The One-Child Policy and Household Savings*

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Abstract

We ask how much the advent of the ‘one-child policy’ can explain the sharp rise in China’s household saving rate, and its distinct age-specific saving behaviour in the last three decades. In a life-cycle model with endogenous fertility, intergenerational transfers and human capital accumulation, we show a macroeconomic and a microeconomic channel through which restrictions in fertility raise aggregate savings. The macro-channel operates through a shift in the composition of demographics and income across generations. The micro-channel alters saving behavior and education decisions at the individual level. Our quantitative OLG model calibrated to household level data shows that the policy can account for a third to 60% of the rise in aggregate saving rate. Equally important, it can capture much of the distinct shift in the level and shape of the age-saving profile observed from micro-level data estimates. We then use data on twins (born under the one child policy) as an out-of-sample check to our quantitative results; estimates on saving and education decisions are decidedly close between model and data.

Keywords: Life Cycle Consumption/Savings, Fertility, Intergenerational transfers.

JEL codes: E21, D10, D91

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1 Introduction

China’s household saving rate is staggeringly high in comparison to most other countries, and increasing at a rapid rate. Between 1982 and 2012, the average urban household saving rate rose steadily from 12.0% to 32.1%. By standard theories, households in a rapidly growing economy should borrow against future income to bring forward consumption, and therefore face a declining saving rate rather than a rise. The conundrum has been referred to by both academics and policymakers as a ‘Chinese Saving Puzzle’ (Modigliani and Cao (2004)), spurring many attempts to tackle it. This paper evaluates the contribution of the ‘one-child policy’ in accounting for this puzzle.

The ‘one-child policy’, introduced in the late 1970’s as part of China’s population control program, is a relatively under-studied event— with economic ramifications to a large extent unknown. A natural question that comes to mind is whether, and to what degree, it has impacted the national saving rate. That concomitant shifts in demographic compositions— of young workers, middle-aged savers and old dissavers—can directly influence the rate of saving at the aggregate level is well-understood through the classic formulations of the life-cycle motives for saving (Modigliani (1976)). Yet, fertility drops can also impinge on saving behavior at the household level. First, a reduction in expenditures on children increases available resources for savings. In a country where education expenditures can amount to 20% of total household expenditures per child, a drop in the number of children can make a sizeable difference. Second, in a society where intergenerational transfers from children to parents are a primary means of old-age support, the reduction in the number of offspring may considerably affect saving decisions for retirement.

This paper formally analyses the impact of the one child policy on saving decisions and human capital accumulation. A key goal is to quantify its impact, and compare model predictions with data estimates. At the same time exploring the policy’s effect on the aggregate saving rate, we discipline our model at the microeconomic level—by examining the implied saving behaviour across age groups.

Our conceptual framework incorporates two new elements to the standard lifecycle model: intergenerational transfers and human capital accumulation. Agents make decisions on the number of children to bear, the level of human capital to endow them, and on how much to save for retirement. An exogenous reduction in fertility lowers total expenditures spent on children and raises household savings (the ‘expenditure channel’); this holds notwithstanding a substitution of ‘quantity’ for ‘quality’— through a rise in education investments in the only child. The rise in the child’s future wages owing to human capital accumulation is not enough to compensate for the overall reduction in transfers that parents receive when retired. Parents thus have to save more in anticipation of lower future transfers from children (the ‘transfer channel’). These forces constitute the basic micro-channel through which fertility controls affect savings behaviour. In addition, the macro-channel operates through shifting demographic compositions and income compositions across age-groups. We later show that quantitatively, the micro-channel is significantly more important than the macro-channel conventionally emphasized. Thus, in accounting for the demographic impact on saving rate, household-level behaviour appears to be crucial. The inherent tractability of the theoretical model lays bare these fundamental mechanisms, and permits a precise decomposition of the policy’s effect into the micro- and macro-channels. The theory also shows that under certain conditions, one can identify the micro-channel through a cross-sectional comparison of twin-households and only-child households. This forms the
basis of our later empirical analysis and counterfactual exercise.

Our second contribution is to develop a quantitative model that can be calibrated to micro-level Chinese data. We simulate the one child policy in our model and compare model-predicted age-savings profiles and aggregate household savings to the data. The model captures a large part of the change in these profile over the period 1982-2009. It also imputes about a third and at most 60% of the rise in aggregate household saving rate to the one-child policy—depending on the natural rate of fertility that would have prevailed.

Above and beyond evaluating the policy’s aggregate effects, we believe that disciplining the model at the micro-level is essential. For one, the one-child policy can affect the saving behaviour of optimising individuals at different stages of their lifecycle—and not just of middle-aged parents. Second, recent studies (Song and Yang (2011) and Chamon and Prasad (2011)) have noted some peculiar patterns of saving behaviour across age groups in the last two decades in China. In particular, the saving rate of the young workers rose faster than the saving rate of the middle-aged over this period. Though seemingly paradoxical, it is in fact consistent with our (modified) lifecycle model. A standard OLG model without old-age support from children, on the other hand, features only the expenditure channel and falls significantly short of matching the evolution of age saving patterns as well as aggregate savings. The ability to match these micro-evidence on saving behavior across generations gives further credence to the model’s macroeconomic implications. In this sense, a distinguishing feature of our paper, and one that sets it apart from the rest of the literature, is our endeavor to bridge the micro-level approach with the macro-level approach in linking demographics to savings. Works such as Modigliani and Cao (2004), Horioka and Wan (2007), Curtis, Lugauer, and Mark (2011) find ample evidence supporting the link between demographics and savings at the aggregate level, but meet difficulty when confronting micro-data.

We then conduct a ‘twin experiment’ in our quantitative model and confront the outcomes with micro data. The birth of twins under the one child policy can be largely seen as an exogenous deviation to fertility—thereby serving as a reasonable instrument and an ‘out-of-sample’ test for the quantitative performance of the model insofar as the micro-channel is concerned. We find that the impact of an additional child as implied by the model is very close to data estimates based on twin observations: in the data, twin households are estimated to save on average 6-7 percentage points less (as a % of income) than only-child households; while overall education expenditures (as a % of wage income) are about 6 percentage points higher in twin households, education expenditures per child are about 2.5 percentage points less on twins than on an only child. The proximity of these empirical findings to model estimates suggests reasonable quantitative predictability of our mechanism. Based on these empirical findings, we can perform a counterfactual ‘two-children policy’, and compute the aggregate saving rate that would have prevailed under this policy. The answer can be deduced from the data with twin observations under the condition that the first-order effects of having twins are arguably not too different from having two children sequentially. According to our empirical estimates, the aggregate saving rate would have risen by about 6.5% percentage points less than the 20 percentage point rise that China had witnessed between 1982-2009. This estimate is fairly close to the model-implied counterfactual and provide a lower bound of the policy’s impact on aggregate savings if one believes that natural fertility had been above two without fertility restrictions. We also
find that the micro channel is significantly more important than the standard macro-channels in its quantitative contributions—accounting for two-thirds of the total impact of the one-child policy on the aggregate saving rate.

**Related literature.** Our paper relates to and complements other works aimed at understanding China’s perplexingly high national household saving rate in recent years. Storesletten and Zilibotti (2013) provides an exposition of the transformation of the Chinese society and the related saving puzzle. Some compelling explanations of the puzzle include: (1) precautionary savings (Blanchard and Giavazzi (2005), Chamon and Prasad (2010) and Wen (2011)); (2) demographic structural changes (Modigliani and Cao (2004), Curtis, Lugauer and Mark (2011), and Ge, Yang and Zhang (2012), Banerjee et al. (2013)); (3) income growth and credit constraints (Coeurdacier, Guibaud and Jin (2013)), potentially also in housing expenditures (Bussiere et al. (2013)); (4) changes in income profiles (Song and Yang (2010), Guo and Perri (2012)); (5) gender imbalances and competition in the marriage market (Wei and Zhang (2011)); and (6) habit formation (Carroll and Weil, 1994). Yang, Zhang and Zhou (2011) provide a thorough treatment of aggregate facts pertaining to China’s saving dynamics, and at the same time present the challenges that some of these theories face.

Compared to other works examining the relationship between fertility and savings, the joint determination of fertility and education decisions in analyzing saving is critical and has been largely absent. The nature of intergenerational altruism differs from that of Barro and Becker (1989)—in our view, the assumption that parents rear children to provide for old-age more aptly captures the family arrangements of a developing country like China than the notion that children’s lives are a continuation of their parents’.

Some of our empirical results resonate with those found in other papers, albeit using an entirely different dataset and/or identification strategy. Oliveira (2012) looks at twins at first birth observations (‘twin-first’) in Indonesian and Chinese households, and also finds that transfers from children are increasing in their quantity and quality. Banerjee et al. (2013) exploits the changes in the demographic structure induced by earlier partial fertility policies (prior to the one child policy) to examine the relationship between fertility and savings, and also find a negative causal relationship between fertility and savings, complementing our evidence based on ‘twins’. A key difference is that our paper focuses on the joint determination of fertility and education decisions, which is crucial for our results. Still, their empirical estimates on the impact of the ‘transfer channel’ on savings is quantitatively consistent with our model predictions for older cohorts.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides certain background information and facts that motivate some key assumptions underlying our framework. Section 3 provides a simple theory that links fertility, education and saving decisions in an overlapping generations model. Section 4 develops a calibrated quantitative model to simulate the impact of the policy on aggregate saving as well as age-saving profiles. The twin experiments and model counterfactuals are conducted in Section 5. Section 6 concludes and points to future directions of work.

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2 Motivation and Background

Based on various aggregate and household level data sources from China, this section provides stylized facts on (1) the background of the ‘one-child policy’ and its consequences on the Chinese demographic composition; (2) the direction and magnitude of intergenerational transfers—from children to parents in support of their old age, and from parents to children in financing their education. The quantitative relevance of these factors motivates the main assumptions underlying the theoretical framework. Micro and macro data sources used are described in Appendix B.

2.1 The One-Child Policy and the Chinese demographic transition

The one-child policy decreed in 1979 was intended to curb the population spiral that the Maoist pronatality agenda had precipitated. The consequence was a sharp drop in the nation-wide fertility rate—from 5.5 children per woman in 1965-1970 to 2.6 between 1980-1985. The policy was strictly enforced in urban areas and partially implemented in rural provinces. Figure 1 displays the evolution of the fertility rate for urban households, based on Census data: a bit above three (per household) before 1970, it started to decline during the period of 1972-1980—when the one-child policy was progressively implemented— and reached a value very close to one after its strict implementation by 1982.\(^2\)

Figure 1: Fertility in Chinese urban areas

Notes: Data source: Census, restricted sample where only urban households are considered.

\(^2\)In contrast to urban areas, rural provinces allowed the birth of two children in the event of a first-born girl. See also Banerjee et al. (2013) for a more detailed description of the progressive implementation of the policy in the 1970s.
Table 1: Demographic structure in China

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1970</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2050</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Share of young (age 0-20/Total Population)</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of middle-aged (age 30-60/Total Population)</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of elderly (age above 60/Total Population)</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median age</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>48.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fertility (children per women, urban areas)</td>
<td>3.18 (1965-70)</td>
<td>1.04 (2004-09)</td>
<td>- n/a -</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: UN World Population Prospects (2011).

Binding fertility constraints is a clear imperative for the purpose of our study. Household-level data (Urban Household Survey, UHS) reveals a strict enforcement of the policy for urban households, although to a much less extent for rural households: over the period 2000-2009, 96% of urban households that had children had only one child.\(^3\) Urban households and their saving behavior are therefore a natural focal point in our empirical analysis. It is important to note that the rise in savings in China is mostly driven by urban households, which account for 82% of the increase between 1982-2012.\(^4\)

The demographic structure evolved accordingly, ensuing fertility controls (Table 1). Some prominent patterns are: (1) a sharp rise in the median age— from 19.7 years in 1970 to 34.5 years in 2010; (2) a rapid decline in the share of young individuals (ages 0-20) from 51% to 27% over the period, and (3) a corresponding increase in the share of middle-aged population (ages 30-60). While the share of the young is expected to drop further until 2050, the share of the older population (above 60) will increase sharply only after 2010— when the generation of the only-child ages. In other words, the ‘one-child policy’ leads first to a sharp fall in the share of young individuals relative to middle-aged adults, followed by a sharp increase in the share of the elderly only one generation later.

### 2.2 Intergenerational Transfers

**Old-age support.** Intergenerational transfers from children to elderly are the bedrock of the Chinese family and society. Beyond cultural norms, it is also stipulated by Constitutional law: “children who have come to age have the duty to support and assist their parents” (article 49). Failure in this responsibility may even result in law suits. According to Census data in 2005, family support is the main source of income for more than half of the elderly (65+) urban population (Figure 2, left panel). From the China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study (CHARLS), individuals of ages 45-65 in 2011 expect this pattern to continue in the coming years: half expect transfers from their children to

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\(^3\)Some urban households had more than one child. If we abstract from the birth of twins, accounting for about 1% of households, the remaining 3% households may include households of minority ethnicities (and thus not subject to the policy)—accounting for a sufficiently small portion to be discarded.

\(^4\)Urban households’ average saving rate grew by about 20 percentage points, whereas rural households’ average saving rate grew by 6 percentage points (from 18.5% to 25.4%). Source: CEIC using Urban Household Survey (UHS) and Rural Household Survey (RHS).
constitute the main source of income for old age (Figure 2, right panel).

Figure 2: Main Source of Livelihood for the Elderly (65+) in Cities

Census 2005
Main source of livelihood (65y+)

Charls 2011 - Expectations of old-age support (45-65y)

Notes: Left panel, Census (2005). Right panel, CHARLS (2011), urban households, whole sample of adults between 45-65 (answer to the question: Whom do you think you can rely on for old-age support?).

Table 2: Transfers towards elderly: Descriptive Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number of households</th>
<th>Average number of adult children (25+)</th>
<th>Share living with adult children</th>
<th>Incidence of positive net transfers</th>
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<td></td>
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<td>- from adult children to parents</td>
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<td>65%</td>
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<td>- from parents to adult children</td>
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<td>4%</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Net transfers in % of parent’s pre-transfer income</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- All parents</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>28%</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Transfer receivers only</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>47%</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Of which households with:</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- One or two children</td>
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<td></td>
<td>10.5%</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Three children</td>
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<td></td>
<td>34.6%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Four children</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>45.9%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Above Five children</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>69.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Data source: CHARLS (2008). Restricted sample of urban households with a respondent/spouse of at least 60 years of age with at least one surviving adult children aged 25 or older. Transfers is defined as the sum of regular and non-regular financial transfers in yuan. Net Transfers are transfers from children to parents less the transfers received by children.

CHARLS provides further detailed data on intergenerational transfers in 2008 for two provinces: Zhejiang (a prosperous coastal province) and Gansu (a poor inland province). For the purpose of
our study, we restrict the sample to urban households in which at least one member (respondent or spouse) is older than 60 years of age. Old age support can take on broadly two forms: financial transfers (‘direct’ transfers) and ‘indirect’ transfers in the form of co-residence or other in-kind benefits. According to Table 2, 45% of the elderly reside with their children in urban households. Positive (net) transfers from adult children to parents occur in 65% of households and are large in magnitude—constituting a significant share of old-age income of on average 28% of all elderly’s pre-transfer income (and up to 47% if one focuses on the sample of transfer receivers). Table 2 also shows that the average transfers (as a % of pre-transfer income) are increasing in the number of children. The flip side of the story is that restrictions in fertility will therefore likely reduce the amount of transfers conferred to the elderly. This facts bears the central assumption underlying our theoretical framework.

Figure 3: Education Expenditures by Age (% of total expenditures)

Education expenditures per only child as a % of total household expenditures

Notes: Data source: UHS (2006) and RUMiCI (2008). Samples are restricted to urban households with an only child. This graph plots the average education expenditure (as a share of total expenditures) by the age of the only child.

Education expenditures. An important feature of our theory is that education expenditures for children are important for understanding the lifecycle saving patterns across age-groups and over time, following fertility changes. Education expenses are a prominent source of transfers from parents towards their children according to Urban Household Surveys (UHS) in 2006 and RUMiCI in
Restricting our attention to families with an only child, Figure 3 displays the share of education expenditures (in total expenditures) in relation to the age of the child; it increases from roughly 10% when the child is below age 15 to up to 15-25% between the ages of 15 and 22. Data from the Chinese Household Income Project (CHIP) in 2002 (not displayed) provides some evidence on the relative importance of ‘compulsory’ and ‘non-compulsory’ (or discretionary) education costs: not surprisingly, the bulk of expenditures (about 80%) incurred for children above 15 are considered as ‘non-compulsory’, whereas the opposite holds for children below 15. This evidence motivates our assumption that education costs are more or less a fixed-cost (per child) when it comes to young children, and a choice variable subject to a quantity-quality trade-off when it comes to older children.

Figure 4: Timing of intergenerational transfers

Notes: CHARLS (2008), whole sample of urban households. The left panel plots the average amount of net transfers of children to his/her parents (left axis) and the % of coresidence (right axis) by the average age of child. The right panel plots the average amount of net transfers received by parents from their children (left axis) and the % of coresidence (right axis) by the average age of parents.

Timing of transfers from children to parents. The timing and direction of transfers — paid and received at various ages of adulthood— are reported in CHARLS (2008) and guide the assumptions adopted by the quantitative model. Figure 4 (left panel) displays the evolution of the average net

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5We use as a robustness check the alternative dataset —the Chinese Household Income Project (CHIP)— in 2002, which yields similar estimates albeit slightly smaller in magnitude.
transfers of children to parents (in monetary values; left axis) as a function of the (average) age of children. The right panel displays the net transfers received by parents as a function of their age. Observing the left panel, one can mark that net transfers are on average negative at young ages (children receiving transfers from parents), and increases sharply at the age of 25. This pattern accords with the notion that education investment is the main form of transfers towards children. After this age, children confer increasing amounts of transfers towards their parents—received by parents upon retirement (right panel). If co-residence (right axis) is also considered as a form of transfers, a similar pattern emerges: children leave the parental household upon reaching adulthood (left panel). When parents reach above 60, the degree of co-residence no longer falls with parental age, remaining around 40–50% as parents return to live with their children (right panel).

