Communication and Influence*

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Abstract

We study the information flows that arise among a set of agents with local knowledge and directed payoff interactions, which differ among pairs of agents. First, we study the equilibrium of a game where, before making decisions, agents can invest in pairwise active communication (speaking) and pairwise passive communication (listening). This leads to a full characterization of information and influence flows. Second, we use our equilibrium characterization to derive a game-theoretic microfoundation of a widely used centrality measure: when the coordination motive dominates the adaptation motive, the influence of an agent on all his peers is approximately proportional to his Invariant Method index. Third, we use our results to explain organizational phenomena such as: the emergence of work cliques; the adoption of human resources practices that foster communication (especially active communication); and the discrepancy between formal hierarchy and actual influence.

1 Introduction

Communication is one of the defining characteristics of humans. A large part of our day is spent on various media, ranging from having informal conversations to writing formal reports, from exchanging email messages to participating in social media. This is true in private context as well as on the workplace. Corporate leaders spend upward of 80 percent of their work time in communication-centered activities (Mintzberg 1973, Kanter 1977, Bandiera et al. 2009)

The endogeneity of communication patterns should lie at the center of a theory of organization (Arrow 1974). We have some control on whom we decide to speak to, email, or

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†Toni passed away in November 2007. His friendship, energy and talents are sorely missed. While the ideas and the results contained in this paper are due to the three authors, only de Martí and Prat are responsible for any remaining errors or omissions.
telephone. As communication requires time, we are selective and instrumental in how much we invest in communicating with different agents. As Simon (1986) noted: “If we record the frequency of communication between different nodes, we [will] find that the pattern is not uniform but highly structured. In fact, the pattern of communication frequencies [should] reflect, approximately, the pattern of authority.” The objective of this paper is to develop a model of endogenous costly communication and to use it to understand influence patterns.

Although, since its inception, information economics has understood the importance and endogeneity of communication, there is no tractable micro-founded model of costly communication among an arbitrary set of agents. A large body of research considers strategic information transmission in settings where communication is costless but non-directly verifiable (see Sobel (2011) for a survey). In particular, two recent contributions study cheap talk on networks (Hagenbach and Koessler 2010, Galeotti et al 2009). A number of authors have studied network problems where the intensity of links between players is costly, endogenous and strategic (see the related literature section for more references). These works do not, however, model information explicitly and their interpretation in terms of information economics is not obvious.

This paper is closest to a small set of papers, which study costly, endogenous communication between two parties (Dewatripont and Tirole 2005, Dessein and Santos 2006). Our main contribution is to study arbitrary sets of agents with arbitrary interactions. On the substantive level, the presence of more than two agents generates interesting “indirect” effect that bring organizational economics closer to the sociology of organizations (Gibbons, 2005): we will relate our work to existing results on: work cliques, the bias against active communication, human resources management practices, and the discrepancy between formal hierarchies and actual influence. On the theoretical level, going beyond two agents allows us to uncover a systematic relation between influence in incomplete information setting and the Invariant Method, a graph-theoretic measure widely used in computer science including in Google’s PageRank argument.

This first step towards a model of endogenous and costly communication among an arbitrary number of agents is made within the classical normal-quadratic local information model that was introduced by team theory (Marschak and Radner 1972) and that has found wide application in the study of contracts and organizations. One advantage of the quadratic approach is that it makes it easy to disentangle coordination and adaptation. Unlike team theory, in our baseline case agents are self-interested. One of our goals is to see what kind of inefficiencies we should expect to arise in a world were communication and influence are chosen by individuals.

The model can be sketched as follows. There are a number of agents who face local uncertainty (for simplicity, local states are assumed to be mutually independent). Each agent observes the realization of his local state and must take an action. The payoff of each agent depends on his local state, his own action, and the action of other agents. The pattern of payoff interactions among agents is described by a directed graph that encompasses two dimensions of heterogeneity: the interdependence on individual actions and the pairwise intensity of these interdependencies. While our setup encompasses both negative and positive payoff interactions, in most of the paper we restrict attention to

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1 Our linear-quadratic problem with endogenous information bears some similarities to the macroeconomic literature on rational inattention initiated by Sims (2003).
positive complementarities only.

Before choosing his action, an agent can engage in communication. He can inform other agents about his own state of the world and he can gather information about other agents’ state of the world.\(^2\) Formally, the agent selects a vector of active communication intensities and a vector of passive communication intensities. The precision of the communication of one agent to another is then determined by how much the sender invests in active communication (talking) and how much the receiver invests in passive communication (listening). Both types of communication are costly, and the cost is an increasing and convex function of communication intensity.

