immigrants from Africa (2.46 years) , Asia (2.61 years) and Turkey (1.61 years). Table **??** also reports the gender gap by wave of immigration. The gender gap is more marked among the first-generation immigrants from Maghreb, Africa, Asia, Turkey and Eastern Europe. But quite remarkably, the pattern is reversed for second-generation immigrants from Maghreb and Asia where women have an education of 0.3 years and 1.39 years higher compared to their men counterparts. In contrast, the gap remains steady for immigrants from Africa and Turkey.

The first important result is that the gender gap decreases dramatically as we move from the first to the second generation, and from the old to the young cohorts. Take the example of immigrants from Maghreb. While there is a statistically significant difference of .72 years among the first generation, the gap becomes no longer statistically significant for the second generation.

5 Female employment

We now turn to the analysis of female employment rate. Table 10 reports employment for women by country of birth and wave of immigration. The sample is made up of prime-age women between 25 years and 59 years old included. For almost all ethnic group, the employment rate is much lower relative to the native women, whose employment rate reaches 74.4 percent. The employment gap is the most significant for foreign-born women from Maghreb, Africa and Turkey, whose employment rate is 43.0 percent, 53.9 percent and 20.0 percent respectively. The difference is more marked among married women with children than within single women.

The female employment rate increases significantly from the first to the second generation of immigrants. The employment rate of second generation women immigrant from Maghreb increases by 16.6 points relative to first generation immigrants. Within married women immigrant from Maghreb with dependent children, the em-

ployment rate increases by 20 points from the first to the second generation.

Figure 5 reports the evolution of the employment gap between first and second generation immigrants. The coefficients are the marginal effects from probit estimates on employment, controlling for age and education. The regressions are run on the whole prime-age population between 25 and 59 years old, where French-native women are taken as the reference group. Table 11 reports the probit estimates with the standard error. Column 1 does not include any controls. Column 2 controls for age and education and reports the coefficients associated with Figure 5. Figure 5 shows that the employment gap narrows significantly for all country of origin.

6 Values and Beliefs

6.1 National identity

In the survey *Histoire de Vies*, a series of question were asked concerning the elements of the respondents'identity.

Table 12 documents the result for national identity. Analyzing these questions reveals that if first generation immigrants tend to have different attitudes and values, as compared to French natives, this difference is largely attenuated for second generation immigrants. For example, the respondents are asked about their attachment to a particular country or continent: "*Overall, do you feel mostly: from a French region, French, European, from another country, from another continent*". Second generation immigrants are more likely to declare that they feel French than the first generation. First generation immigrants from Southern Europe are 50% less likely to declare that they feel French than are French natives, controlling for age, gender, and education. This is particularly true of those who were born after 1970 (where the probability is reduced by 77%). In the second generation, immigrants from Southern Europe are still 16% less likely to declare that they feel French than native French. Those who were born after 1970 are 3 times less likely to declare that they feel French. By contrast, if first generation immigrants from Maghreb are (28%) less likely to "feel French", this effect is not statistically significant for second generation immigrants from this region.

Table 13 documents the results for job identity. Among immigrants, the second generation more often chooses "occupation" in the list of the three most important elements of their identity. Hence, the second generation of Maghrebins is not statistically less likely to choose this item, whereas it is the case for the first generation (especially the older cohort).

Table 14 documents the role-model of migrants' parents. It is striking that 13% of second-generation Maghrebin immigrants declare that when they were 15 years old, they did not (or never) see their father work or that their father was absent or

unknown. Concerning the labour force participation of women, the proportion of respondents who declare that they saw their mother work when they were 15 years old is also significantly lower amongst immigrants of the first and second generation.

6.2 Religion

Among the elements of identity, religion is a source of cultural differences. Table 15 shows that immigrants attach a high importance to the transmission of religion to their children. There is essentially no decrease in this attitude from the first to the second generation of Maghrebins. Surprisingly, this attachment to religious transmission is more pronounced in the younger cohort of Maghrebins born after 1970.