3 Theoretical Analysis

We develop a tractable multi-period overlapping generations model with intergenerational transfers, endogenous fertility and human capital accumulation. The parsimonious model yields a semi-closed form solution that serves two main purposes. First, it reveals the fundamental channels driving the fertility-saving relationship. Second, the model motivates our empirical strategy in showing how one can identify the impact of the one child policy on human capital accumulation and savings through a cross-sectional comparison between two-children (twin) households and only-child households. A quantitative version of the model developed in the subsequent section gives rise to a more detailed individual age-saving profile to which we compare the data, although the main mechanisms are elucidated in the following model.

3.1 Model

3.1.1 Set-up.

Consider an overlapping generations economy in which agents live for four periods, characterized by: childhood ($k$), youth ($y$), middle-age ($m$), and old-age ($o$). The measure of total population $N_t$ at date $t$ comprises the four co-existing generations: $N_t = N_{k,t} + N_{y,t} + N_{m,t} + N_{o,t}$.

An individual born in period $t-1$ does not make decisions on his consumption in childhood, which is assumed to be proportional to parental income. The agent supplies inelastically one unit of labor in youth and in middle-age, and earns a wage rate $w_{y,t}$ and $w_{m,t+1}$, which is used, in each period, for consumption and asset accumulation $a_{y,t}$ and $a_{m,t+1}$. At the end of period $t$, the young agent makes the decision on the number of children $n_t$ to bear. In middle-age, in $t+1$, the agent chooses the amount of human capital $h_{t+1}$ to endow to each of his children, and at the same time transfers a combined amount of $T_{m,t+1}$ to his $n_t$ children and parents—to augment human capital of the former, and consumption of the latter. In old-age, the agent consumes all available resources, which is financed by gross returns on accumulated assets and transfers from children $T_{o,t+2}$. A consumer maximizes the life-time utility which includes the consumption $c_{\gamma,t}$ at each age $\gamma$ and the benefits from having $n_t$ children:

$$U_t = \log(c_{y,t}) + \nu \log(n_t) + \beta \log(c_{m,t+1}) + \beta^2 \log(c_{o,t+2})$$
where \( v > 0 \) reflects the preference for children, and \( 0 < \beta < 1 \). The sequence of budget constraints for an agent born in \( t - 1 \) obeys

\[
\begin{align*}
    c_{y,t} + a_{y,t} &= w_{y,t} \\
    c_{m,t+1} + a_{m,t+1} &= w_{m,t+1} + Ra_{m,t} + T_{m,t+1} \\
    c_{o,t+2} &= Ra_{m,t+1} + T_{o,t+2}.
\end{align*}
\]

(1)

Agents lend (or borrow) through bank deposits, earning a constant and exogenously-given gross interest rate \( R \).\(^6\)

Because of parental investment in education, the individual born in period \( t - 1 \) enters the labor market with an endowment of human capital \( h_t \), which, along with experience \( e < 1 \), and a deterministic level of economy-wide productivity \( z_t \), determines the wage rates:

\[
\begin{align*}
    w_{y,t} &= e z_t h_t^\alpha \\
    w_{m,t+1} &= z_{t+1} h_t^\alpha.
\end{align*}
\]

The cost of raising kids are assumed to be paid by parents in middle-age, in period \( t + 1 \), for a child born at the end of period \( t \). The total cost of raising \( n_t \) children is proportional to current wages, \( n_t \phi(h_{t+1}) w_{m,t+1} \), where \( \phi(h) = \phi_0 + \phi_h h \), \( \phi_0 > 0 \) and \( \phi_h > 0 \). The ‘mouth to feed’ cost, including consumption and compulsory education expenditures (per child), is a fraction \( \phi_0 \) of the parents’ wage rate; the discretionary education cost \( \phi_h h_{t+1} \) is increasing in the level of human capital chosen by the parents.\(^7\)

Transfers made to the middle-aged agent’s parents amount to a fraction \( \psi n_{t-1}^{\psi-1}/\psi \) of current wages \( w_{m,t+1} \), with \( \psi > 0 \) and \( 0 < \psi \leq 1 \). This fraction is decreasing in the number of siblings—to capture the possibility of free-riding among siblings sharing the burden of transfers. We treat these transfers as an institutional norm in China; children supporting their parents are not only socially expected, but in fact stipulated by law. The assumed functional form for transfers is analytically convenient, but (i) its main properties are tightly linked to the data and therefore somewhat justifiable. For instance, as we show in Section 4.2, transfers given by each offspring are indeed decreasing in the number of offspring, and the income elasticity of transfers is close to 1; (ii) these properties are also qualitatively retained with endogenous transfers but at the expense of tractability and facility of parametrization.\(^8\)

The combined amount of transfers made by the middle-aged agent in period \( t + 1 \) to his children

\(^6\)This is analogous to a model in which the central bank acts an intermediary to channeling household savings abroad. This modelling choice is adopted for analytical tractability and for the purpose of distilling the most essential forces governing the fertility-saving relationship without undue complication of the model. Omitting capital accumulation in this model severs the feedback effect of interest rates onto fertility. However, the focus of our analysis on an exogenous constraint on fertility mitigates the importance of this effect. An extension of the model with endogenous interest rate determination and capital accumulation is taken up in Coeurdacier, Guibaud and Jin (2013 b).

\(^7\)This is a key departure from the quantity-quality trade-off models of Becker and Lewis (1973), later adopted by Oliveira (2012). They assume that costs to quality are independent of the level of quality.

\(^8\)As in Boldrin and Jones (2002), we furthermore developed a model in which transfers are endogenously determined—where children place a weight on parents’ old-age utility of consumption. The main properties still hold in the steady-state: transfers are decreasing in the number of offspring, and the income elasticity of transfers is 1. Although it is true that parents may desire to undertake less saving knowing that more saving begets less transfers from children, this effect amounts to a reduced discount rate. It does not affect the main result that a fertility drop leads to higher savings.
and parents thus satisfy
\[ T_{m,t+1} = - \left( n_t \phi(h_{t+1}) + \psi \frac{n_{t-1}^{\omega-1}}{\omega} \right) w_{m,t+1}. \]

In old-age, agents become receivers of transfers from a total of \( n_t \) number of children:
\[ T_{o,t+2} = \psi \frac{n_t^{\omega}}{\omega} w_{m,t+2}. \]

### 3.1.2 Consumption, fertility and human capital decisions

**Consumption decisions.** Optimal consumption can be solved given fertility and human capital decisions. The following assumption,

**Assumption 1** *The young are subject to a credit constraint, binding in all periods:*

\[ a_{g,t} = -\theta \frac{w_{m,t+1}}{R}, \quad (3) \]

which specifies that the young can borrow up to a constant fraction \( \theta \) of the present value of future wage income. For a given \( \theta \), the constraint is more likely to bind if productivity growth is high (relative to \( R \)) and the experience parameter \( e \) is low. This assumption is necessary for obtaining a realistic saving behavior of the young—one that avoids a counterfactual sharp borrowing that emerges under fast growth and a steep income profile (see also Coeurdacier, Guibaud and Jin (2013)).

Assumption 3 and the absence of bequests mean that the only individuals that optimize their savings are the middle-aged. The assumption of log utility implies that the optimal consumption of the middle-age is a constant fraction of the present value of lifetime resources, which consist of disposable income—of what remains after the repayment of debt from the previous period—and the present value of transfers to be received in old-age, less current transfers to children and parents:

\[ c_{m,t+1} = \frac{1}{1 + \beta} \left[ \left( 1 - \theta - n_t \phi(h_{t+1}) - \psi \frac{n_{t-1}^{\omega-1}}{\omega} \right) w_{m,t+1} + \psi \frac{n_t^{\omega}}{\omega} w_{m,t+2} \right]. \quad (4) \]

It follows from Eq. 1 that the optimal asset holding of a middle-aged individual is

\[ a_{m,t+1} = \frac{\beta}{1 + \beta} \left[ \left( 1 - \theta - n_t \phi(h_{t+1}) - \psi \frac{n_{t-1}^{\omega-1}}{\omega} \right) w_{m,t+1} - \frac{\psi}{\beta R} \frac{n_t^{\omega}}{\omega} w_{m,t+2} \right]. \quad (5) \]

Eq. 5 illuminates the link between fertility \( n_t \) and savings: parents with more children accumulate less wealth because they have less available resources for savings (term \( n_t \phi(h_{t+1}) \)) and because they expect larger transfers (last term).

The old, by consuming all resources, enjoy

\[ c_{o,t+2} = \frac{\beta}{1 + \beta} \left[ R \left( 1 - \theta - n_t \phi(h_{t+1}) - \psi \frac{n_{t-1}^{\omega-1}}{\omega} \right) w_{m,t+1} + \psi \frac{n_t^{\omega}}{\omega} w_{m,t+2} \right]. \]
Fertility and Human Capital. Fertility decisions hinge on equating the marginal utility of bearing an additional child compared to the net marginal cost of raising the child:

$$\frac{v}{n_t} = \frac{\beta}{c_{m,t+1}} \left( \phi(h_{t+1})w_{m,t+1} - \frac{\psi n_t^{\omega-1} w_{m,t+2}}{R} \right)$$

$$= \frac{\beta}{c_{m,t+1}} \left( \phi(h_{t+1}) - \mu_{t+1} \psi n_t^{\omega-1} \left( \frac{h_{t+1}}{h_t} \right)^\alpha \right) w_{m,t+1}, \quad (6)$$

where $\mu_{t+1} \equiv z_{t+2}/R z_{t+1} \equiv (1 + g_{z,t+1})/R$ is the productivity growth-interest rate ratio. The right-hand side is the net cost, in terms of the consumption good, of having an additional child. The net cost is the current marginal cost of rearing a child, $\partial T_{m,t+1}/\partial n_t$ less the present value of the benefit from receiving transfers next period from an additional child, $\partial T_{o,t+2}/\partial n_t$. In this context, children are analogous to investment goods—and incentives to procreate depend on the factor $\mu_{t+1}$—productivity growth relative to the gross interest rate. Higher productivity growth raises the number of children—by raising future benefits relative to current costs. But saving in assets is an alternative form of investment, which earns a gross rate of return $R$. Thus, the decision to have children as an investment opportunity depends on this relative return.⁹

The optimal choice on the children’s endowment of human capital $h_{t+1}$ is determined by

$$\frac{\psi n_t^\omega}{R} \left( \frac{\partial w_{m,t+2}}{\partial h_{t+1}} \right) = \phi_h n_t w_{m,t+1},$$

where the (discounted) marginal gains of having children more educated and thus providing more old-age support is equalized to the marginal cost of further educating them. Using Eq. 2, the above expression yields the optimal choice for $h_{t+1}$, given $n_t$ and the parent’s own human capital $h_t$, which is predetermined:

$$h_{t+1} = \left[ \frac{\psi \alpha}{\omega \phi_h h_t^\omega n_t^{\omega-\omega}} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\omega}} \cdot \mu_{t+1} \equiv (1 + g_{z,t+1})/R \quad \text{—which gauges the relative benefits of investing in children. Greater altruism of children for parents (high $\psi$) increases parental investment in them. Higher marginal cost of education $\phi_h$ (parents’ opportunity cost of $h_t$) reduces human capital accumulation.}

The optimal number of children $n_t$, combining Eq. 4, 6 and 7, satisfies, with $\lambda = \frac{v + \omega \beta (1 + \beta)}{\omega v + \alpha \beta (1 + \beta)}$:

$$n_t = \left( \frac{v}{\beta (1 + \beta) + v} \right) \left( \frac{1 - \theta - \psi n_t^{\omega-1}}{\phi_0 + \phi_h (1 - \lambda) n_{t+1}} \right) \cdot \phi_h(1 - \lambda) h_{t+1}. \quad (8)$$

---

⁹ All else constant, the relationship between fertility and interest rates is negative—as children are considered as investment goods. This relationship is the opposite of the positive relationship in a dynastic model (Barro and Becker (1989)).
Equations 7 and 8 are two equations that describe the evolution of the two key endogenous variables of the economy \(\{n_t, h_{t+1}\}\).

Eq. 8 elucidates the equilibrium relationship between the number of children to bear \(n_t\) in relation to the amount of education to provide them \(h_{t+1}\). There are two competing effects governing this relationship: the first effect is that higher levels of education per child raises transfers per child, thus motivating parents to have more children. The second effect is that greater education, on the other hand, raises the cost per child, and reduces the incentives to have more children. The first effect dominates if diminishing returns to transfers is relatively weak compared to diminishing returns to education, \(\lambda > 1\)—in which case the relationship between \(n_t\) and \(h_{t+1}\) is positive. The second effect dominates when diminishing returns to education are relatively weak, \(\lambda < 1\), and the relationship between \(n_t\) and \(h_{t+1}\) is negative. The two effects cancel out when \(\lambda = 1\), and decisions on \(n_t\) become independent of human capital decisions.

### 3.1.3 Steady-state analysis

In the steady state, \(\mu_t = \mu = \frac{1+g}{R}\), \(h_{t+1} = h_t = h_{ss}\) and \(n_t = n_{t-1} = n_{ss}\). Equations (7) and (8) are, in the long run:

\[
\frac{n_{ss}}{1 - \theta - \psi \frac{n_{ss}^{\infty - 1}}{\varpi}} = \left(\frac{v}{\beta(1 + \beta) + v}\right) \left(\frac{1}{\varphi_0 + \varphi_h (1 - \lambda) h_{ss}}\right) \quad \text{(NN)}
\]

\[
h_{ss} = \left(\frac{\alpha \psi}{\varphi_h \mu}\right) \frac{n_{ss}^{\infty - 1}}{\varpi}. \quad \text{(QQ)}
\]

Figure 5 depicts graphically the two curves for an illustrative calibration. The (NN) curve describes the response of fertility to higher education. Its positive slope (for \(\lambda > 1\)) captures the greater incentive of bearing children when they have higher levels of human capital. The downward sloping curve (QQ) shows the combination of \(n\) and \(h\) that satisfies the quantity/quality trade-off in children.

**Assumption 2** Henceforward, parameters are restricted such that \(\varpi \geq \alpha\), implying \(\lambda > 1\).

Assumption 2 ensures model convergence to a stable steady-state—avoiding divergent dynamics whereby parents constantly reduce their children’s education for cost reduction and increase their number (or vice-versa). This leads to the following proposition:

**Proposition 1** There is a unique steady-state for the number of children \(n_{ss} > \frac{\psi}{(\beta(1 + \beta) + v)\varphi_0}\) and their education choice \(h_{ss} > 0\) to which the dynamic model defined by equations 7 and 8 converges. Also, comparative statics yield

\[
\frac{\partial n_{ss}}{\partial \mu} > 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{\partial h_{ss}}{\partial \mu} > 0; \quad \frac{\partial n_{ss}}{\partial v} > 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{\partial h_{ss}}{\partial v} < 0; \quad \frac{\partial n_{ss}}{\partial \varphi_0} < 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{\partial h_{ss}}{\partial \varphi_0} > 0.
\]

**Proof:** See Appendix A.1.

The intuition behind these comparative statics is straightforward: higher productivity growth relative to the interest rate increases the incentives to invest in children, both in terms of quantity and
quality. A stronger preference towards children (or lower costs of raising them) makes parents willing to have more children, albeit less educated (lower "quality") ones.

Figure 5: Steady-State Human Capital and Fertility Determination

Notes: Steady-state, with an illustrative calibration using $\phi_0 = 0.1, \phi_h = 0.1, \psi = 0.2, \beta = 0.985$ per annum (0.75 over 20 years), $R = 4\%$ per annum, $g_z = 4\%$ (per annum), $\theta = 0, \omega = 0.7, \alpha = 0.4, \nu = 0.055$ set such that $n_{ss} = 3/2$ (3 children per households).

**Definition of Saving Rates.** The aggregate saving of the economy in period $t$, denoted as $S_t$, is the sum of the aggregate saving of each generation $\gamma = \{y, m, o\}$ coexisting in period $t$. Thus, $S_t \equiv \sum_{\gamma} S_{\gamma,t}$, where the overall savings of each generation $S_{\gamma,t}$ are by definition the change in asset holdings over a period with optimal asset holdings $a_{\gamma,t}$ given by Eq. 3 and Eq. 5: $S_{y,t} \equiv N_t^y a_{y,t}$, $S_{m,t} \equiv N_t^m (a_{m,t} - a_{y,t-1})$, and $S_{o,t} \equiv -N_t^o a_{m,t-1}$.

We define the individual saving rate $s_{\gamma,t}$ of cohort $\gamma$ to be the change in asset holdings over a period divided by the cohort’s corresponding labor income (for the young and middle-aged) or capital income (for the old):$^{10}$

$$s_{y,t} \equiv \frac{a_{y,t}}{w_{y,t}} \quad s_{m,t} \equiv \frac{a_{m,t} - a_{y,t-1}}{w_{m,t}} \quad s_{o,t} \equiv -\frac{a_{m,t-1}}{(R-1)a_{m,t-1}} = - \left( \frac{1}{R-1} \right).$$

$^{10}$For analytical convenience, debt repayments for middle-aged and transfers are not included in the disposable income of the relevant generations. Results do not alter much except including more cumbersome expressions.
The aggregate saving rate, defined as \( s_t \equiv S_t / Y_t \) (where \( Y_t \) denotes aggregate labor income), can thus be decomposed as follows:

\[
s_t = s_{y,t} \left( \frac{n_tw_{y,t}}{y_t} \right) + s_{m,t} \left( \frac{w_{m,t}}{y_t} \right) + s_{o,t} \left( \frac{(R - 1) a_{m,t-1}}{n_{t-1}y_t} \right),
\]

where aggregate labor income per middle-aged household, \( y_t = Y_t/N_{m,t} \), is introduced for convenience.

Steady-State Aggregate Savings. Long-run analysis helps gain intuition on how exogenous changes in long-run fertility impacts the aggregate saving rate. These exogenous changes can be brought about by a change in the preference for children \( \nu \), since it alters the birth rate but does not exert any impact on savings other than through its effect on \( n_{ss} \). The saving rate, decomposed into the contribution of contemporaneous generations, is, in the long-run version of Eq. 9:

\[
s = \frac{n_{ss}e}{(1 + n_{ss}e)} \left( \frac{-\theta \mu}{s_y} \right) + \frac{1}{1 + n_{ss}e} \left( \frac{\kappa(n_{ss}) + \theta}{R} \right) s_m - \frac{\kappa(n_{ss})(R - 1)}{n_{ss}(1 + n_{ss}e)(1 + g_z)} \left( \frac{1}{R - 1} \right),
\]

where \( \kappa(n_{ss}) \equiv a_{m,t}/w_{m,t} \) is given by the steady-state equivalent of Eq. 5:

\[
\kappa(n_{ss}) = \frac{\beta}{1 + \beta} \left( 1 - \theta \right) - \left( \phi_0 n_{ss} + \alpha \psi \mu n_{ss} \right) \frac{n_{ss}}{\varpi} \left( \text{cost of children} \right) - \psi n_{ss} \frac{\varpi - 1}{\varpi} \left( \text{cost of parents} \right) + \psi \mu n_{ss} \frac{\varpi}{\beta} \left( \text{benefits from children} \right),
\]

using \( n_{ss}h_{ss} = \alpha \psi \mu n_{ss} \frac{\varpi}{\varpi} \) from Eq. 7.

Micro-Economic Channel. The above expression illuminates the three channels through which a reduction in long-run fertility affects optimal asset holdings of a middle-aged individual, and therefore his saving behavior. The first channel ('expenditure channel') is to reduce the total cost of children—both because there are 'fewer mouths to feed' (\( \phi_0 n_{ss} \) falls) and because total (discretionary) education costs have fallen in spite of the rise in human capital per child (\( \alpha \psi \mu n_{ss} \frac{\varpi}{\varpi} \) falls). The second effect comes through the impact on the 'cost of parents'—the amount of transfers given to the middle-aged individual’s parents (\( \psi n_{ss} \frac{\varpi - 1}{\varpi} \) rises). As there are fewer siblings among whom the individual can share the burden, total transfers to parents rise, thus reducing the saving rate. The third channel is

\[11\] The total cost of education is \( n_{ss}h_{ss} \), which is increasing in \( n_{ss} \). In other words, the rise in human capital per child rises by less than the fall in the number of children. This is because the overall reduction in transfers coming from fewer children also reduces incentives to educate heavily in them.
through the expected transfers made by the children (the term $\psi \mu n_{ss}^\omega / (\beta \omega)$). With a reduction in fertility, the overall amount of transfers received from children falls when old—despite higher human capital per child. Lower expected transfers in turn raises the need to save (the ‘transfer channel’). The overall micro-economic effect of a reduction in $n_{ss}$ can be summarized by

$$
\kappa'(n_{ss}) = \frac{\beta}{1 + \beta} \left[ -\phi_0 - \frac{(1 + \alpha \beta)\psi}{\beta} \mu n_{ss}^\omega - 1 + \frac{\psi(1 - \omega)}{\omega} n_{ss}^\omega - 2 \right].
$$

The first two terms are negative and corresponds to the ‘expenditure’ and ‘transfer’ channels. The third terms offsets partially the first two and comes from higher burden for middle-aged due to fewer siblings. One can see that under the (weak) assumption that $\mu n_{ss}(1 + \alpha \beta)/\beta > (1 - \omega)/\omega$, a fall in the steady-state number of children raises the steady-state saving rate of the middle-aged. As $\omega$ approaches 1, the transfers made to the parents are independent of the number of siblings, and a fall in $n_{ss}$ does not reduce saving owing to greater transfers to parents—that is, the third term disappears. In this case, $\kappa'(n_{ss})$ is unambiguously negative. Moreover, along the transition path, an exogenous change in fertility will unambiguously increase the saving rate of the first generation of ‘treated’ middle-age parents—indeed, these are agents who do not need to reduce savings in order to support their parents owing to the many siblings with whom they can share that burden.

**Macro-Economic Channel.** The macro-economic channels comprise of changes in the composition of population, and the composition of income attributed to each generation. This is evident by examining the overall impact of $n_{ss}$ on aggregate saving rate, given by Eq. 10:

$$\frac{\partial s}{\partial n_{ss}} = e \left( \frac{\kappa'(n_{ss})}{1 + n_{ss}e} \right) \cdot s - \kappa'(n_{ss}) \frac{s}{n_{ss} (1 + n_{ss}e) (1 + g_z)} + \frac{1}{1 + n_{ss}e} \left[ \theta e \mu + \frac{\kappa(n_{ss})}{n_{ss}^2 (1 + g_z)} \right].$$

which shows that apart from the micro-economic channel (the last term of the equation)—changes to aggregate saving occur through macro-level compositional changes. The first compositional change is an ‘income composition effect’: a reduction in fertility reduces the proportion of the young’s contribution to aggregate income, $n_{ss}e$. Thus, more aggregate income attributed to the middle-aged savers of the economy and less to the young borrowers tend to raise the aggregate saving rate. On the other hand, when $\kappa'(n_{ss}) < 0$ is satisfied under the aforementioned weak assumption, lower fertility increases the interest payments to old dissavers (since aggregate wealth over income in the economy increases) and thus their share in total income—hence reducing the aggregate saving rate. This effect is therefore ambiguous.

The second aggregate compositional effect is demographic. A reduction in $n_{ss}$ reduces the proportion of young borrowers (relative to the middle-aged)—thus tending to raise aggregate saving rate—but also increases the proportion of the old dissavers (relative to the middle-aged)—thus tending to reduce it. The overall effect of population compositional changes is also ambiguous. Again, it is important to note that along the transition path towards a steady state with lower fertility, both the income and
population composition effects will initially raise the aggregate saving rate unambiguously. The reason is that the proportion of the young (relative to the middle-age) immediately falls but the proportion of the dependent elderly will take one generation to increase. Likewise, the share of the young’s income (relative to that of the middle-aged) falls before the share of income of the old (relative to that of the middle-aged) rises.

3.2 The One-Child Policy

We examine the theoretical impact of the one-child policy on the aggregate saving rate, by comparing the implied saving rate to the saving rate under unconstrained fertility. We then show theoretically how one can identify the effect of the one-child policy on individual saving behavior (the micro-economic channel) by using twin births as an exogenous deviation from the policy. Conditions under which one can infer a lower bound for the micro-channel impact of the policy on the aggregate saving rate immediately follows.

Fertility constraint. The government is assumed to enforce a law that compels each agent to have up to a number $n_{max}$ of children over a certain period $[t_0, t_0 + T]$ with $T \geq 1$. In the case of the one-child policy, the maximum number of children per individual is $n_{max} = 1/2$. We now examine the transitory dynamics of the key variables following the implementation of the policy, starting from an initial steady-state of unconstrained fertility characterized by $\{n_{t_0-1}; h_{t_0}\}$.

3.2.1 Human Capital and Aggregate Savings

The additional constraint $n \leq n_{max}$ is now added to the original individual optimization problem. Under constrained fertility, one needs to amend Assumption 2 for the model to converge:

Assumption 3 Henceforward, parameters are restricted such that: $\varpi \geq 1/2 > \alpha$.

Assumption 3 puts an upper bound on the parameter $\alpha$, which limits the returns to education. This is necessary to avoid divergent paths of human capital accumulation where higher education increases expected transfers and gives further incentives to raise education without any offsetting feedback on fertility decisions. Note that the assumed values for $\alpha$ are well within the range of the macro literature (Mankiw et al. (1992); see also survey by Sianesi and van Reenen (2000)).

In the interesting scenario in which the constraint is binding ($n_t = n_{max}$ for $t_0 \leq t \leq t_0 + T$), a byproduct of the policy is given by the following Lemma:

**Lemma 1:** As $T \to \infty$, human capital converges to a new (constrained) steady-state $h_{max}$ such that:

$$h_{max} = \left(\frac{\alpha \psi \phi}{\phi h \mu}\right)^{n_{max}} > h_{t_0}.$$  

**Proof:** See Appendix A.1.

The policy aimed at reducing the population inadvertently increases the level of per-capita human capital, thus moving the long-run equilibrium along the (QQ) curve, as shown in Figure 5.

Assuming constant productivity growth to interest rate ratio $\mu$, the impact of the one-child policy on the dynamics of the aggregate saving rate between $t_0$ and $t_0 + 1$ is given by the following Lemma:
Lemma 2: With binding fertility constraints in period \( t_0 \) \( (n_t_0 = n_{\text{max}}) \), the aggregate saving rate increases unambiguously over a generation:

\[
s_{t_0+1} - s_{t_0} > 0.
\]

Proof: See Appendix A.1.

The channels through which the fall in fertility increases the saving rate during the transition are the same micro and macro-channels analyzed before. However, the main difference is that the offsetting forces are not yet present during the one generation immediately following the policy implementation: income and population composition effects are attributed entirely to the proportional reduction in the young cohort (relative to the middle-aged); the reduction in fertility has not yet fed into an increase in the proportion of the dependent elderly (relative to the middle-aged). Moreover, the higher resources needed to support parents when children have fewer siblings in the steady-state does not affect the first generation of parents with an only child. Thus, all forces exert pressure on the saving rate in the same direction, and aggregate saving rate rises unambiguously in the period following the implementation of the policy.

3.2.2 Identification Through ‘Twins’

We next show theoretically how one can identify the microeconomic channel (over time) through a cross-sectional comparison between only-child households and twin-households. Proofs of these results are relegated to Appendix A.1. Consider the scenario in which some middle-aged individuals exogenously deviate from the one-child policy by having twins. The first result (and testable implication) is under Assumption 2:

Test 1: Quantity-Quality Tradeoff. Parents of twins devote less resources for education per-child but their overall education expenditures are higher:

\[
\frac{1}{2} < \left( \frac{h_{t_0+1}^{\text{twin}}}{{h}_{t_0+1}} \right) = \left( \frac{1}{2} \right)^{\frac{1-\varpi}{1-\alpha}} < 1. \tag{11}
\]

The quantity-quality trade-off driving human capital accumulation can be identified by comparing twins and an only-child. This ratio as measured by the data also provides some guidance on the relative strength of \( \varpi \) and \( \alpha \). Despite the tradeoff, the fall in human capital per capita is less than the increase in the number of children, so that total education costs still rise for twins.

Test 2: Identifying the micro-channel on savings. The micro-economic impact of having twins on the middle-age parent’s saving rate decisions comprise an ‘expenditure channel’ and a ‘transfer channel’. Parents of twins save less and the difference in the saving rate in the case of an only-child compared to twins in \( t_0 + 1 \) satisfies:

\[
\frac{s_{m,t_0+1} - s_{twin}^{m,t_0+1}}{s_{m,t_0}} = \frac{\beta}{1 + \beta} \left[ n_{\text{max}} \varphi_0 + \frac{(1 + \alpha \beta) \psi (1 + g_z)}{R \beta} \varpi n_{\text{max}} \left( \frac{h_{t_0+1}}{h_{t_0}} \right)^\alpha \left( 2^{\frac{\varpi - \alpha}{1-\alpha}} - 1 \right) \right] > 0.
\]
A Lower Bound for the Micro-Channel. Let us introduce $\Delta s_m = s_{m,t_0+1} - s_{m,t_0}$, the change in the saving rate of middle-aged parents one generation after the policy implementation (see Appendix A.1 for detailed expression of $\Delta s_m$). $\Delta s_m$ reflects the micro-economic impact on savings of moving from unconstrained fertility $n_{t_0-1}$ to $n_{max}$. One can estimate the micro-channel of the policy by comparing, in the cross-section, the saving behaviour of parents of twins versus parents of only child:

**Lemma 3:** If the fertility rate in absence of fertility controls is two children per household ($n_{t_0-1} = 2n_{max}$), then

$$\Delta s_m = s_{m,t_0+1} - s^{twin}_{m,t_0+1}.$$ 

**Proof:** See Appendix A.1.

If the initial unconstrained fertility is 2 children per household, we can identify precisely the micro-economic impact of the policy—by comparing the saving rate of a middle-aged individual with $n_{max}$ kids to one with $2n_{max}$ kids. We can also deduce a lower-bound estimate for the overall impact of the policy on the middle-aged’s saving rate—if the unconstrained fertility were greater than 2 (as is the case for China prior to the policy change). That is, if $n_{t_0-1} > 2n_{max}$, then

$$\Delta s_m > s_{m,t_0+1} - s^{twin}_{m,t_0+1}.$$ 

These theoretical results demonstrate that observations from twin-households can inform us of the impact of the one-child policy on saving behavior.

**Caveats.** The identification strategy based on twins coming out of our model relies on a set of important assumptions. Due to the timing and the presence of binding credit constraints, having two children that are expected or (non-expected) twins leads to identical savings and education decisions. There are also no inherent differences in the behavior of twin-households from other households prior to the policy implementation. Finally, our model relies on a representative household: if in China, some households can avoid the policy by manipulating fertility (having twins) and these households make different savings and education decisions than the average household, any empirical strategy based on twins would be biased. The validity of these assumptions is discussed in the empirical section (Section 5).

### 4 A Quantitative OLG Model

We develop and calibrate a multi-period quantitative model to household-level data. A reasonably parameterized model can assess the quantitative impact of the one-child policy on aggregate saving over the period 1982-2012. In addition, it is able to deliver a finer and more realistic age saving profile. The evolution of these profiles is a distinct implication of the model and can be confronted with the data.
4.1 Set-up and model dynamics

**Timing.** Agents now live for 8 periods, so that eight generations ($\gamma = \{1; 2; \ldots; 8\}$) coexist in the economy in each period. The timing of the events that take place over the lifecycle is similar to before: the agent is a child for the first two periods, accumulating human capital in the second period; a young worker in the third period, he makes fertility and education decisions at the end of this period. The agent then becomes a parent during periods 4-6, rearing and educating children while making transfers to his now elderly parents. Upon becoming old in periods 7 and 8, he finances consumption from previous savings and support from his children, and dies with certainty at the end of period 8, without leaving any bequests.

**Preferences.** Let $c_{\gamma,t}^i$ denote the consumption of of an individual aged $\gamma$ in period $t$, with $\gamma \in \{3, 4, \ldots, 8\}$. The lifetime utility of an agent born at $t-2$ and who enters the labor market at date $t$ is

$$U_t = v \log(n_t) + \sum_{\gamma=3}^{8} \beta^{\gamma-3} \log(c_{\gamma,t+\gamma-3}),$$

with $0 < \beta < 1$ and $v > 0$.

**Transfers and life income profile.** The functional form of transfers and the costs of rearing and educating children are retained from before, although the timing of expenditure outlays is more elaborate. Data reveals the timing and scale of these expenditure and transfers. Following empirical patterns, we assume that compulsory education costs are paid during $\gamma = \{4, 5\}$ and is a fraction $\phi_{\gamma} n_t$ of the agent’s wage income (for an agent entering the labor force at $t$). The discretionary education costs are born only at age $\gamma = \{5\}$ and are a fraction $\phi_{h} n_t$ of wages—corresponding to the fact that the bulk of ‘non-compulsory’ education costs is paid when the child is between the ages of 15 and 25—just before entering the labor market. Transfers to parents are made at age $\gamma = \{5, 6\}$.

Net transfers of an individual born in $t-2$ over his lifetime are thus:

$$T_{4,t+1} = -\phi_{4} n_t w_{4,t+1} - \left[ (\phi_{5} + \phi_{h} h_{t+1}) n_t + \psi_{n}^{\gamma_{t-1}} \right] w_{5,t+2}$$

$$T_{5,t+2} = -\psi_{n}^{\gamma_{t-1}} w_{6,t+3}$$

$$T_{6,t+3} = \psi_{n}^{\gamma_{t-1}} w_{7,t+4}; \quad T_{7,t+4} = \psi_{n}^{\gamma_{t-1}} w_{5,t+4}; \quad T_{8,t+5} = \psi_{n}^{\gamma_{t-1}} w_{6,t+5}.$$  

As before, an individual entering at date $t$ in the labor market with human capital $h_{t-2}$ earns $w_{\gamma,t+\gamma-3} = e_{\gamma,t+\gamma-3} z_{t+\gamma-3} h_{t-2}^{\alpha}$ for $\gamma = \{3, \ldots, 8\}$; $e_{\gamma,t}$, the age/experience aspect of the life income profile is potentially time-varying if growth is biased towards certain age-groups; $z_t$ represents aggregate productivity and is assumed to be growing at a constant rate of $z_{t+1}/z_t = 1 + g_z$, for simplicity. Figure C.1 in Appendix C summarises the timing and patterns of income flows, costs and transfers, at each age of the agent’s life.

\[12\] Also in line with the data is that the average age of parents giving first births at 28 (average over the period 1975-2005 from UHS).
We verify that the condition for the parameters is satisfied at every point along the equilibrium path in the simulations.

Fertility and human capital. The quantitative model, despite being more complex, yields a similar set of equations capturing the dynamics of fertility and human capital accumulation as in the simple model (see Appendix A.2 for a detailed derivation):

\[ a_{\gamma,t+\gamma-3} \geq -\theta \frac{w_{\gamma,t+\gamma-2}}{R} \text{ for } \gamma = \{3; \ldots; 8\}, \]

where \( a_{\gamma,t} \) denotes total asset accumulation by the end of period \( t \) for generation \( \gamma = \{3; \ldots; 8\} \). Parameters chosen for the age-income profile \( e_{\gamma,t} \), productivity growth \( g_z \), interest rate and discount factor (\( \beta \) and \( R \)) make the constraint binding only in the first period of working age (\( \gamma = 3 \)).