Table 15 shows that the proportion of immigrants of the first generation who declare that they have a religious practice is higher than that of French natives. This difference almost disappears for the second generation, except for Maghrebins, for whom this attitude remains statistically more pronounced, even in the younger generation of those born after 1970.

6.3 Language

Another dimension of integration and identity is language. In the survey, the following question is asked: "What language(s) did your parents usually speak when you were a child (around 5 years old)?". Proposed answers are: only French, another language, French and another language, two other languages. If the respondent answers that his parents spoke another language (including French), he is asked about this language, and whether he speaks in this language with his spouse,his children (who live in France), other adults living in the household and other adults living in the neighborhood. This concerns 1 863 persons (18% of the sample).

Even at the second generation, about 30% of immigrants declare that they speak in their foreign mother tongue with their spouse, children, family or their neighbors. The differences shown in Table 17 remain statistically significant in a regression with the usual controls, for all migrants from South Europe and Maghreb, of the two considered cohorts. (The first row of Table 17 concerns French natives, i.e. including immigrants of the third generation of more. 10% of them still speak in a foreign language with their relatives or friends).

7 Conclusion

This chapter has compared a wide range of outcomes for the main groups of immigrants in France with the outcomes for French natives. The indicators we look at

are fertility, marriage and divorce rates, inter-ethnic marriage, spousal age gaps, the gender gap in education, employment rates, national identity, religiosity and language use. We find substantial heterogeneity across communities but also evidence that in almost all dimensions and for all groups, there is a fast integration process between first and second generation immigrants. The rate of cultural and economic integration is faster for some variables than others. It is religion, family arrangements and endogamy that shows the slowest rate, in particular among immigrants from Maghreb. Second generation from Maghreb also display a persistent penalty in terms of employment. Yet this slower assimilation process in religious and family arrangements does not go against a strong feeling of French identity among the second generation immigrants from Maghreb.

References

[15] Aeberhardt, R., and Pouget, 2007, R., National Origin Wage Differentials in France: Evidence from Matched Employer-Employee Data. Crest Working paper.

[15] Algan, Y., Ch. Dustmann, A. Glitz, and A. Manning (2010). "The Economic Situation of First and Second-Generation Immigrants in France. Germany and the United Kingdom." Economic Journal. Royal Economic Society. vol. 120(542). pages F4-F30. 02.

[15] Bisin, A., Patacchini, E., Verdier, T., and Zenou, Y., 2008, "Are Muslim Immigrants Different in terms of Cultural Integration?" Journal of the European Economic Association, Vol. 6: 445-456.

[15] A. F. Constant, K. F. Zimmermann: Measuring Ethnic Identity and Its Impact on Economic Behavior, Journal of European Economic Associ- ation, 6(2-3), 424-33, 2008

[15] Fougère, D., and Safi, M., 2009, The effects of naturalization on Immigrants'Employment Probability, France 1968-1999. Crest Working Paper.

[15] Manning, A., Roy S. (2010). "Culture Clash or Culture Club? National Identity in Britain," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society. 120(542), pp F72-F100, 02.

[15] Noiriel, G., 1988, Le creuset français: histoire de l'immigration au XIX-XXème siècle, editord Seuil

[15] Schnapper, D., 1991, La France de l'intégration, edts Gallimard

[15] Silberman, R. and Fournier, I., 1999, Les enfants d'immigrés sur le marché du travail: les mécanismes d'une discrimination sélective", *Formation et Emploi*, 65: 31-55.

[15] Silberman, R. and Fournier, I., 2007, Is French Society Truly Assimilative? Immigrant Parents and Offspring on the French Labor Market.

[15] Vigdor, J., 2009, Measuring Immigrant Assimilation in the United States, Civic Report.

[15] Weil, P., 2002, Qu'est-ce qu'un immigré, Histoire de la nationalité française depuis la Révolution, Grasset, Paris.