The sequence of budget constraints, for an individual born at \( t = 2 \) (and entering labor market at date \( t \)), are then:

\[
\begin{align*}
    c_{3,t} &= w_{3,t} + \theta \frac{w_{4,t+1}}{R} \\
    c_{4,t+1} + a_{4,t+1} &= w_{4,t+1}(1 - \theta) + T_{4,t+1} \\
    c_{\gamma,t+\gamma-3} + a_{\gamma,t+\gamma-3} &= w_{\gamma,t+\gamma-3} + T_{\gamma,t+\gamma-3} + Ra_{\gamma-1,t+\gamma-4} \\
    c_{8,t+5} &= T_{8,t+5} + Ra_{7,t+4}.
\end{align*}
\]

The intertemporal budget constraint, combining the period constraints of \( \gamma = 4 \) to \( 8 \), is

\[
\sum_{\gamma=4}^{8} \frac{c_{\gamma,t+\gamma-3}}{R^{\gamma-4}} = \sum_{\gamma=4}^{8} \frac{w_{\gamma,t+\gamma-3} + T_{\gamma,t+\gamma-3} - \theta w_{4,t+1}}{R^{\gamma-4}},
\]

which, along with the budget constraint for \( \gamma = 3 \) and the Euler equations, for \( \gamma \geq 4 \):

\[
c_{\gamma+1,t+\gamma-2} = \beta R c_{\gamma,t+\gamma-3},
\]

yields optimal consumption and saving decisions in each period, given \( \{n_t; h_{t+1}\} \).

Consumption decisions. The assumption of credit constraints dictates that

\[
a_{\gamma,t+\gamma-3} \geq -\theta \frac{w_{\gamma,t+\gamma-2}}{R} \text{ for } \gamma = \{3; \ldots; 8\},
\]

where \( a_{\gamma,t} \) denotes total asset accumulation by the end of period \( t \) for generation \( \gamma = \{3; \ldots; 8\} \). Parameters chosen for the age-income profile \( e_{\gamma,t} \), productivity growth \( g_z \), interest rate and discount factor (\( \beta \) and \( R \)) make the constraint binding only in the first period of working age (\( \gamma = 3 \)).

The sequence of budget constraints, for an individual born at \( t = 2 \) (and entering labor market at date \( t \)), are then:

\[
\begin{align*}
    c_{3,t} &= w_{3,t} + \theta \frac{w_{4,t+1}}{R} \\
    c_{4,t+1} + a_{4,t+1} &= w_{4,t+1}(1 - \theta) + T_{4,t+1} \\
    c_{\gamma,t+\gamma-3} + a_{\gamma,t+\gamma-3} &= w_{\gamma,t+\gamma-3} + T_{\gamma,t+\gamma-3} + Ra_{\gamma-1,t+\gamma-4} \\
    c_{8,t+5} &= T_{8,t+5} + Ra_{7,t+4}.
\end{align*}
\]

The intertemporal budget constraint, combining the period constraints of \( \gamma = 4 \) to \( 8 \), is

\[
\sum_{\gamma=4}^{8} \frac{c_{\gamma,t+\gamma-3}}{R^{\gamma-4}} = \sum_{\gamma=4}^{8} \frac{w_{\gamma,t+\gamma-3} + T_{\gamma,t+\gamma-3} - \theta w_{4,t+1}}{R^{\gamma-4}},
\]

which, along with the budget constraint for \( \gamma = 3 \) and the Euler equations, for \( \gamma \geq 4 \):

\[
c_{\gamma+1,t+\gamma-2} = \beta R c_{\gamma,t+\gamma-3},
\]

yields optimal consumption and saving decisions in each period, given \( \{n_t; h_{t+1}\} \).

Fertility and human capital. The quantitative model, despite being more complex, yields a similar set of equations capturing the dynamics of fertility and human capital accumulation as in the simple model (see Appendix A.2 for a detailed derivation):

\[
n_t = \left( \frac{v}{\beta(1 + \beta + \ldots + \beta^4)} + v \right) \left( 1 - \theta + \kappa_1 (1 - \psi \frac{n_{t-1}}{\phi_0,t + \phi_{h,t}(1 - \lambda)h_{t+1}}) \right)
\]

\[
h_{t+1} = \left[ \frac{\psi \alpha}{\phi_h \varpi} \frac{\xi_{t+1}}{h_t^n n_{t+1}^{-\varpi}} \right]^{1/\varpi},
\]

where \( \lambda = \frac{v + \varpi \beta (1 + \beta + \ldots + \beta^4)}{\alpha \lambda + \alpha \beta (1 + \beta + \ldots + \beta^4)} \). The transformation of the education costs \( \phi_{0,t} \) and \( \phi_{h,t} \), and the parameters \( \kappa_1 \) and \( \xi_{t+1} \) are defined in Appendix A.2 as a function of \( \mu = \frac{1 + g_z}{R} \) and the shape of the income profile (terms \( \frac{e_4}{e_{4,t}} \) and \( \frac{e_5}{e_{5,t}} \)). The unique steady state \( \{n_{ss}; h_{ss}\} \) can be characterized analytically, and is analogous to that of the four-period model—as are comparative statics. One important difference, however, is that optimal fertility also depends on the shape of the income profile, which is originally assumed to be flat across the middle-aged in the four-period model. In particular, the case in which growth is biased towards younger individuals (of age \( \gamma = 4 \)) features a falling natural rate of fertility.

---

13 We verify that the condition for the parameters is satisfied at every point along the equilibrium path in the simulations.
This stems from the fact that the costs of raising children in terms of foregone wages rises without an equivalent increase in future benefits measured in terms of received transfers.

4.2 Data and Calibration

Parameter values. In an 8-period OLG model, a period corresponds to 10 years. Endogenous variables prior to 1971 are assumed to be at a steady-state characterized by optimal fertility and human capital \(\{n_{ss}; h_{ss}\}\). Data used in the calibration procedure is described in Appendix B. The calibration is summarized in Table 3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Target (Data source)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(\beta) (annual basis)</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(R) (annual basis)</td>
<td>5.55%</td>
<td>Agg. household saving rate in 1981-1983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(g_z) (annual basis)</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>Output growth per worker over 1980-2010 (PWT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(v)</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>Fertility in 1966-1970 (n_{ss} = 3/2) (Census)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\theta)</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>Av. saving rate of under 25 in 1986 (UHS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\alpha)</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\omega)</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>Transfer to elderly wrt the number of siblings (CHARLS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>({\phi_4; \phi_5; \phi_h})</td>
<td>{0.14; 0.06; 0.35}</td>
<td>Educ. exp. at age 30-50 in 2006-08 (UHS/RUMiCI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\psi)</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>Saving rate of age 50-60 in 1986 (UHS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>((e_{\gamma}/e_5)_{\gamma=3,4,6})</td>
<td>{65%; 90%; 57%}</td>
<td>Wage-income profile in 1992 (UHS)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Alternative calibrations

Low transfers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Target (Data source)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(\psi)</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>Observed transfers to elderly (CHARLS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(R) (annual basis)</td>
<td>3.75%</td>
<td>Agg. household saving rate in 1981-1983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(v)</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>Fertility in 1966-1970 (n_{ss} = 3/2) (Census)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Time-varying income profile

\((e_{\gamma,t}/e_5)_{\gamma=3,4,6}\) for \(t \leq 1998\) \{65\%; 90\%; 57\%\} Wage income profile in 1992 (UHS)  
for \(1998 < t \leq 2004\) \{65\%; 94\%; 57\%\} Wage income profile in 2000 (UHS)  
for \(t > 2004\) \{65\%; 101\%; 56\%\} Wage-income profile in 2009 (UHS)  

Preferences and Technology. We set \(\beta = 0.99\) on an annual basis. The real growth rate of output per worker averages at a high rate of 8.2\% over the period 1980-2010 in China (Penn World Tables). However, this rate of growth is an upper-bound for \(g_z\) in the model, as growth occurs partly endogenously through human capital accumulation. To generate a real average output growth per worker of about 8\% in the model requires the constant exogenous growth rate to be \(g_z = 7\%\). The technological parameter \(\alpha\) is set to 0.37— in line with estimates of production functions in the empirical growth literature (Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) and Sianesi and van Reenen (2000)).

Age-Income profile. We calibrate the efficiency parameters \(\{e_{\gamma}\}_{3 \leq \gamma \leq 6}\) to income by age group,
provided by UHS data. The first available year for which individual income information is available is 1992.\textsuperscript{14} Calibrating the (pre-policy) initial steady state to 1992 data is still sensible for the reason that human capital levels of the working-age population has not yet been affected by fertility control policies (chosen by ‘non-treated’ parents). The age-income profile as extrapolated from the data in 1992 is displayed in Figure 6. The benchmark case considers time-invariant efficiency parameters in order to zero-in on the impact of the one-child policy. In an extension, we allow for a *time-varying income profile*, in order to replicate the full flattening of the profile for adults between 30 and 45 over the period 1992-2009, as observed in Figure 6. It is important to recognize that part of this flattening arises *endogenously* from the model: the quantity-quality tradeoff induces rising income for the young only children as a consequence of human capital accumulation.

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**Figure 6: Age-income profiles (1992 and 2009)**

![Age-income profiles graph](image)

*Notes:* Data source: UHS, 1992 and 2009. Wages includes wages plus self-business incomes. The model counterpart in 2010 (Benchmark Model 2010) is obtained under the benchmark calibration.

**Fertility, demographic structure and policy implementation.** The initial fertility rate $n_{ss}$ is taken to be the fertility rate of urban households prior to 1971—when families were entirely unconstrained. Census data gives a fertility rate slightly above 3 in urban areas in 1965-1970. We therefore

\textsuperscript{14} One could alternatively apply the method developed by Chesher (1998) to estimate individual income profiles as is done for individual consumption (see Appendix B). The resulting estimates are very close to the one directly observed in 1992.
select the preference parameter for children, \( v \), to target \( n_{ss} = n_{t<1971} = \frac{3}{2} \).15 Given initial fertility, the initial population distribution—the share of each age group (0-10; 10-20, ..., 60-70 and above 70) in 1966—can be calibrated to its empirical counterpart provided in the United Nations data (in 1965). While the one-child policy appeared to be nearly fully-binding in 1980 and fully-binding after 1982, earlier endeavors to curb population growth were already under way, and most likely account for the fall in fertility over the period 1972-1980 (see Fig. 1). The policy is thus assumed to be implemented progressively during the 1970s, such that, taking cohorts to be born every 4 years, fertility varies (exogenously) according to \( n_{1974} = 2.6, n_{1978} = 1.8 \).16 For any date after 1982, fertility is constrained by the one-child policy: \( n_{\max} = \frac{1}{2} \).

**Education expenditures.** We calibrate education costs based on the evidence shown in Section 2 (see Fig. 3). Data from UHS (2006) show that for children of ages 0-15, the costs of education (as a fraction of total household expenditures) are between 2% and 15% for an only child. Thus, we select \( \phi_4 = 0.14 \) so that 7% of total household income is devoted to compulsory education of a child of ages 15 and younger. For children between 15-21, total education expenditures constitute an average of 15%−25% of total expenditures. A reasonable target is setting \( \phi_5 + \phi_h h \) to be on the order of 20% of total consumption expenditures. Compulsory education costs for this age group are given in CHIP (2002), and constitutes about 5% of total household expenditures. A reasonable choice is thus \( \phi_5 = 0.06 \), which corresponds to about 3% of household income devoted to a child’s compulsory education. In equilibrium, the remaining non-compulsory education costs as a share of household income (captured by \( \phi_h h \)) are in line with the data for \( \phi_h = 0.35 \). It is important to note, however, that these estimates based on education expenditures only represent a lower bound of the total cost associated with a child since other transfers (food, co-residence, etc...) are likely sizeable, although omitted in this model.17

**Old age support.** Two parameters govern transfers to parents, \( \psi \) and \( \varpi \). The first captures the degree of altruism towards one’s parents—in terms of the overall amount of transfers one wishes to confer; the latter captures the propensity to free-ride on the transfers provided by one’s siblings. We first estimate \( \varpi \) empirically.

*Estimation of \( \varpi \) and validation of the transfer function.* CHARLS provides data on transfers from a given child to his/her parents for the year 2008 (see Appendix B for data description).18 Using this

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15The Census data provides information on the number of siblings associated with each observed adult born between 1966-1970. The result is slightly above 3 children per couple. Since the number of children under the one-child policy is also slightly above 1, we take 3 to obtain the appropriate change in fertility. Note that it is possible that the natural rate of fertility may have changed after 1971 in China owing to changing preferences; we discuss this possibility in Section 5.

16We assume \( \nu \) to vary over this period to match these fertility statistics, as \( \nu \) does not exert any intrinsic impact on the model except through its influence on fertility \( n \).

17Unlike education costs, other types of expenditures are difficult to break down into amounts solely related to children.

18CHARLS include both rural and urban. We focus on urban households but when performing robustness checks on the whole sample of urban and rural, we find very similar results. We also perform robustness checks using the ‘Three cities survey’ for the year 1999 based only on urban households and the recent version of CHARLS (2011) with similar (non-reported) findings.
cross-sectional data, the transfer function can be estimated performing the following regression:

$$\log(T_{i,f,p}) = \alpha + \alpha_p + \beta_n \log(n_f) + \beta_x \log(x_i) + \gamma Z_{i,f} + \varepsilon_{i,f,p}, \quad (16)$$

where $T_{i,f,p}$ denotes transfers per child $i$ belonging to family $f$ and living in province $p$ to his/her parents. The number of offsprings of a given family $f$ is denoted by $n_f$, and $x_i$ is a numerical indicator of quality of child $i$ (education or imputed individual income), while $Z_{f,i}$ a vector of control variables (child’s age and gender, child’s and parents’ age, dummy for the co-residence of parents).

Table 4: Transfers from a given child to his/her parents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>Transfers per child to parents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log nbr children</td>
<td>-0.349**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.167)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log educ. level</td>
<td>1.302***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.205)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log income (predicted using UHS)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.143)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>1,489</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other controls</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Data source: CHARLS (2008). Sample restricted to children whose parents are above the age of 60. We take one observation per child. Estimation using Poisson Pseudo-Maximum-Likelihood (PPML). Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$. Other controls included in all regression includes: age of child, average parents’ age, a dummy for co-residence of the child with his parents and the child’s gender.

Results are displayed in Table 4. The Poisson Pseudo-Maximum-Likelihood (PPML) estimator is employed to treat the zero values in our dependent variable (see Gourieroux, Monfort, and Trognon (1984) and Santos and Tenreyro (2006)). In both samples and across all specifications, we find that the amount of transfers (per offspring) received by the parents is decreasing in the number of siblings the offspring has, and increasing in the offspring’s quality — using either education or income-based measures of quality. The regression estimates for the elasticity of transfers to an offspring’s income and to the number of his/her siblings are in line with our theoretical formulation of the transfer function, $\psi \frac{\varpi - 1}{\varpi} w$ (in logs), where correspondingly, $\beta_n = \varpi - 1$ and $\beta_x = 1$. The elasticity with respect to (imputed) income is indeed very close to unity (Column 3), while the elasticity $\beta_n$ of transfers to the number of his/her siblings is equal to -0.35. Thus, we set $\varpi = 0.65$.\(^{20}\)

Measuring $\psi$. The second parameter measures the degree of altruism towards parents $\psi$, linked to the overall level of transfers towards the elderly. Direct measurement of $\psi$ based solely on measured

\(^{19}\)There is no direct income information for the children. Therefore, we measure an offspring’s quality $x_i$ either by his/her education level (Columns 1-2), or, in Column 3, use information on individual income and observable characteristics of the offspring (duly observed in UHS data) to assign to each child the income of an individual with the same set of characteristics in UHS data (see Appendix B).

\(^{20}\)In a non-reported regression using preliminary data from CHARLS (2011), we find a very similar estimate for $\varpi$ ($=$ 0.61) and a unitary elasticity w.r.t. income (CHARLS 2011 provides income data for the children). Using ‘Three cities survey’ data, we find a smaller estimate of $\varpi$ ($=$0.52) but not statistically different.
transfers from CHARLS gives a very low value for \( \psi \), around 4 – 5\% for \( \varpi = 0.65 \). A value this low, however, does not square with the Census evidence that family support is reported to be the main source of income, according to the elderly (Fig. 2).\textsuperscript{21} Transfers measured in the data are likely to be underestimated. First, it does not include many forms of ‘non-pecuniary transfers’—in-kind benefits such as coresidence and health care. In Section 2 we have documented how coresidence with children is a primary form of living arrangement for the elderly. Any sort of transfers that essentially provide insurance benefits to the elderly should in principle be taken into account—as they determine saving decisions for middle-aged adults. Second, CHARLS does not report pecuniary transfers within a household. If one takes only pecuniary transfers towards parents living in another city from CHARLS (2011), \( \psi \) is significantly higher—about 9 – 10\%. These transfers are arguably a better proxy since in-kind benefits and mis-measured pecuniary transfers within households become less of an issue when parents live far away. Given the difficulty in accurately measuring \( \psi \) from the data, our preferred strategy is to calibrate it to match the initial age-saving profile in the early 1980’s.

**Parameters \{\psi, \theta, R\}: matching initial age-saving profile and aggregate savings.** Our calibration strategy is to choose the remaining parameters to match the initial age-saving profile—its level and shape—and in turn, the aggregate saving rate in 1982. Replicating the initial saving profile is important for accurately assessing the ability of the model to explain the change in aggregate and micro-level saving over time. We construct the initial age-saving profile based on year 1986, the first year available in UHS (Figure 7).\textsuperscript{22} The profile estimated at this point in time is a valid proxy for the initial steady-state profile—applicable to pre-policy implementation era. The validity rests on the fact that the sole cohort (of adults) that were subjected to the policy at that time were those in their 20’s to early 30’s.\textsuperscript{23}

Three parameters, \( \theta, R, \psi \), are jointly determined to match the levels of the initial age-saving profile, its shape, and the initial aggregate saving rate. The parameter \( \theta \) largely determines the first point on the age-saving profile—the level of saving rate of 20-year-olds in 1986—resulting in a value of \( \theta = 2\% \).\textsuperscript{24} The rate of return \( R \) is set to match the average aggregate saving rate of 10.4\% between 1981-1983 for a given value of \( \psi \). Calibrated values of the interest rate are of reasonable orders of

\textsuperscript{21}Wages of children are not observed in CHARLS (2008) but can be imputed based on observed children’s characteristics. This gives transfers ranging from 4% (4 or more siblings) to 10% (only child) of the wage income of individuals 42 – 54 years old (CHARLS 2008), yielding a value of \( \psi = 4 – 5\% \). See Appendix B for a more detailed description of data treatment.

\textsuperscript{22}Estimating the individual age-saving profile in the presence of multigenerational households (more than 50\% of the observations) is a complex task, and the standard approach based on using household head information is flawed—as demonstrated in Coeurdacier, Guibaud and Jin (2013). A technical appendix shows how individual age-saving can be recovered from household-level data following a method initially proposed by Chesher (1998). The method relies on estimating individual consumption from household level consumption data using variations in the family composition as an identification strategy. Individual saving are then calculated using these individual consumption estimates in conjunction to the observed individual income data (see Appendix B and Coeurdacier et al. (2013) for more details).

\textsuperscript{23}Note that youngest age group (age 20 – 25) is subject to the credit constraint and their saving decisions are therefore unaffected by fertility policies in the model. Even within the group of individuals in their early 30s, there is likely a sizeable population that had children earlier than 1980, in which case they would have been less affected by the policy.

\textsuperscript{24}The lack of consumer credit and mortgage markets, as well as the very low levels of household debt in China (less than 10\% of GDP in 2008) warrants a choice of a low \( \theta \) to strongly limit the ability of young households to borrow against future income. The choice of \( \theta = 2\% \) allows the model to reach reasonable estimates for the young’s saving rate in 1986, and similar estimates would have been obtained if using the subsequent years of the survey. Results are not sensitive to \( \theta \) as long as it is fairly close to zero.
Notes: Data source: UHS (1986), to construct individual profiles according to the methodology in Chesher (1998) (see Appendix B and technical appendix in Coeurdacier et al. (2013)). Steady-state age-saving profiles as implied by the model take $n_{ss} = \frac{3}{5}$. For different values of $\psi$, the real interest rate $R$ such that aggregate saving equals the 1981-1983 average.

magnitude of $4 - 5\%$. The value for $\psi$ is essential for matching the saving rate of those in their 50's in 1986 and for determining the overall shape of the profile. The resulting value in our benchmark calibration is $\psi = 12\%$, a choice in line with that of Banerjee et al. (2013) and Curtis et al. (2011). As Figure 7 shows, taking $\psi = 4\%$ from direct estimates from CHARLS significantly distorts the profile. Lower transfers to the elderly tends to underestimate the saving rate of the young and overestimate that of the middle-aged—as lower receipts of transfers from children bid the middle-aged to save more, and the young to save less due to mitigated parental obligations. This larger wealth accumulation also leads to significantly larger dissavings of the old. Thus, a unique combination of the parameters $\{\psi, \theta, R\}$ gives us a very close fit of the model-implied initial age-saving profile with that of the data in 1986—matching well the saving rate of the young, middle-aged and old (see Fig. 7).  

Note that with $\psi = 12\%$, the saving rate of those between 25-30 falls slightly short of data estimates. This discrepancy is, if anything, consistent with the theory, since these individuals are the first to be affected by the policy change and therefore, should accordingly see a higher saving rate (data estimate in 1986) than their counterparts before the policy change (model predictions).
4.3 The Impact of the One-Child Policy

We next study the transitory dynamics of the model following the implementation of the one-child policy at date $t_0 = 1982$, starting from an unconstrained steady state characterized by $\{n_{ss}; h_{ss}\} = \{n_{t_0-1}; h_{t_0}\}$ and an initial age-saving profile $\{s_{\gamma,t_0}\}_{\gamma=3}^{8}$. The policy is assumed to be binding (with the exception of twin births) for $t \geq t_0$. Since analytical solutions are cumbersome, we resort to a numerical simulation of the model’s dynamics following the policy.

**Transitory dynamics.** The maximization problem is the same as in the case with unconstrained fertility, except that fertility is subject to the binding constraint $n \leq n_{\text{max}}$. After $t_0$, the equation governing the evolution of human capital is described by Eq. 15, except that $n_{\text{max}}$ now replaces $n_t$. Given initial human capital $h_{t_0}$ and the dynamics of human capital $h_t$ for $t \geq t_0 + 1$, the consumption/saving decisions at $t \geq t_0 + 1$ can be readily backed out for each age group, using the appropriate intertemporal budget constraint (Eq. 12) and the Euler equation (Eq. 13). Aggregate savings and age-saving profiles for $t \geq t_0 + 1$ immediately follow.

4.3.1 Aggregate savings

Figure 8 displays aggregate savings as a share of disposable income in the years following the policy in the model and in the data. Model estimates are linearly interpolated at the various dates starting in 1970. The benchmark results can account for almost 60% of the total increase in aggregate savings over the last thirty years. However, this number is most likely an upper-bound of what can be attributed to the policy change —if the (endogenous) natural fertility rate had fallen since 1982, and has thus raised savings independently of the policy. Section 5.3 discusses precisely counterfactual fertility and savings in the absence of the policy. The experiment with a time-varying income profile replicates the full flattening of the income profile for those between 30-45 in the years 2000-2009, and brings the model predictions even closer to the data (Fig. 8). The result derives from a stronger incentive to save for individuals in their 30’s facing lower expected income growth.

It is somewhat reassuring that aggregate saving dynamics are quite insensitive to different values of $\psi$ — a 12.4% rise over the period 1982-2012 in the benchmark calibration ($\psi = 12\%$) compared to a 11.0% rise in the case of low transfers ($\psi = 4\%$). The predicted aggregate saving rate is similar because the two main channels governing aggregate savings turn out to be more or less offsetting: a high value of $\psi$ makes the ‘micro-channel’ stronger owing to a greater importance of transfers (and their decline ensuing the policy); the ‘macro-channel’, however, is dampened as a result of a flatter age-saving profiles (Fig. 7): composition effects on savings are weaker when differences in saving rates among various age groups are less pronounced. Conversely, a lower value of $\psi$ implies a stronger ‘macro-economic channel’ and a weaker ‘micro-economic channel’. The predicted rise in aggregate savings is thus comparable— even though the age-saving profiles are markedly different across these calibrations.

---

26 Household saving rates are slightly noisy in the beginning of the sample, and as such, we average the years 1981-1983 when calculating its overall increase.
4.3.2 Age-saving profiles

The data reveals a marked evolution in the age-saving profile between 1986 to 2009. These changes are immediately visible when comparing the profile in 1986 and in 2009 (see Figure 9—‘Model SS prior to policy’ approximates the initial age saving profile). In particular, there has been an upward shift in the age-saving profile over this period, as well as a change in the shape of the profile—characterized by two distinct features: (1) a significant flattening of the saving profile for the middle-aged (30-60) that contrasts with the conventional hump-shaped pattern in 1986; and (2) a noticeable dip in the saving rate of those in their late 30’s. We investigate to what extent our model captures these particularities, and, at the same time demonstrate the failure of a standard OLG model in accounting for these changes when intergenerational transfers towards the elderly are absent.

In so doing, we consider cohorts that are born every 4 years—the oldest of which is born in the year 1938. The age at which individuals have their first child corresponds to the average age of first-births in the data as seen over the last 30 years (age 28). While individuals optimize every 10 years, we assume that they have the same saving rate over the following age brackets: [20-26], [30-38], [42-50] and [54-60] (corresponding to $\gamma = 3, \ldots, 6$). In between those ages, saving rates are interpolated in order to generate a smoother age-saving profile. It is important to note that individuals from different age
groups coexisting in 1986 and 2009 may be differently affected by fertility control policies (see Table C.1 in Appendix C for detailed information of coexisting cohorts in terms of the number of children and siblings they have in 1986 and 2009). For instance, parents subject to the one-child policy (born after 1954) contrast with those subject to partial fertility policies (born between 1944-1953), as well as with those altogether unaffected (born before 1943).  

Figure 9: Age-Saving Profiles (2009): Model vs. Data

![Figure 9: Age-Saving Profiles (2009): Model vs. Data](image)

Notes: Data source: UHS (2009), to construct individual age-saving profile following Chesher (1998) (see Appendix B and technical appendix in Coeurdacier et al. (2013)). Cohorts in the quantitative model are born every four years starting from 1936. Parameter values are provided in Table 3.

Figure 9 presents the predicted age-saving profile \( \{ s_{\gamma,t} \} \) for 2010 and its data counterpart (in 2009). The profiles under the benchmark calibration and under the time-varying income profile calibration are juxtaposed. The model-implied initial age-saving profile (before the policy) is displayed for comparison (with its closely-corresponding data counterpart omitted). One can mark that, first, the model can generate the upward shift of the profile over the period; it results from both a fall in expenditures on children and a rise in savings throughout the lifecycle—in response to the expected fall in future receipts of transfers. The model also captures well two aspects of the change in the

---

27There are also differences within age brackets: a 30 year old in 2009, for example, is different from a 38 year old: the former is only allowed one child and was born during a period in which the policy was almost fully-implemented (in 1979). Those who were 38 were also subject to the one-child policy but potentially have siblings (born in 1971 before the policy implementation). See Table C.1 in Appendix C.
shape of the profile. The first is a significant flattening of the curve for the middle-aged (30-60): in 1986, the peak of the saving rate occurred around age 50 in the model—as in the data. After the policy, saving rates flattened for the 30 to 60 age group. Implicitly, the saving rate rose fastest for those in their 30s—consistent with this well-marked pattern in the Chinese data (see also Chamon and Prasad (2010) and Song and Yang (2010)). The pattern arises for the following reason: the cohorts around age 30 in 2009 is the most impacted by the policy – because they are the subject of the one-child policy and therefore take on the brunt of the burden of supporting their parents later, and also because they are subject to the one-child policy themselves and expect to receive less transfers from their only child. Both effects raise substantially their saving rate. Cohorts in their late 30s-50s in 2009 are only partially affected by the policy, and to varying degrees: although they are allowed only one child, those in their 50s had more siblings than those in their late 30s and early 40s. The eldest cohorts (strictly above 65), on the other hand, were unaffected by the policy.

Figure 10: Change in saving rates across age between the initial steady-state and 2010. Model Predictions.

Notes: This figure plots the model-implied change in saving rates between the initial (steady-state) period and 2010. Three cases considered: benchmark calibration, time-varying income profile calibration and standard OLG model in which transfers and human capital accumulation are absent. Cohorts born every four years starting from 1936. Parameter values provided in Table 3. The data counterpart corresponds to the change of saving rate for a given age between 1986 and 2009.


c28An important difference between our saving profiles as estimated from the data and those of Chamon and Prasad (2010) and Song and Yang (2010) is that young (childless) adults did not see a rise in saving rates. The difference comes from our correction for the biases associated with multigenerational households (see Coeurdacier, Guibaud and Jin (2013)).
Comparison with a standard OLG Model. These changes in the levels and shape of the age-saving profile become apparent when examining the change in the saving rate across age groups over the last three decades. Figure 10 juxtaposes the predicted change in saving rates in the benchmark model with that of the standard OLG model in which only the expenditure channel is operative. In the absence of old-age support, the standard OLG model falls significantly short of predicting the change in saving rates across all ages. The largest discrepancy between the two models concerns individuals in their 50s. The standard OLG model predicts a fall in saving rate for this age group, while our model predicts a rise due to the transfer channel. A clear implication is the importance of the transfer channel in linking fertility changes to savings; this channel, as the results suggest, can be moreover identified by investigating the saving behaviour of parents in their 50s—as is done in Banerjee et al. (2010, 2013). The magnitude of the transfer channel in our model is very close to their empirical evidence. Using the partial implementation of fertility restrictions in the 1970s as an identification strategy, their double-difference estimation compares the saving behavior corresponding to individuals in their mid-50s to individuals in their early 60s in 2008: in line with our quantitative estimates, they find that the latter save on average about 10% less than the former.

Still, one can mark that our benchmark model falls short of explaining the sharp increase in saving rates of older workers and retirees over this period, and falls somewhat short of explaining the overall increase in saving of younger adults (in their 30s). Allowing for a time-varying life income profile can remedy the latter issue: as the life-income profile flattens in recent years, younger adults in their 30s have greater incentives to save.

4.3.3 Human capital accumulation

The inclusion of human capital accumulation is critical for assessing quantitatively the importance of fertility on savings. First, the degree of substitution between quantity and quality determines the extent of the fall in expected transfers—and thus the strength of the saving-response as per the transfer channel. The model-implied increase in human capital following the policy is economically significant though it explains only a small share of the income difference between the only-child generation and their parents: quantitatively, the level of human capital for an only child is 47% higher than the level of their parents (with two siblings)—translating into a wage increase of about 15% for the generation of only children compared to their parents. Second, due to human capital accumulation, the distribution of income across age groups shifts, and in turn impacts aggregate saving (income composition channel). It is important to mention that this effect will only rise in magnitude in the coming years when the generation of only children—of at-most 30 year old in 2009-2010—exerts a greater impact in the economy in terms of their higher income and savings. Third, the model can generate endogenously a portion of the flattening of the income profile observed in the data (see Fig. 6) owing to the higher levels of human capital for the only-children generation.

---

29 Fixed costs per child $\phi_{\gamma}$ are kept at the same values but human capital is fixed and transfers to elderly are set to zero. Similar patterns emerge if old age transfers are independent of the number of children.

30 Due to consumption smoothing over the life cycle, lower expenditures on children released more resources for consumption when children were no longer living in the household.

31 Banerjee et al. (2010, 2013) suggests that our model predicts the appropriate variations between treated and non-treated households. Yet, saving rates increased for both groups beyond what can be explained by fertility planning.
Section 3.2.2 showed how one can identify theoretically the micro-channel by comparing two-children (twin) households to only-child households. Using this theoretical analysis as guidance, we estimate a ‘twin effect’ from the data and simulate a ‘twin’ experiment in the quantitative model, and compare various meaningful outcomes between model and data. One may query the validity of using twins as exogenous deviation of fertility—for instance, in the event that twinning is fostered by ‘artificial’ fertility methods whose adoption may be correlated with the propensity to save. We endeavor to address this concern. The important thing to note is that identification based on twins born under the one child policy is of independent value—particularly for providing a good out-of-sample check to our model predictions—and this is precisely how it should be viewed.

5.1 Data Estimates of the ‘Twin Effect’

A detailed description of the various datasets used is provided in Appendix B. One data limitation is that one observes children (twins or only child) only when (1) residing in a household, or (2) when residing outside but remaining financially dependent. Ideally, one would have preferred to additionally observe the parents’ saving behavior after the children have departed. The limitation means that the ‘transfer channel’ can only be indirectly inferred rather than directly measured using observations of parents in their fifties living alone.

Household Savings. The first set of regressions estimates the impact of twins on household saving rate. It uses the whole sample in UHS (1986 and 1992-2009), which includes households that had children both before and after the implementation of the one-child policy. We consider only households with resident children below the age of 18 (or 21 as a robustness check), as otherwise consumption, income and savings of the household includes those of the potentially employed children. The following regression is performed for a household $h$ living in province $p$ at a date $t = \{1986, 1992, ..., 2009\}$:

$$s_{h,p,t} = \alpha + \alpha_t + \alpha_p + \beta_1 D_{\text{Twin}}^{\text{Twins}} + \beta_2 D_{\text{Twin}}^{\text{Twins born} \geq 1982} + \gamma Z_{h,t} + \varepsilon_{p,h,t}, \quad (R1)$$

where $s_{h,p,t}$ denotes the household saving rate of household $h$ (defined as the household disposable income less expenditures over disposable income); $\alpha_t$ and $\alpha_p$ are respectively time and province fixed-effects, $D_{\text{Twin}}^{\text{Twins}}$ is a dummy that equals one if twins are observed in a household, $D_{\text{Twin}}^{\text{Twins born} \geq 1982}$ is a dummy that equals 1 if the twins are born after the full implementation of the one-child policy (post 1982), $Z_{h,t}$ is a set of household level control variables and $\varepsilon_{p,h,t}$ is the residual. While $\beta_1$ measures the overall effect of giving birth to twins on the household saving rate over all years, $\beta_2$ measures the effect of having twins after the policy implementation.

Columns 1-3 in Table 5 display the coefficient estimates of the impact of twins on household saving rate before and after the policy implementation. Importantly, the twin effect ($\text{Twin}$) is insignificant (or not robustly so) when the one-child policy was not binding in the earlier years, but is significant.

---

32Following Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980), Rosenzweig and Zhang (2009) uses the birth of Chinese twins to measure the ‘quantity-quality’ trade-off in children and find supportive evidence to the main mechanisms of our model (see also Hongbin et al. (2008) and Qian (2013)).
Table 5: Household Saving Rate: Twin Identification

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>(1) Sav. rate</th>
<th>(2) Sav. rate</th>
<th>(3) Sav. rate</th>
<th>(4) Sav. rate</th>
<th>(5) Sav. rate inc. educ. transfers</th>
<th>(6) Sav. rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oldest child</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Up to 18y</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of household</td>
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<td>All</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>Nuclear only</td>
<td></td>
<td>Nuclear only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twins born ≥ 1982</td>
<td>-0.0692***</td>
<td>-0.0653***</td>
<td>-0.0747***</td>
<td>-0.0540***</td>
<td>-0.0691***</td>
<td>-0.0662***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twins</td>
<td>0.0227</td>
<td>0.0196</td>
<td>0.0242*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional Control (2)</td>
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<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>85,643</td>
<td>85,643</td>
<td>101,815</td>
<td>41,899</td>
<td>41,867</td>
<td>50,668</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.088</td>
<td>0.180</td>
<td>0.170</td>
<td>0.158</td>
<td>0.159</td>
<td>0.161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years Dummies</td>
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<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Province Dummies</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prefecture Dummies</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Data source: UHS (1986, 1992-2009). We take one observation per household. Outliers with saving rate over (below) 85% (-85%) of income are excluded. Controls include average age of parents, mother’s age at first birth, and child’s age. Additional control (1) includes household income in addition to the benchmark controls, and additional controls (2) includes a dummy for the multigenerational structure of the family. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Columns (5) and (6) include education transfers to children living in another city as part of consumption expenditures when computing household savings.

and negative in the later years when it was enforced (Twins born ≥ 1982). In other words, households who had twins were not saving at systematically different rates from households without twins in the absence of fertility controls. The estimated coefficients on $D_{h,t}^{\text{Twin born} \geq 1982}$ show that under the one-child policy, households with twins saved (as a share of disposable income) on average 6.5 to 7.4 percentage points less than household with an only child. Moreover, the magnitude is similar under different specifications and across samples.33

Columns 4-6 report regression results for a restricted sample of nuclear households (unigenerational). These households had only one incidence of births—either bearing an only child or twins. The advantage of pooling all households that are unigenerational is that the same demographic composition (up to the presence of twins) applies to all households —making this exercise the closest to our theoretical framework. Unlike the full sample in regression (R1), all households here are treated by the policy.34 Households with twins have on average a 5.4 percentage-points lower saving rate than those with an only child. The simple-difference in the cross-section of treated households gives estimates similar in magnitude to the double-difference estimates of Columns 1-3. The result is perhaps

33 In Column 1, household income is excluded as it could be an outcome variable—household members may decide to work more to meet higher expenditures with a larger number of children, or, lower the labor supply of mothers. Column 2 controls for household income. Column 3 includes all children up to the age of 21 years old.