[15] Weil, P., 2005, La République et sa diversité. Immigration, Intégration, Discriminations. La République des idées. Le Seuil Paris.

[15] Wieviorka, 1996, Une société fragmentée: Le multiculturalisme en débat, pp. 11-60

[15] Wieviorka, 2005, La différence, Gallimard.

Table 1: *Labor French Survey 2005-2007*

Country of origin	1^{st} generation	2^{nd} generation
Natives	90.2	
Immigrants	6.5	3.3
Of which (%)		
Maghreb	44.1	40.7
Southern Europe	24.8	37.4
Africa	11.3	5.0
Northern Europe	6.6	3.7
Eastern Europe	5.9	7.5
Turkey-ME	4.1	3.6
Asia	3.2	2.2

Source: LFS 2005-2007. [8]

Table 2: *OLS estimates of completed fertility rates for women by generation of immigrants and country of origin*

Country of origin	1st generation	2nd generation
France	Reference	
Africa	0.3228***	0.1263
	(0.0545)	(0.1360)
Asia	0.3292***	-0.0654
	(0.0533)	(0.1116)
Europe	0.0195	-0.0366
	(0.0307)	(0.0254)
South Europe	0.0436	-0.2449***
	(0.0247)	(0.0237)
Maghreb	0.5666***	0.1665***
	(0.0205)	(0.0479)
Controls	Age, Education, Occupation	
N	135025	
R2	0.0907	

Standard errors clustered at the ethnicity level in parentheses

$^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{***}p < 0.001$

Source: EHF 1999. The sample is all women over 40.

Note: Specification is that of model (1).

Table 3: *Censored median regression estimates of the age of the mother at first birth by generation of immigrants and country of origin*

Country of origin	1st generation	2nd generation
France	Reference	
Africa	-1.082***	-0.351*
	(0.1333)	(0.3330)
Asia	0.921***	-0.249*
	(0.1417)	(0.116)
Europe	0.329***	-0.332**
	(0.0834)	(0.0704)
South Europe	-0.232***	0.649***
	(0.0654)	(0.0628)
Maghreb	-0.351***	-0.329***
	(0.0550)	(0.1035)
Controls	Age, Education, Occupation	
N	88449	
Pseudo R2	0.0399	

Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses

$^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{***}p < 0.001$

Source: EHF 1999. The sample is all women under 45.

Note 1: Specification is that of model (1).

Note 2: 3-step censored median regression model à la Chernozukhov is used to deal with censoring of women not having children at their current age.

Table 4: *Estimates of the probability of being married at age 25 by generation of immigrants and country of origin. Logit estimates: marginal effects at the mean*

	All		Men		Women	
Country of origin	1st gen.	2nd gen.	1st gen.	2nd gen.	1st gen.	2nd gen.
France	Reference		Reference		Reference	
Africa	-0.0387**	-0.0773***	-0.0305	-0.0933***	-0.0447**	-0.0635**
	(0.0154)	(0.0176)	(0.0223)	(0.0200)	(0.0209)	(0.0280)
Asia	-0.0104	-0.0598***	-0.0559**	-0.0634**	0.0386	-0.0541*
	(0.0174)	(0.0213)	(0.0223)	(0.0283)	(0.0263)	(0.0317)
Europe	0.0791***	0.00511	0.0863***	0.00848	0.0708***	0.00247
	(0.0133)	(0.0118)	(0.0206)	(0.0173)	(0.0174)	(0.0161)
South. Europe	0.0724***	0.00927	0.0844***	0.00911	0.0586***	0.0115
	(0.0140)	(0.00745)	(0.0217)	(0.0109)	(0.0178)	(0.0100)
Maghreb	0.0107	-0.0256***	-0.00325	-0.0375***	0.0261*	-0.0109
	(0.0104)	(0.00622)	(0.0148)	(0.00852)	(0.0147)	(0.00895)
Controls	Gender, Age, Education, Occupation					
N	101599		40029		61570	
R2	0.095		0.059		0.086	

Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the origin*country of birth level

$^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{***}p < 0.001$

Source: EHF 1999. The sample is all individuals under 40.