34 The regression performed is for a household $h$ living in prefecture $p$ at date $t = \{2002, ..., 2009\}$: $s_{h,p,t} = \alpha + \alpha_t + \alpha_p + \beta D_{h,t}^{\text{Twin}} + \gamma Z_{h,t} + \varepsilon_{p,h,t}$. 

34
unsurprising since no significant difference in the saving behavior of household with twins from those without was detected before the policy. Finally, in Columns 5-6, we compute an alternative and more accurate measure of the saving rate by incorporating education transfers to children residing outside of the household as part of household expenditures (only available in the sample starting in 2002). The more precise measure of saving rate gives a larger twin effect: households with twins save on average 6.9 percentage-points less than those with an only child. In a nutshell, our results show that having (exogenously) one more child under the one-child policy reduces saving rates by at least 5.4 percentage-points and up to 7 percentage-points. We now perform robustness checks regarding the effect of fertility on households savings and discuss the validity of our twin-experiment.

Table 6: Savings and expenditures for different age groups: Twin identification

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Savings</td>
<td>Savings</td>
<td>Non-education</td>
<td>Non-education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(in % of household income)</td>
<td>rate</td>
<td>rate</td>
<td>exp.</td>
<td>exp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twins</td>
<td>-0.0691***</td>
<td>-0.0521***</td>
<td>0.0237*</td>
<td>0.0115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0123)</td>
<td>(0.0131)</td>
<td>(0.0127)</td>
<td>(0.0137)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twins with parents &gt; 45</td>
<td>-0.122***</td>
<td>0.0688**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0350)</td>
<td>(0.0346)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controls</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>41,867</td>
<td>41,867</td>
<td>25,833</td>
<td>25,833</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.159</td>
<td>0.160</td>
<td>0.154</td>
<td>0.154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years Dummies</td>
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<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prefecture Dummies</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Data source: UHS (2002-2009) for columns 1-2 and UHS (2002-2006) for columns 3-4 (decomposition of expenditures across different sectors including education is only available for the years 2002-2006). Restricted sample of nuclear households are those with either an only child or twins up to the age of 18 years old. Outliers with saving rate over (below) 85% (-85%) of income are excluded. In columns 3-4 outliers with non-education expenditures above 150 % of income are also excluded. Controls include average age of parents, mother's age at first birth, child's age, and household income. In columns (2) and (4) dummy for parents above the age of 45. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Identifying the transfer channel. One could argue that our results on savings are entirely driven by the extra costs of having twins compared to an only-child. As the impact of the ‘transfer channel’ should increase with parental age, at the same time mostly affecting non-education related expenditures, we test whether there is a differential twin effect for older parents (above 45), and particularly so for expenditures excluding education. Results are shown in Table 6 using the sample of nuclear households (unigenerational). The first observation is that savings of twin-households compared to only-child households are smaller but even more so when parents are above 45 (Columns 1-2). Furthermore, expenditures excluding education are higher for twin households—again even more so when parents are older (Columns 3-4). An interpretation is that the ‘transfer channel’ is in operation. To identify the ‘transfer channel’ as the source of variation of saving rates across households with different numbers of children, one would prefer to observe parents’ saving behavior after the children have departed from the household and became financially independent—a limitation of the data that at this point cannot be circumvented.35

35The ‘expenditure channel’, if anything, would tend to raise the saving rates of families of this age group with more
‘Artificial Twins’. There is a concern that twins born after the one-child policy could potentially be ‘artificial’. If true, this becomes a concern when families with ‘artificial twins’ have a different propensity to save—after controlling for observable factors such as differences in household income, education, parents’ age, etc. We conduct a series of robustness checks on systematic income and saving differences between only-child and twin households (by first child birth) over time. If artificial twin households were partly driving our empirical results, the difference between the two type of households would increase over time as artificial twinning technologies improve and become more accessible. Our first-hand investigation suggests that this is not the case. While there was a clear discontinuity between twin and non-twin household’s saving behavior around 1982 (echoing our regression results), the difference between their saving rate has not risen over time since 1982. Also, no such discontinuity occurred for the average household income level—which has been similar between twin and non-twin households (by first child birth) since 1970—nor for the number of observations of twin vs. non-twin households (per 1st child birth) since 1970: the proportion over this period has stayed roughly constant. Regression analysis also confirms that the incidence of twinning is not correlated with observables other than a weak association with parental age.\textsuperscript{36}

Figure 11: Education Expenditures per child: Only Child vs. Twins

Notes: UHS (2002-2006), restricted sample of nuclear households. This figure displays the average education expenditure per child (as a share of total household expenditure) by age of the child, over the period 2002-2006.

\textsuperscript{36}Results based on UHS data (1986, 1992-2009). Figures and regressions for these results are available upon request.

children—owing to consumption smoothing (see Fig. 10).
The Quantity-Quality Trade-Off. A quantity-quality tradeoff is immediately visible from casual evidence in Figure 11: the per-capita education expenditure on a twin is significantly lower than on an only child— for children above the age of 15. The difference reaches almost 50% at age 20. One can estimate this relationship by running the regression

\[ \frac{\text{exp}_{h,p,t}^{\text{Educ.}}}{n_{h,t}} = \alpha + \alpha_t + \alpha_p + \beta D_{\text{Twin}}^{h,t} + \gamma Z_{h,t} + \varepsilon_{p,h,t}, \]  

for a household \( h \) at date \( t = \{2002,...,2006\} \), where \( \frac{\text{exp}_{h,p,t}^{\text{Educ.}}}{n_{h,t}} \) denotes the education expenditure household \( h \) spends on each child (as a share of household income) at date \( t = \{2002,...,2006\} \).\(^{37}\)

Results of regression (R3) are shown in Columns 2 and 4 of Table 7. For the sake of comparison, the impact of twins on overall education expenditures of the household is also shown (Columns 1 and 3). We find that education investment (per child) in twins is much lower than in an only child: while households with twins significantly raise education expenditures (as a share of household income) on average (Column 1), they reduce education expenditures spent on each child—by an average of 2.4 percentage points (Column 2). As conjectured, this trade-off mostly applies to older children (above 15), whose education attainment becomes discretionary (Column 4).

Table 7: Education Expenditures per Child: Twin identification.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>(1) Education exp. (in % of household income)</th>
<th>(2) Education exp. per child</th>
<th>(3) Education exp. total</th>
<th>(4) Education exp. per child</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Twins</td>
<td>0.0605***</td>
<td>-0.0239***</td>
<td>0.0482***</td>
<td>-0.0121***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0105)</td>
<td>(0.00526)</td>
<td>(0.00952)</td>
<td>(0.00467)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twins ≥ 15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0292</td>
<td>-0.0240**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0221)</td>
<td>(0.0111)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controls</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.122</td>
<td>0.120</td>
<td>0.136</td>
<td>0.134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years Dummies</td>
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<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prefecture Dummies</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: UHS (2002-2006), restricted sample of nuclear households are those with either an only child or twins up to 21 years of age. Other controls include average age of parents, mother’s age at first birth, child’s age and household income. Outliers with saving rate over (below) 85% (-85%) of income are excluded. Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

The quantity-quality trade-off is also manifested in differences in education attainment. LOGIT regression results on dummies that measure the level of school enrollment (academic high school, technical high school and higher education) are displayed in Table 8. Comparing education attainment of twins versus only children (of age 18-22) over the period 2002-2009 indicates that twins are on average 40% less likely to pursue higher education than their only-child peers (Column 2), a quantitatively

\(^{37}\)Education expenditures are only available for the years 2002-2006 in UHS.
Table 8: Education Attainment: Twin Identification (LOGIT)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLE (logistic regression)</th>
<th>Higher education</th>
<th>Academic high school</th>
<th>Technical high school</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>estimate</td>
<td>odds ratio</td>
<td>estimate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twins</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.168)</td>
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<td>Years dummies</td>
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<td>YES</td>
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<tr>
<td>Province dummies</td>
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<td>YES</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Notes: UHS (2002-2009), restricted sample of nuclear households are those with either an only child or twins of ages 18-22 years old. Controls include child’s age, average age of parents, mother’s age at first birth, average parents’ education level, and household income. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

large effect. This is so because for secondary education, twins are 40% less likely to pursue an academic secondary education which prepares to university (Columns 4) and 40% more likely to go technical high school instead (Column 6).\(^{38}\)

5.2 Quantitative Predictions of the ‘Twin Effect’

We turn now to the simulated results of a twin experiment as predicted by our model, and juxtapose these results with our empirical estimates in Table 9. In the new simulations, individuals give birth to twins at a date \( t > t_0 \), under the binding constraint that \( n_{\text{max}} = 1 \) (1 child per parent, e.g twins). Table 9 reports model outcomes for an individual with twins and an individual with an only child at various ages under the benchmark calibration. The model predicts very close estimates on the differences between these individuals compared to data estimates: the predicted saving rate at \( \gamma = 4 \) and \( \gamma = 5 \) are respectively 6.4% (5.4 – 6.9% in the data) and 9.5% (7.0 – 9.6% in the data) lower in households with twins than in households with an only child in 2009.

When examining education expenditure differences (as a share of wage income), we observe that households with twins have 7% (6.1% in the data) higher total expenditures for \( \gamma = 4 \) and 8.4% (7.5% in the data) higher expenditures at \( \gamma = 5 \). Parents of twins tend to reduce their children’s quality as compared to their counterparts with an only child—spending (as a % of wages) about 2.1 percentage points less on non-compulsory education per child (2.4 percentage points in the data). As a consequence, our calibrated model suggests a 22% difference in human capital attainment between a twin and an only child. The proximity of model and data estimates are reassuring since the model is not calibrated on results from ‘twin’ households.

\(^{38}\)It is possible that twins are of lower quality compared to singletons—for example, by having lower weights at birth (net of family-size effects)—and parents may in turn invest less in their education and substitute investment towards their singleton offspring. The problem is less serious, however, when households are allowed only one birth as in China. Oliveira (2012) finds no systematic differences between singletons and twins.
Table 9: Twin Experiment: Model and Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Only child</td>
<td>Twins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saving rate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \gamma = 4 ) (30–40)</td>
<td>25.9%</td>
<td>19.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \gamma = 5 ) (40–50)</td>
<td>36.2%</td>
<td>26.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education expenditures</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \gamma = 4 ) (30–40)</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \gamma = 5 ) (40–50)</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>20.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non compulsory educ. exp. per child</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \gamma = 5 ) (40–50)</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human capital</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \frac{(h_{2009} - h_{ss})}{h_{ss}} )</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Estimates of the impact on household saving rates and education expenditures of having twins for these age brackets is available on request. Non reported in our benchmark regressions as coefficients were not significantly different across age brackets in most specifications.

Notes: This table compares the saving rate, expenditures devoted to children and children’s human capital attainment for households with twins and those with an only child in 2009, under the benchmark calibration, and in the data (where relevant).

5.3 Counterfactuals

5.3.1 Data Counterfactual

Using the empirical estimates of the twin-effect on saving and human capital accumulation, one can back out the counterfactual saving rate if instead a ‘two-children policy’ had been implemented since 1977. In other words, given the difficulty in knowing what the natural fertility rate in China would have been over this period, we can estimate a lower-bound of the overall impact of the one-child policy on the aggregate saving rate (micro and macro channels combined)— assuming that the natural rate of fertility would not have fallen below 2. We also point out that the full impact of the policy on aggregate saving rate is not yet realized, as the generation of only-children has yet to grow old and exert a greater impact on the economy, both in terms of their demographic weight and in terms of their income weight via their higher human capital. The procedure to compute the counterfactual involves estimating the age-saving profile and aggregate saving rate that would have prevailed in 2009 if all households were assumed to have two children after 1977, and to behave like parents of twins (using regression results based on twins). Details of the procedure are provided in Appendix B.3.

Results are displayed in Table 10, which shows the decomposition of the overall effect of the policy on aggregate saving into contributions from the various channels. The counterfactual exercise indicates that aggregate saving rate would have been between 6.4% to 7.3% lower if China had implemented a (binding) ‘two-children’ policy—or, alternatively if the natural rate of fertility after 1977 had simply been two children per household. These empirical estimates impute roughly a third of the 20% increase in aggregate savings rate in China to the one child policy since its implementation. Importantly, the
micro-channels explain about two-thirds of the overall effect, and is significantly more important than the macro-channel conventionally emphasized.

Table 10: Empirical counterfactuals using estimates from twins regressions: aggregate effect under a two children scenario.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aggregate savings rate 2009 (Census corrected)</th>
<th>Aggregate savings rate</th>
<th>Additional effect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Macro channels</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age composition</td>
<td>28.28%</td>
<td>-1.45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education and income composition (22 to 33y)</td>
<td>28.06%</td>
<td>-0.23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Micro channels</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (child below/over 15y)</td>
<td>25.68%</td>
<td>-2.37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-education (parents below/above 45)</td>
<td>24.22%</td>
<td>-1.46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional transfer channel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(More conservative) 3.4% scenario</td>
<td>23.32%</td>
<td>-0.90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Less conservative) 6.8% scenario</td>
<td>22.42%</td>
<td>-1.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total effect (3.4% scenario)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>-6.42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total effect (6.8% scenario)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>-7.31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total effect (Model)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>-6.45%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** Counterfactuals are run using estimates from the twins regressions. Macro (composition) channels are computed by multiplying the number of individuals born after 1982 by 2 (and 1.5 between 1978-1981), at the same time imputing them lower incomes/education attainment as predicted by Table 8. Micro-channels are calculated using the response of expenditures of households at various ages of the children (for educ. exp.) and various ages of the parents (for non-educ. exp.) from Tables 6 and 7. See details in Appendix B.3. Model estimates are based on running a ‘two-children’ policy in the quantitative model (benchmark calibration).

**Twins versus two-children.** One should be cautious with our empirical counterfactual as it assumes that having twins is similar to having two children sequentially. In what ways are twins different from two singleton children? One is that their arrival together may have been unanticipated, and the second is that there may be a difference in the degree of scale economies when having twins compared to having two children sequentially. With regard to the first issue, we mainly focus on older parents, so that the unanticipated dimension to the arrival of twins is less relevant—particularly since most of the expenditures relates to education at a later stage. Regarding economies of scale, there is evidence that they are larger for short birth spacing (of less than two years), particularly in childcare, and when children are of the same gender (see Newman (1983), Browning (1992), Rosenzweig and Wolpin (2000) for references; see also Rosenzweig and Zhang (2009)). For instance, apparel and room-sharing is found to be more likely when siblings are of the same gender. Thus, if anything, we tend to underestimate the expenditure channel when focusing on twins even though scale economies should not significantly differ between twins and two children households for most part of education costs.
5.3.2 Model Counterfactuals

The quantitative model can perform the same ‘two-children’ policy counterfactual as conducted in the data. But beyond the data counterfactuals, one can also apply it to assess the quantitative contribution of the one-child policy on national saving by simulating the case under unconstrained (and optimal) fertility.

‘Two-children’ policy. The same counterfactual exercise of a ‘two-children policy’ can be done for the quantitative model. If commencing 1976, all Chinese households were constrained to having 2 children, then the quantitative model (retaining all calibrated parameters) predicts a 6.5% lower aggregate saving rate in 2009 than that under a one-child policy—corresponding to about a third of the increase in aggregate saving rate over the last thirty years. This falls in the ballpark of our (conservative) empirical estimates (see Table 10).

Natural fertility rate. The empirical and model-based counterfactual of an alternative (two-children) policy demonstrates the quantitative relevance of the model given its proximity to empirical estimates. It is important to note that as long as fertility is constrained (under a one/two-children policy), our estimates are fairly accurate since the model is calibrated to observed data in the constrained regime. Ideally, one would also like to see how much of the rise in aggregate saving can be tied to the one-child policy by letting fertility be optimally chosen. The challenge, though, is that any attempted estimate risks being crude and speculative. One cannot, firstly, observe variations in the data that would enable us to deduce the natural fertility rate. Furthermore, one would need to be able to solve for the transition path post-1970—but data prior to the mid-80s (early 90s) is scarce. In particular, we have access neither to survey based data to estimate costs/returns to education nor aggregate data to gauge the relative benefits of investing in children over that period (mostly pinned-down by the parameter $\mu = \frac{1+g_z}{R}$.\(^{39}\) At this stage, the benchmark simulation implicitly takes these variables as constant from the starting point of the policy; e.g the natural fertility remained at 3 children per household. Under this scenario which provides an upper-bound of the effect, the policy would be able to explain almost 60% of the increase in aggregate savings.

The alternative calibration with time-varying income profiles implies a falling natural rate of fertility. Since growth is biased towards younger workers in that calibration, the cost of educating children in terms of foregone wages is rising relative to its expected benefits. The predicted natural fertility rate thus falls to 2.75 children per household in 2009, leading to an 3.5% increase of the aggregate saving rate since 1982 according to our simulations without fertility constraints. In this scenario, the one-child policy would thus explain about 45% of the increase in aggregate savings. If one conjectures that the natural fertility had been closer to 2 in the early 1980s and remained as such until 2009—then a third of the increase in aggregate savings can then be tied to the policy (similar to a ‘two-children’ policy experiment). In a nutshell, if the natural fertility rate of China hovered around 2 to 3 over this period—a reasonable scenario—\(^{40}\) one can argue that the one-child policy may have contributed to at least a third (and at most 60%) of the 20% increase in aggregate household saving over the last three decades.

\(^{39}\)Reliable estimates of the real interest rate is absent prior to the late-1980’s. Data post 1990 shows that $\mu$ has been fairly constant—consistent with our simulations.

\(^{40}\)For comparison purposes, the overall fertility rate in South Asia is 2.7 in 2011 (United Nations).
6 Conclusion

We show in this paper that exogenous fertility restrictions in China may have led to a rise in household saving rate—by altering saving decisions at the household level, and demographic and income compositions at the aggregate level. We explore the quantitative implications of these channels in a model linking fertility and savings through intergenerational transfers that depend on the quantity and quality of offspring. Predictions on the age-saving profile become richer and more subtle than that of the standard lifecycle model—where human capital investment and intergenerational transfers towards the elderly are absent. We show that where our quantitative framework can generate both a micro and macro effect on savings that is close to the data, the standard OLG model falls short on both fronts.

The impact of twins estimated from the data provides an out-of-sample check to our model predictions, based on a similar twin experiment. The impact on household saving, expenditures and the degree of the quantity-quality tradeoff is very close between model and data estimates. We find that the ‘one-child policy’ can account for at least a third (and up to 60%) of the rise in the aggregate household saving rate since its enforcement in the early 1980s. Importantly, the micro-channel accounts for the majority of the effect. This contrasts with the standard lifecycle hypothesis which conventionally focuses only on the macro channel of shifting demographic compositions.

This paper demonstrates that shifts in demographics as understood through the lens of a lifecycle model remain to be a powerful factor in accounting for the high and rising national saving rate in China—when augmented with important features capturing the realities of its households, and particularly when buttressed by compatible micro-level evidence. The tacit implication—on a broader scale—is that the one-child policy provides a natural experiment for understanding the link between fertility and saving behavior in many developing economies. The quantitative impact of the policy is still evolving as the generation of more-educated only children become older and exert a greater impact on the economy—both in human capital and demographic weight. We may therefore expect a greater impact of the policy on aggregate savings in years to come.

References


A Theory

A.1 Four-period model

Proof of Proposition 1

Proof of uniqueness:

If \{n_{ss}; h_{ss}\} exists, then it must satisfy the steady-state system of equations:

\[
\frac{n_{ss}}{1 - \theta - \psi \frac{n_{ss}}{\varpi}} = \left( \frac{v}{\beta(1 + \beta) + v} \right) \left( \frac{1}{\phi_0 + \phi_h(1 - \lambda) h_{ss}} \right)
\]

\[
h_{ss} = \left( \frac{\alpha \psi \mu}{\phi_h} \right) \frac{n_{ss}^{\varpi - 1}}{\varpi},
\]

which, combined, yields:

\[
\frac{n_{ss}}{1 - \theta - \psi \frac{n_{ss}}{\varpi}} = \left( \frac{v}{\beta(1 + \beta) + v} \right) \left( \frac{1}{\phi_0 + \alpha \varpi(1 - \lambda) \mu \alpha \psi \frac{n_{ss}}{\varpi}} \right),
\]

Let \(N_{ss} = n_{ss}^{\varpi - 1}\), and rewriting the above equation yields

\[
N_{ss}^{-(1/\omega)} - \left( \frac{v}{\beta(1 + \beta) + v} \right) \left( \frac{1 - \theta \psi \varpi\frac{N_{ss}}{\varpi}}{\phi_0 + (1 - \lambda) \mu \alpha \psi \varpi N_{ss}} \right) = 0
\]

Define the function \(G(x) = x^{-1/(1-\omega)} - \left( \frac{v}{\beta(1 + \beta) + v} \right) \left( \frac{1 - \theta \psi \varpi x}{\phi_0 + (1 - \lambda) \mu \alpha \psi \varpi x} \right)\) for \(x > 0\). Then,

\[
\lim_{x \to +\infty} G(x) = \left( \frac{\varpi v}{\beta(1 + \beta) + \varpi} \frac{\psi/\varpi}{(1 - \lambda)(\mu \alpha \psi \varpi)} \right) < 0 \text{ if } \lambda > 1
\]

and \(\lim_{x \to 0^+} G(x) = +\infty\). We have:

\[
G'(x) = -\frac{x^{-\omega/(1-\omega)}}{1 - \omega} + \frac{\psi\psi/\omega}{\beta(1 + \beta) + v} \frac{\phi_0 + (1 - \theta) (1 - \lambda) \alpha \mu}{\phi_0 + (1 - \lambda) \mu \alpha \psi \varpi x^2}.
\]

Two cases are:

- Case (1): if \(\phi_0 + (1 - \theta) (1 - \lambda) \alpha \mu \leq 0\) then \(G(x)\) is monotonically decreasing over \([0; +\infty)\).

- Case (2): \(G(x)\) is first decreasing— to a minimum value strictly negative attained at \(x_{\min} > 0\)— and then increasing for \(x > x_{\min}\).

In both cases, the intermediate value theorem applies, and there is a unique \(N_{ss} > 0\) such that \(G(N_{ss}) = 0\)— thus pinning down a unique \(\{n_{ss}; h_{ss}\}\) such that both are greater than 0. Moreover, if we define a unique \(n_0\) implicitly by

\[
\frac{n_0}{1 - \theta - \psi \frac{n_0^{\varpi - 1}}{\varpi}} = \left( \frac{v}{\beta(1 + \beta) + v} \right) \left( \frac{1}{\phi_0} \right),
\]

then it immediately follows that \(n \geq n_0\) if \(\varpi \geq \alpha\) (and \(\lambda > 1\)).
Proof of Lemma 2:

Substituting \( n_{\text{max}} \) for the choice variable \( n_t \) in Eq. 7, the dynamics of \( \log(h_{t+1}) \) becomes

\[
\log(h_{t+1}) = \frac{1}{1 - \alpha} \log \left( \frac{\alpha \psi n_{\text{max}}^{\omega - 1}}{\phi_h} \right) + \frac{1}{1 - \alpha} \log(\mu_{t+1}) - \frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha} \log(h_t),
\]

where \( \log(h_{t+1}) \) is mean-reverting due to \(-\frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha} < 1\) for \( \alpha < 1/2 \). It follows from \( n_{t_0 - 1} > n_{\text{max}} \) that \( h_{\text{max}} > h_{t_0} \).

Define aggregate labor income in the economy to be the sum of income of the young and middle-aged workers \( Y_{t+1} = (1 + n_t)N_{m,t+1}w_{m,t+1} \). Population evolves according to \( N_{m,t+1} = N_{y,t} = n_{t-1}N_{o,t+1} \), and analogously, \( N_{y,t+1} = n_tN_{y,t} = n_tN_{m,t+1} \). Cohort-level saving at date \( t + 1 \) are respectively:

\[
S_{y,t+1} = N_{y,t+1}a_{y,t+1} = -\theta n_t N_{t+1}^m \frac{w_{m,t+2}}{R} \\
S_{m,t+1} = N_{m,t+1}(a_{m,t+1} - a_{y,t}) = N_{m,t+1} \left[ \frac{\beta w_{m,t+1}}{1 + \beta} \left( 1 - \theta - n_t \phi(h_{t+1}) - \frac{\psi n_{t-1}^{\omega - 1}}{\omega} \right) - \frac{w_{m,t+2}}{R(1 + \beta)} \frac{\psi n_{t-1}^{\omega}}{\omega} + \theta \frac{w_{m,t+1}}{R} \right] \tag{17}
\]

\[
S_{o,t+1} = -N_{t+1}^o a_{m,t-1} = -N_{t+1}^o \left[ \frac{\beta w_{m,t}}{1 + \beta} \left( 1 - \theta - n_{t-1} \phi(h_t) - \frac{\psi n_{t-2}^{\omega - 1}}{\omega} \right) - \frac{w_{m,t-1}}{R(1 + \beta)} \frac{\psi n_{t-3}^{\omega}}{\omega} \right] \\
\]

Let \( S_{t+1} = \sum \gamma S_{y,t+1} \) (where \( \gamma \in \{ y, m, o \} \)) be aggregate saving at \( t + 1 \), denoted, then the aggregate saving rate \( s_{t+1} = S_{t+1}/Y_{t+1} \) can be written as

\[
s_{t+1} = \frac{1}{(1 + n_t)} \left[ -\frac{\theta}{R} n_t \left( \frac{w_{m,t+2}}{w_{m,t+1}} \right) + \frac{\beta}{1 + \beta} \left( 1 - \theta - n_t \phi(h_{t+1}) - \frac{\psi n_{t-1}^{\omega - 1}}{\omega} \right) - \frac{\psi}{R(1 + \beta)} \frac{n_{t-1}^{\omega}}{\omega} \left( \frac{w_{m,t+2}}{w_{m,t+1}} \right) + \frac{\theta}{R} \right] \tag{18}
\]

Comparison with twins:

From Eq. 7, the per-capita human capital of the twins (denoted \( h_{t+1}^{\text{twin}} \)) must satisfy:

\[
(h_{t+1}^{\text{twin}})^{1 - \alpha} h_{t+1}^{\alpha} = \left( \frac{\alpha \psi}{\phi_h} \mu \right) \left( \frac{2n_{\text{max}}^{\omega - 1}}{\omega} \right) < \left( \frac{\alpha \psi}{\phi_h} \mu \right) \left( \frac{n_{\text{max}}^{\omega - 1}}{\omega} \right) = (h_{t+1})^{1 - \alpha} h_{t+1}^{\alpha}.
\]

This leads immediately to the first testable implication.

The aggregate saving rate in \( t_{o+1} + 1 \), after the policy implemented in \( t_{o+1} \), is obtained by replacing \( t + 1 \) by \( t_{o+1} + 1 \) in Eq. 18 and \( n_t \) by \( n_{\text{max}} \). Using the optimal relationship between fertility and human capital along the transition path: \( \phi_h n_{\text{max}} h_{t+1} = \left( \frac{\alpha \psi}{\phi_h} (1 + g_2) \left( \frac{h_{t_{o+1} + 1}^{\alpha}}{n_{t_{o+1} + 1}^\alpha} \right)^{\alpha} \right) \left( \frac{n_{\text{max}}^{\omega - 1}}{\omega} \right) = \left( \frac{\alpha \psi}{\phi_h} \right) \left( \frac{n_{\text{max}}^{\omega - 1}}{\omega} \right) \left( \frac{w_{m,t+2}}{w_{m,t+1}} \right) \),

we have

\[
s_{t_{o+1} + 1} = \frac{1}{(1 + n_{\text{max}} e)} \left[ -\frac{\theta}{R} \left( 1 - n_{\text{max}} \frac{w_{m,t+2}}{w_{m,t+1}} \right) + \frac{\beta}{1 + \beta} \left( 1 - \theta \right) \left( 1 - \frac{1}{n_{\text{max}} (1 + g_2)} \right) \right] \]

\[
- \frac{\psi}{R(1 + \beta)} \frac{n_{\text{max}}^{\omega - 1}}{\omega} \left( 1 + \beta \alpha \right) - \frac{\beta}{1 + \beta} \phi_0 \left( n_{\text{max}} - \frac{1}{1 + g_2} \right)
\]

\[
+ \frac{\psi}{R(1 + \beta)} \frac{n_{\text{max}}^{\omega - 1}}{\omega} \left( 1 + \beta \alpha \right) - \frac{\psi}{1 + \beta} \frac{n_{t_{o+1} + 1}^{\omega - 1}}{\omega} - \frac{1}{n_{t_{o+1} + 1} (1 + g_2)} \]

The aggregate saving rate \( s_t \) in the initial period \( t = t_0 \) is the steady-state equivalent of the above
equation. In order to find the difference \( s_{t_0+1} - s_{t_0} \) we first obtain, with some algebraic manipulation:

\[
s_{t_0+1} = \left( 1 + \frac{(n_{t_0} - n_{\text{max}})}{n_{\text{max}}} e \right) s_{t_0}
\]

\[
= \frac{1}{1 + n_{\text{max}} e} \left[ -\frac{\theta}{R(1+\beta)} \psi \left( n_{\text{max}} \left( \frac{w_{m,t+1}}{w_{m,t+1} - 1} \right) - n_{t_0} - (1 + g_z) \right) \right]
\]

\[
= \frac{1}{1 + n_{\text{max}} e} \left[ -\frac{\theta}{R(1+\beta)} \psi \left( n_{\text{max}} \left( \frac{h_{t_0+1}}{n_{t_0}} \right) - n_{t_0} - (1 + g_z) \right) \right].
\]

Rearranging,

\[
s_{t_0+1} - s_{t_0} = \frac{(n_{t_0} - n_{\text{max}})}{1 + n_{\text{max}} e} s_{t_0} + \frac{1}{1 + n_{\text{max}} e} \frac{\theta}{R} (1 + g_z) \left( n_{t_0} - n_{\text{max}} \right) \left( \frac{h_{t_0+1}}{h_{t_0}} \right)^\alpha
\]

\[
+ \frac{\beta}{(1+\beta)(1 + n_{\text{max}} e)} \left[ \phi_0 (n_{t_0} - n_{\text{max}}) + \frac{1 + \beta \alpha}{\psi (1 + g_z)} \left( n_{t_0}^\omega - n_{\text{max}}^\omega \right) \left( \frac{h_{t_0+1}}{h_{t_0}} \right)^\alpha \right].
\]

To prove that \( s_{t_0+1} - s_{t_0} > 0 \), we first use Eq. 7 to determine the human capital level in periods \( t_0 \) (in steady-state) and \( t_0 + 1 \):

\[
h_{t_0} = \left( \frac{\alpha \psi}{\phi_h R} (1 + g_z) \right) \left( \frac{n_{t_0} - n_{\text{max}}}{n_{t_0} - n_{\text{max}}} \right)^{\omega - 1}
\]

\[
(h_{t_0+1})^{1-\alpha} h_{t_0}^{\alpha} = \left( \frac{\alpha \psi}{\phi_h R} (1 + g_z) \right) \left( \frac{n_{\text{max}}}{n_{t_0} - n_{\text{max}}} \right)^{\omega - 1}
\]

\[
\Rightarrow \left( \frac{h_{t_0+1}}{h_{t_0}} \right) = \left( \frac{n_{t_0} - n_{\text{max}}}{n_{\text{max}}} \right)^{\frac{1-\alpha}{\omega}} \tag{19}
\]

This implies that if \( n_{t_0} > n_{\text{max}} \), then

\[
n_{t_0} - n_{\text{max}} \left( \frac{h_{t_0+1}}{h_{t_0}} \right)^\alpha = n_{t_0} - \left( n_{\text{max}} \right)^{\frac{1-\alpha}{1-\alpha}} > 0
\]

\[
n_{t_0}^\omega - n_{\text{max}}^\omega \left( \frac{h_{t_0+1}}{h_{t_0}} \right)^\alpha = n_{t_0}^\omega - \left( n_{t_0}^\omega \right)^{\frac{1-\alpha}{\omega}} > 0
\]

if \( \omega > 1/2 > \alpha \).

**Proof of Lemma 3**

From 19, we have:

\[
s_{m,t_0+1} - s_{m,t_0} = \Delta s_m = \frac{\beta}{(1+\beta)} \left[ \phi_0 (n_{t_0} - n_{\text{max}}) + \frac{1 + \beta \alpha}{\psi (1 + g_z)} \left( n_{t_0}^\omega - n_{\text{max}}^\omega \right) \left( \frac{h_{t_0+1}}{h_{t_0}} \right)^\alpha \right]
\]

The saving rate for a middle-aged agent in period \( t+1 \) is \( s_{m,t+1} \equiv (a_{m,t+1} - a_{y,t})/w_{m,t+1} \). By Eq. 18,
we have

\[ s_{m,t_0+1} - s_{m,t_0+1}^{twin} = \frac{\beta}{1+\beta} \left[ \phi_0 n_{\max} + \frac{(1+\alpha \beta)}{R \beta} \frac{\psi(1+g_z)}{n_{\max}^{\alpha}} \left( \frac{h_{t_0+1}}{h_t} \right)^{\alpha} \left( 2^{\frac{\alpha - \alpha}{2}} - 1 \right) \right]. \]

The micro-channel on aggregate saving of moving from \( n_{t_0-1} = 2n_{\max} \) to \( n_{\max} \) in \( t_0 \) is,

\[
\Delta s_m(2n_{\max}) = \frac{\beta}{1+\beta} \left[ \phi_0 n_{\max} + \frac{(1+\beta \alpha)}{R \beta} \frac{\psi(1+g_z)}{n_{\max}^{\alpha}} \left( \frac{h_{t_0+1}}{h_t} \right)^{\alpha} \left( 2^{\alpha \left( \frac{h_{t_0+1}}{h_t} \right)^{-\alpha}} - 1 \right) \right]
\]

\[
= \frac{\beta}{1+\beta} \left[ \phi_0 n_{\max} + \frac{(1+\beta \alpha)}{R \beta} \frac{\psi(1+g_z)}{n_{\max}^{\alpha}} \left( \frac{h_{t_0+1}}{h_t} \right)^{\alpha} \left( 2^{\frac{\alpha - \alpha}{2}} - 1 \right) \right]
\]

\[
= s_{m,t_0+1} - s_{m,t_0+1}^{twin},
\]

using Eq. 19.

### A.2 Quantitative OLG model

Derivation of Fertility and Human Capital Relationships in the Quantitative Model.