Note 1: Specification is that of model (1).

Table 5: *Estimates of the probability of being or having been divorced conditional on being or having been married by generation of immigrants and country of origin. Logit estimates: marginal effects at the mean*

	All		Men		Women	
Country of origin	1st gen.	2nd gen.	1st gen.	2nd gen.	1st gen.	2nd gen.
France	Reference		Reference		Reference	
Africa	0.00332	-0.0307	0.0641*	-0.0810***	-0.0392**	0.000315
	(0.0177)	(0.0211)	(0.0358)	(0.00998)	(0.0167)	(0.0312)
Asia	-0.0440***	0.0806**	-0.0339	0.0953	-0.0540***	0.0677
	(0.0144)	(0.0390)	(0.0240)	(0.0684)	(0.0174)	(0.0445)
Europe	-0.00990	0.0421***	-0.00150	0.0321	-0.0151	0.0476**
	(0.0105)	(0.0157)	(0.0189)	(0.0242)	(0.0121)	(0.0204)
South. Europ	-0.000143	0.00609	0.00531	0.0105	-0.00357	0.00229
	(0.0134)	(0.00835)	(0.0224)	(0.0134)	(0.0164)	(0.0105)
Maghreb	-0.00119	0.0455***	0.00582	0.0492***	-0.0110	0.0417***
	(0.0102)	(0.00896)	(0.0156)	(0.0154)	(0.0133)	(0.0107)
Controls	Gender, Age, Education, Occupation					
N	51087		17628		33459	
R2	0.032		0.026		0.038	

Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the origin*country of birth level

$^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{***}p < 0.001$

Source: EHF 1999. The sample is all individuals being or having been married

Note 1: Specification is that of model (1).

Table 6: *Interethnic marriages*

Country of origin	French native	Non-French native Same origins	Non-French native Different origins
French native			
1ST GENERATION			
Maghreb	21.67	74.29	4.05
Africa	26.83	69.16	4.01
Southern Europe	30.34	65.84	3.82
Northern Europe	45.21	44.25	10.54
Eastern Europe	38.89	53.88	7.23
Turkey	9.72	85.35	4.92
Asia	18.63	78.59	2.78
2NDGENERATION			
Maghreb	41.06	53.40	5.54
Africa	52.40	39.35	8.24
Southern Europe	71.21	23.42	5.37
Northern Europe	85.27	6.16	8.57
Eastern Europe	72.48	16.16	11.36
Turkey	36.41	51.76	11.83
Asia			

Source: LFS 2005-2007

Table 7: *OLS estimates of the difference between the age of husband and age of wife*

	All	Spouses of same origin	Spouses of different origin
Country of origin			
France	Reference	Reference	Reference
South Europe 1st generation	-0,1	0,4	-0,8
	(0.280)	(0.374)	(0.543)
Maghreb 1st generation	1.882***	3.555***	0,18
	(0.228)	(0.311)	(0.473)
South Europe 2nd generation	0,31	1,91	-0,07
	(0.293)	(1.248)	(0.472)
Maghreb 2nd generation	-0,07	1.819**	-0,59
	(0.349)	(0.904)	(0.540)
Controls		Age, Gender, Education	
N	5905	4212	1690
R2	0,03	0,05	0,02

Robust standard errors in parentheses

$^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{***}p < 0.001$

Source: Histoires de Vie, INSEE, 2003

Table 8: *Gender gap in age left full-time education*

Country of origin	Men	Women	Gender gap		
			Whole	1st	2nd
France	18.2	18.0	0.13		
Maghreb	16.2	15.5	0.73	1.2	-0.3
Africa	19.2	16.77	2.46	2.3	2.0
Southern Europe	15.5	15.2	0.41	0.3	0.4
Northern Europe	19.7	18.7	0.95	0.8	0.6
Eastern Europe	17.7	16.8	0.82	1.30	0.9
Turkey-Middle East	17.2	15.6	1.61	1.6	1.2
Asia	18.7	16.0	2.61	2.7	-1.9