The intertemporal budget constraint satisfies

\[
\left( \sum_{\gamma=4}^{8} \beta^{\gamma-1} \right) \left( \frac{c_{4,t+1}}{w_{4,t+1}} \right) = (1 - \theta - \phi_4 n_t) + \mu \left[ (\phi_5 + \phi_h h_{t+1}) n_t + \psi \frac{n_{t-1}^{\alpha-1}}{n_t^{\alpha}} \right] \left( \frac{e_{5,t+2}}{e_{4,t+1}} \right)
\]

\[-\mu^2 \left( \psi \frac{n_{t-1}^{\alpha-1}}{n_t^{\alpha}} \right) \left( \frac{e_{6,t+3}}{e_{4,t+1}} \right) + \mu^3 \left( \psi \frac{n_{t}^{\alpha-1}}{n_t^{\alpha}} \right) \left( \frac{h_{t+1}}{h_t} \right)^{\alpha} \left( \frac{e_{5,t+4}}{e_{4,t+1}} + \mu \frac{e_{6,t+5}}{e_{4,t+1}} \right)
\]

\[+ \mu \left( \frac{e_{5,t+2}}{e_{4,t+1}} + \mu \frac{e_{6,t+3}}{e_{4,t+1}} \right) \quad \text{(20)}
\]

First order condition on \( h_{t+1} \):

\[
h_t^{\alpha-1} h_{t+1} = \left( \frac{\psi \mu^2}{\phi_h} \right) n_t^{\alpha-1} \left[ \mu \left( \frac{e_{6,t+5}}{e_{5,t+2}} \right) + \left( \frac{e_{5,t+4}}{e_{4,t+1}} \right) \right]
\]

or,

\[
\left( \frac{h_{t+1}}{h_t} \right)^{\alpha} = \frac{\phi_h h_{t+1}}{\xi_{t+1} n_t^{\alpha-1} \psi} \quad \text{(21)}
\]

where \( \xi_{t+1} \equiv \mu^2 \left[ \mu \left( \frac{e_{5_{t+4}}}{e_{5_{t+2}}^2} \right) + \left( \frac{e_{5_{t+4}}}{e_{5_{t+2}}^2} \right) \right] \).

First order condition on fertility \( n_t \):

\[
\frac{v}{n_t} = \frac{\beta}{c_{4,t+1}} \left[ \mu(\phi_5 + \phi_h h_{t+1}) \frac{e_{5,t+2}}{e_{4,t+1}} - \mu^3 \left( \psi n_t^{\alpha-1} \right) \left( \frac{h_{t+1}}{h_t} \right)^{\alpha} \left( \frac{e_{5,t+4}}{e_{4,t+1}} + \mu \frac{e_{6,t+5}}{e_{4,t+1}} \right) \right] w_{4,t+1}
\]
C

Steady-State Properties. If variables are assumed to be constant through time and \( \lambda > 1 \), there exists a unique steady-state \( \{n_{ss}; h_{ss}\} \)— characterized by \( n_{ss} > \left( \frac{v}{v+\Pi(\beta)} \right) \left( \frac{1-\theta+\mu x_{ss}}{\phi_{0,ss}} \right) \) and \( h_{ss} > 0 \)— to which the dynamic model defined by Eq. 14 and 15 converges. The modified \((NN)\) and \((QQ)\) curves, describing the steady-state choice of fertility, given human capital accumulation and the quantity-quality trade-off, become:

\[
\frac{n_{ss}}{(1-\theta)+\mu x_{ss}(1-\varphi n_{ss}^{\omega-1}/\omega)} = \left( \frac{v}{v+\Pi(\beta)} \right) \left( \frac{1}{\phi_{0,ss} + \phi_{h,ss} h_{ss}(1-\lambda)} \right) \quad \text{(NN)}
\]

\[
h_{ss} = \left( \frac{\psi \alpha x_{ss}}{\omega \phi_{h}} \right) n_{ss}^{\omega-1}, \quad \text{(QQ)}
\]

The \((NN)\) and \((QQ)\) curves and the associated comparative statics are similar to those in the simple four-period model.

B Data

Common Definitions.

Nuclear household: a household with two parents (head of household and spouse) and either a singleton or twins.

Individual disposable income: annual total income net of tax payments: including salary, private business and property income, as well as private and public transfers income.

Household disposable income: sum of the individual disposable income of all the individuals living in the household.

Household consumption expenditures: the sum of consumption expenditures in the household, including food, clothing, health, transportation and communication, education, housing (ie. rent or estimated rent of owned house), and miscellaneous goods and services. Education transfers to children living in another city are available only for UHS 2002 to 2009. Our definition of consumption expenditure does not include interest and loan repayments, transfers and social security spending.

Individual consumption expenditures: individual expenditures are not directly observable. The estimation strategy explicated in Appendix B.2 gives age-specific individual expenditures from household
Household saving rate: household disposable income less household expenditures as a share of household disposable income.
Individual savings rate: individual disposable income less individual expenditure as a share of disposable income.

B.1 Data Sources and Description

1. Urban Household Survey (UHS)
We use annual data from the Urban Household Survey (UHS), conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics, for 1986 and 1992 to 2009. Households are expected to stay in the survey for 3 years and are chosen randomly based on several stratifications at the provincial, city, county, township, and neighborhood levels. Both income and expenditures data are collected based on daily records of all items purchased and income received for each day during a full year. No country other than China uses such comprehensive 12-month expenditure records. Households are required by Chinese law to participate in the survey and to respond truthfully, and the Chinese survey privacy law protects illegal rural residents in urban locations (Gruber (2012); Banerjee et al. (2010)).

The 1986 survey covers 47,221 individuals in 12,185 households across 31 provinces. Hunan province observations in 1986 are treated as outliers and excluded because of the excessive share of twin households (46 out of 356). For the 1992 to 2009 surveys the sample covers 112 prefectures across 9 representative provinces (Beijing, Liaoning, Zhejiang, Anhui, Hubei, Guangdong, Sichuan, Shaanxi and Gansu). The coverage has been extended over time from roughly 5,500 households in the 1992 to 2001 surveys to nearly 16,000 households in the 2002 to 2009 surveys.

We generally limit the sample of households to those with children of 18 and below (or 21 and below) because older children who still remain in their parents’ household most likely are income earners and make independent decisions on consumption (rather than being made by their parents). Children who have departed from their parents’ household are no longer observed (unless they remain financially dependent). As less than 0.5% of surveyed individuals aged 18 to 21 years old are living in uni-generational household (i.e. children studying in another city are still recorded as members of their parents’ household), we believe that potential selection biases are rather limited.

Definitions

Young dependents: all individuals aged below 18 years of age as well as those aged 18 to 25 who are still full-time students. We assume that those individuals, being financially dependent, do not make their own saving and investment decisions.

Twins: we identify a pair of twins as two children under the same household head who are born in the same year, and when available, in the same month. When comparing twins identified using year of birth data as opposed to using both year and month of birth data (available for 2007 to 2009), only 8 households out of 206 with children below 18 years were misidentified as having twins and only 1 nuclear household out of 154 was misidentified. Overall, twins household make up for roughly 1% of all households with young children, which is consistent with the biological rate of twins occurrence.
In Table 8 the following definitions apply:

Higher education: dummy is equal to one if the child has reached post-secondary education.

Academic high school: dummy is equal to one if the child’s highest level of education is either an academic high school or an undergraduate/postgraduate degree.

Technical high school: dummy is equal to one if the child’s highest level of education is either a technical or vocational high school or a professional school (i.e. junior college).

2. CHARLS

The China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study (CHARLS) pilot survey was conducted in 2008 in two provinces—Zhejiang and Gansu. Subsequently, CHARLS conducted in 2011 the first wave of its national baseline survey covering 28 provinces. Data for 2011 are now partially available. The main respondents are from a random sample of people over the age of 45, and their spouses. Detailed information are provided on their transfer received/given to each of their children. The urban sample in 2008 (2011) covers 670 households (4,224 households) of which 321 (1,699) have at least one parent above 60 and at least one adult children above 25.

Definitions

Gross transfers: sum of regular financial transfer, non-regular financial transfer and non-monetary transfer (i.e. the monetary value of gifts, in-kind etc.) from adult children to elderly parents. In 2008, of the 359 urban households in which transfers occur between children and parents: regular monetary transfers represent 14% of the total value of transfer from children, non-regular monetary transfers represent 42%, and 44% takes in the form of non-monetary support.

Net transfers: gross transfers less the sum of all transfers from parents to children.

Used in Table 4 (CHARLS 2008):

Transfers: the sum of all financial and non-monetary transfers from an individual child to his elderly parents. We focus only on gross transfers because the Poisson estimation does not allow for negative values in the dependent variable. This restriction does not bias the results since negative net transfers between elderly parents and adult children occur in only 4% of the households in CHARLS 2008.

Individual income: CHARLS 2008 does not provide data on children’s individual income. Therefore, in order to approximate the share of transfers in children’s income we need to use UHS (2008) income data. We compute the average individual income level by province, gender and education level (four groups) for each 3-year age group, in UHS. Then the incomes of these individuals with a certain set of characteristics are taken to be proxies for the incomes of children with the same set of characteristics in CHARLS. In CHARLS 2011 parents are asked to estimate each of their children household annual income. Regression estimates CHARLS 2011 using this measure are very similar.

Education level: categorical variable with 10 groups ranging from “no formal education” to “PhD level”.

3. RUMiCI

We use the China sample of the 2008 Rural-Urban Migration in China and Indonesia (RUMiCI) sur-
vey. The urban sample covers 4,998 households (of which 2,654 are nuclear households) across 19 cities in 10 provinces. RUMiCI provides data on all children born to the household head (as opposed to UHS where only children registered in the household are reported). Thus we can use RUMiCI as a robustness check on the saving and expenditures profiles, which are in line with those estimated from UHS data (Figure 3).

4. Census
The 1990 Chinese census surveyed 1% of the Chinese population across 31 provinces. The urban sample includes nearly 3 million individual observations. Figure 1 plots the number of surviving children associated with the responding head of household (or spouse) against the average birth cohort of children living in the household. For the calibration and counterfactual analysis we use the 1990 Census age distribution of urban individuals, assuming a zero mortality to compute the aggregate savings rate in different years.

B.2 Individual consumption estimation
The estimation procedure for age-saving profiles in China are explained in detail in the Technical Appendix of Coeurdacier, Guibaud and Jin (2013). Here, we briefly describe the main methodology employed to disaggregate household consumption into individual consumption, and thereby estimate individual saving by age. Following the projection method of Chesher (1997, 1998), the following model is estimated on the cross-section of households for every year:

$$C_h = \exp(\gamma Z_h) \left( \sum_{j=1}^{99} c_j N_{h,j} \right) + \epsilon_h,$$

where $C_h$ is the aggregate consumption of household $h$, $N_{h,j}$ is the number of members of age $j$ in household $h$, and $Z_h$ denotes a set of household-specific controls. Following Chesher (1997), multiplicative separability is assumed to limit the number of degrees of freedom, and control variables enter in an exponential term. The control variables include:

- Household composition: number of children aged 0-10, number of children 10-18, number of adults, and depending on the specification, the number of old and young dependents. The coefficient associated with the number of children is positive, as children-related expenses are attributed to the parents.

- Household income group: households are grouped into income quintile. The sign of the control variable (a discrete variable 1-5) is positive: individuals living in richer households consume more.

In the estimation, a roughness penalization term is introduced to guarantee smoothness of the estimated function $c_j = c(j)$. This term is of the form:

$$P = \kappa^2 \int [c''(j)]^2 \, dj,$$
where $\kappa$ is a constant that controls the amount of smoothing (no smoothing when $\kappa = 0$ and forced linearity as $\kappa \to \infty$). The discretized version of $P$, given that $j$ is an integer in $[19; 99]$, can be written $\kappa^2 (Jc_j)'(Jc_j)$, where the matrix $J$ is the $79 \times 81$ band matrix

$$
J = \begin{bmatrix}
1 & -2 & 1 & 0 & \ldots & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 1 & -2 & 1 & \ldots & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 1 & -2 & \ldots & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
\vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots \\
0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & \ldots & -2 & 1 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & \ldots & 1 & -2 & 1 \\
\end{bmatrix},
$$

and $c_j = [c_{j}]_{j=19,...,99}$ is an $81 \times 1$ vector. Pre-multiplying $c_j$ by $J$ produces a vector of second differences. We set $\kappa = 10$.

As a robustness check, we use the projection method to estimate individual income distributions by age from household income data, and then confront the estimated distributions with the actual ones—which we observe for the period 1992-2009. The estimated income distributions are very close to the observed ones.\(^{41}\)

### B.3 Empirical Counterfactual

One would also need to identify all channels through which having two children rather than one affect household savings. Four different effects comprising the macro-economic and micro-economic channels include (i) composition of income and education; (ii) composition of population; (iii) expenditure channel; (iv) transfer channel. We decompose the quantitative contribution of each of these different channels in Table 10, noting however that (iii) and (iv) are difficult to disentangle empirically.

#### Macro-channels.

**Composition of Population.** First, one needs to account for the shifts in the demographic composition. This involves multiplying the number of observations of individuals born after 1982 by a factor of 2 and the number of individuals born in between 1978-1981 by a factor of 1.5, in the 2009 sample. Holding constant the age-saving profile, aggregate saving is now about 1.45 % lower under a ‘two-child policy’ due to the demographic composition effect.

**Composition of Education and Income.** Second, the incremental individual human capital that is attributed to the one-child policy alters household saving to the extent that those with higher education tend to save more; it also alters the composition of income across age groups. Therefore, we need to ‘purge’ the additional human capital caused by the policy. Using estimates of the twin-effect on education attainment provided in Table 8, we give young cohorts a 40 percent less likelihood of attaining higher education under the two-children scenario. The overall impact on aggregate saving, holding everything else constant, is however very small—less that 0.3 %. The effect being small is not surprising since it concerns only a small fraction of households in the whole sample at present; also,

\(^{41}\)For the year 1986, information on income is available only at the household level. For that year, we therefore use the projection method to estimate both individual income and individual consumption.
the positive impact of higher education on savings comes through only in later stages of life rather than at young ages. We therefore expect a greater impact of the education and income channel in the future years.

Thus, when moving from one to two children per household, compositional effects account for a 1.7% difference in aggregate saving. Though this number may seem small at first glance, this effect will only rise in magnitude in the near future as the generation of only child ages and accounts for a larger share of aggregate income and saving at the age of 40—around 10 years time.

Micro-channels.

**Expenditure and Transfers.** Third, the imputed increase in expenditures associated with having an additional child is used to quantify the expenditure channel effect. Taking first education expenditures, we give all households with one child under 15 years of age in the sample now a 4.8% higher expenditure in education (as a share of household income) on compulsory education, relying on the estimates from Table 7 (Column 3). For households with a child above 15 years of age, we assign an additional non-compulsory education expenditure that is lower since the quantity-quality trade-off is at work: from the estimate in Column 3, we find a 2.7% increase for an additional child above 15 (i.e. = 4.8%+2.9%−5.0% corresponding to 4.8% higher education expenditures for all twins households, 2.9% higher education expenditures specific to households with twins above 15, minus 5% higher education expenditures which are common to all households with children above 15). The overall effect of higher education expenditures leads to an additional 2.37% fall in the aggregate saving rate.

One can proceed by the same methodology to calculate the additional non-education related expenditures, remarking though that these effects kick in mostly during later stages of adulthood (see Table 6 column 4). We impute to all parents with financially dependent children (i.e below 18 or below 25 and still students) a 1.2% higher non-education expenditure when under 45, and a 7.6% higher expenditures when above 45 (i.e. = 1.2%+6.8%−0.4% corresponding to 1.2% higher non-education expenditures for all twins households, 6.8% higher non-education specific to twins parents above 45, minus 0.4% higher expenditures common to all households with parents above 45).

Taken all together, the incremental education and non-education expenditures lead to an additional 3.83% (= 2.37% + 1.46%) drop in the aggregate saving rate (see Table 10). Note that apart from education expenditures that are clearly devoted to children, the change in other expenditures when moving from one to two children is partly driven by the ‘expenditure channel’ and partly by the ‘transfer channel’. One cannot fully disentangle the two using existing data, but we nevertheless believe that the impact on older parents’ of ‘other expenditures’ is likely to operate through the transfer channel.

A caveat is that older parents (in their late 40s and 50s) that were subject to the policy should also be affected by the ‘transfer channel’, even though their only child has left the household. This effect cannot be measured in the data since one can no longer observe whether parents had an only child or twins once the children have departed from the household. But if ‘non-education expenditures’ for parents above 45 (in Table 6) is used as a proxy for the increase in overall expenditures, (treated) households in their late 40s to 50s (before retirement) with two children should incur an additional 6.8% (of household income) higher expenditure. This channel is, however, less precisely estimated from
the data and warrants a sensitivity analysis using more conservative estimates: assuming instead that additional expenditures are 3.4% higher (rather than 6.8%) for older parents (without children below 21 or below 25 but still studying in the household), aggregate saving rate falls by an additional 0.9% (resp. 1.8%).

The combined effect of these channels summarized in Table 10 indicates that aggregate saving rate would have been between 6.4% to 7.3% lower if China had implemented a (binding) ‘two-children’ policy—or, alternatively if the natural rate of fertility after 1977 had simply been two children per household. These estimates impute roughly a third of the 20% increase in aggregate savings rate in China to the one child policy since its implementation.
C  Additional Tables and Figures

Figure C.1: Timing of Lifetime Events: Quantitative OLG Model

Table C.1: Number of Siblings/Children by Cohort (1986 and 2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age (Birth Year)</th>
<th>No. Sibling (Fertility Year)</th>
<th>No. Children</th>
<th>Age (Birth Year)</th>
<th>No. Sibling (Fertility Year)</th>
<th>No. Children</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>35 (1951)</td>
<td>3 (1979)</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>35 (1974)</td>
<td>2.25 – 2.7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45 (1941)</td>
<td>3 (1969)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>45 (1964)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55 (1931)</td>
<td>3 (1959)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>55 (1954)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65 (1921)</td>
<td>3 (1949)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>65 (1944)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75 (1911)</td>
<td>3 (1939)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>75 (1934)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The number of children and siblings (including the individual) attributed to an individual belonging to a particular cohort in the year 1986 and 2009—by year in which they and their children were, respectively, born. This shows that contemporaneous cohorts in each of these two years were differentially affected by fertility control policies.