Source: LFS 2005-2007:

Figure 1

Figure 2

Table 9: *Gender gap in age left full-time education for different waves of immigration and birth cohorts*

Country of origin	Maghreb	Africa	Southern Europe	Northern Europe	Eastern Europe	Turkey	A
French-Born							
Born before 1970	-.246	-2.272***	-.200*	-.383	-.989***	-1.284	
	(.189)	(.303)	(.112)	(.490)	(.246)	(.877)	
Born after 1970	.479***	-1.053***	.509***	-1.424	.908**	-.271	
	(.189)	(.392)	(.181)	(1.687)	(.433)	(.955)	
Foreign Born							
Born before 1970	-.729***	-	-.062	-1.193***	-.544***	-.764*	
	(.099)		(.086)	(.215)	(.252)	(.402)	
Born after 1970	-.479**	-.514	.641***	-0.828	1.814***	-.724	
	(.300)	(1.018)	(.248)	(.579)	(.834)	(.495)	
Observation	11963	2209	10594	2206	2361	1381	6
Source: LFS 2005-2007:							

Figure 3

Table 10: *Female labor force participation by country of birth, wave of immigration and marital status*

Country of origin	French native	Maghreb	Africa	Southern Europe	Northern Europe	Eastern Europe	Turkey	A
All women								
France-born								5
All	72.4	59.6	62.3	74.6	62.2	66.0	51.1	7
Single	81.3	63.2	58.1	78.3	80.0	78.2	75.0	7
Married	60.7	63.1	50.0	68.2	-	-	-	-
Married with dependent children	75.3	55.1	64.7	75.3	75.0	-	41.3	-
Foreign-born								
All		43.0	53.9	67.2	59.0	55.0	20.0	5
Single		63.9	48.9	70.9	77.2	54.0	43.0	5
Married		45.9	66.6	55.5	46.2	52.8	28.2	5
Married with dependent children		36.5	53.5	71.4	57.8	54.2	16.4	5

Source: LFS 2005-2007

Figure 4

Table 11: *Probability of being employed for women- Marginal probit estimates*

Country of origin	1st	2nd	1st	2nd
	(1)		(2)	
France	Reference			
Maghreb	-.301***	-.178***	-.232***	-.172***
	(.015)	(.02)	(.017)	(.022)
Africa	-.246***	-.251***	-.245***	-.193***
	(.027)	(.094)	(.030)	(.106)
Southern Europe	.078***	.012	.026	.023
	(.021)	(.022)	(.018)	(.022)
Northern Europe	-.108***	-.124	-.164***	-.047
	(.038)	(.098)	(.040)	(.091)
Eastern Europe	-.212***	-.039	-.218***	-.015
	(.041)	(.066)	(.042)	(.062)
Turkey-Middle East	-.481***	-.379***	-.415***	-.334***
	(.033)	(.103)	(.042)	(.110)
Asia	-.243***	-.041	-.198***	-.114
	(.059)	(.146)	(.062)	(.156)
Controls	no		age, education	
Observation	86059			

Source: LFS 2005-2007

Figure 5

Table 12: *Probit estimates that identity=country of origin*

	All	Born after 1970	Born before 1970
Country of origin			
France	Reference	Reference	Reference
South Europe 1st generation	0.134***	0.2	0.127***
	(0.022)	(0.154)	(0.022)
Maghreb 1st generation	0.129***	0.138**	0.128***
	(0.017)	(0.056)	(0.018)
South Europe 2nd generation	0.03	0.090**	0,01
	(0.017)	(0.044)	(0.018)
Maghreb 2nd generation	0	0.01	0
	(0.017)	(0.026)	(0.024)
Controls		Age, Gender, Education	
N	8403	1626	6777

Robust standard errors in parentheses

$^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{***}p < 0.001$

Source: Histoires de Vie, INSEE, 2003

Table 13: *Probit estimates of job identity*

	All	Born after 1970	Born before 1970
Country of origin			
France	Reference	Reference	Reference
South Europe 1st generation	-0,03	-0,03	-0,03
	(0.026)	(0.153)	(0.026)
Maghreb 1st generation	-0.080***	-0.201***	-0.062***
	(0.020)	(0.057)	(0.021)
South Europe 2nd generation	-0.053**	-0,06	-0.053*
	(0.024)	(0.055)	(0.027)
Maghreb 2nd generation	-0,03	0	-0,05
	(0.028)	(0.042)	(0.038)
Controls		Age, Gender, Education	
N	8403	1626	6777

Robust standard errors in parentheses

$^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{***}p < 0.001$

Source: Histoires de Vie, INSEE, 2003

Table 14: *Probit estimates that mother worked when respondent was 15*

	All	Born after 1970	Born before 1970
Country of origin			
France	Reference	Reference	Reference
South Europe 1st generation	-0.118***	0,05	-0.122***
	(0.025)	(0.144)	(0.025)
Maghreb 1st generation	-0.281***	-0.478***	-0.250***
	(0.018)	(0.047)	(0.019)
South Europe 2nd generation	-0.104***	0,04	-0.138***
	(0.025)	(0.056)	(0.027)
Maghreb 2nd generation	-0.188***	-0.203***	-0.180***
	(0.026)	(0.041)	(0.036)
Controls		Age, Gender, Education	
N	8016	1599	6417

Robust standard errors in parentheses

$^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{***}p < 0.001$

Source: Histoires de Vie, INSEE, 2003

Table 15: *Probit estimates of religious practice*

	All	Born after 1970	Born before 1970
Country of origin			
France	Reference	Reference	Reference
South Europe 1st generation	0.134***	0.290*	0.124***
	(0.026)	(0.154)	(0.027)
Maghreb 1st generation	0.159***	0.366***	0.131***
	(0.021)	(0.063)	(0.022)
South Europe 2nd generation	-0,03	0,08	-0.063**
	(0.025)	(0.054)	(0.028)
Maghreb 2nd generation	0.124***	0.222***	0,02
	(0.030)	(0.041)	(0.042)
Controls		Age, Gender, Education	
N	8403	1626	6777

Robust standard errors in parentheses

$^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{***}p < 0.001$

Source: Histoires de Vie, INSEE, 2003

Table 16: *Probit estimates of important that children share same religion*

	All	Born after 1970	Born before 1970
Country of origin			
France	Reference	Reference	Reference
South Europe 1st generation	0.218***	0,29	0.214***
	0.027)	0.214)	0.027)
Maghreb 1st generation	0.219***	0.574***	0.204***
	0.023)	0.080)	0.024)
South Europe 2nd generation	0	0,07	-0,01
	0.029)	0.112)	0.030)
Maghreb 2nd generation	0.117***	0.233***	0.089**
	0.040)	0.089)	0.045)
Controls		Age, Gender, Education	
N	6463	480	5983

Robust standard errors in parentheses

$^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{***}p < 0.001$

Source: Histoires de Vie, INSEE, 2003

Table 17: *Probit estimates of speaking in one's foreign mother tongue with their spouse, children, family or neighbors*

	All	Born after 1970	Born before 1970
Country of origin			
France	Reference	Reference	Reference
South Europe 1st generation	0.672***		0.653***
	(0.019)		(0.020)
Maghreb 1st generation	0.431***	0.846***	0.364***
	(0.021)	(0.024)	(0.023)
South Europe 2nd generation	0.282***	0.485***	0.227***
	(0.027)	(0.055)	(0.030)
Maghreb 2nd generation	0.250***	0.413***	0.117***
	(0.031)	(0.042)	(0.043)
Controls		Age, Gender, Education	
N	8403	1615	6777

Robust standard errors in parentheses

$^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{***}p < 0.001$

Source: Histoires de Vie, INSEE, 2003