At this point, we face two alternative modeling choices. Agents may choose communication intensities before or after they learn about their own state of the world. This depends on whether we think of communication investment as long-term or short-term. As we shall see, the advantage of the classical normal-quadratic setting explored here is that both versions of the model have the same equilibrium.\(^3\)

One of the advantages of our modeling approach is that the intensity of communication and influence (how much an agent’s state influences another agent’s action) is represented by continuous variables. This is useful because, as it has been recognized by sociologists for a long time (Granovetter, 1973), the strength of interpersonal ties should not be thought of as a 0-1 variable. We keep the analysis tractable by abstracting from the possibility of information manipulation on the part of active communicators.\(^4\) This allows us to give a clean answer to the problem of moral hazard in direct communication intensity, as identified by Arrow (1974).\(^5\)

Our analysis is divided in three parts. We first characterize communication patterns and individual decisions in equilibrium. We show that games in the class we consider have a unique equilibrium in linear strategies, namely one where the action of each agent is a linear function of his own signal and the signal that he receives from other agents.

These games feature various levels of strategic interaction. Active communication, pas-

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\(^2\)In our set-up, which allows for one round of communication only, there is no loss of generality in assuming that communication only relates to the observed state of the world. Things would be different if we allowed for more than one round.

\(^3\)The example of a short-term investment could be a visit. A firm invites representatives from another firm to visit their plants, as a chance for the visitors to learn more about the host firm. The active communication cost is sustained by the host firm (hospitality, time devoted to visitors, etc...), while the passive communication cost is sustained by the visitors (travel costs, time spent on visit, etc...). As a visit can be planned in a matter of weeks, it is conceivable that the decision to organize a visit is taken after the two parties learn their respective states of the world (demand, production costs, etc...). Instead the example of a longer term communication investment could be the appointment of a liaison officer. A firm invites another firm to second one of their employees to the first firm. The liaison officer would then be in a good position to report information about the host firm as it arises. Here, again, the host sustains an active communication cost while the liaison officer’s firm sustains a passive communication cost. A secondment of this kind appears to require a longer time horizon and it is likely that both firms will receive new information after the investment is made.

\(^4\)Strategic communication within organizations is explored by Alonso et al. 2007, Rantakari 2007.

\(^5\)While the non-manipulability assumption is strong, it is plausible for certain types of communication. For instance, it is standard for a host firm to allow visitors to sample randomly from their product stock (e.g. food products, geological samples, test trials, etc...). The cost of active communication is given by the amount of product sampled, while the cost of passive communication relates to the quality of the analysis performed by the visitors. The signal visitors receive is an unbiased estimator of the product characteristics.
sive communication, and decision influence are strategic complements. Alice invests in talking to Bob, because she hopes that Bob will invest in listening to her and will use the information he has received to coordinate his action's with Alice’s state, something that would benefit Alice. Bob is influenced by the signal she receives from Alice because he has invested in listening and he thinks that she has invested in active communication; hence the signal should be valuable in coordinating his action with hers. With more than two agents, these interactions may be indirect. Alice and Carol are not interested in coordinating their actions per se, but they both want to coordinate with Bob. In equilibrium they might invest in communicating with each other, in the knowledge that Bob’s action will be affected by their states.

One way of finding the fixed point of this set of interactions is to proceed iteratively, at each step taking into account a higher level of interactions. Our equilibrium corresponds to the limit of this iterative process. In equilibrium, a simple linear relation describes active and passive communication from one agent to the other as a linear function of how much the latter is influenced by information he receives. In turn, influence coefficients are determined jointly for all agents as a linear system. This tractable equilibrium characterization is useful to draw lessons on patterns of communication and influence.

In the second part of the paper we use the main characterization result to explore patterns of communication and influence. As one would expect, we can prove that communication flows and influence relations between two agents, if these agents have stronger exogenous interaction ties. Less obvious are indirect effects, namely how communication between two agents changes when other interaction ties change. Suppose the exogenous ties between a subset of workers become stronger: in the labor sociology language, a work “clique” forms. (Dalton, 1959). We show the existence of an insularity effect, pushing the clique members to reduce their interest in talking to the outside world, and an opposite reinforcement effect, whereby outsiders are keen to understand what goes on inside the firm. Active and passive communication go in opposite direction. The overall effect on influence from the clique to the outside is positive at first when the clique has relatively weak ties, but it turns to negative when the ties get sufficiently strong.

In our non-cooperative set-up, communication and influence is generally inefficiently low. Agents do not internalize the benefit that investment in communication generates for other agents. This is true for both active and passive communication. However players tend to under-invest, in relative terms, more on active communication relative to passive communication. To see this, suppose that active and passive communication have the same cost. A planner would choose the same level of active and passive communication. Yet, with \( n > 2 \), agents spend less on active communication. The benefit of listening is direct: the receiver incorporates the information in his decision-making. The benefit of speaking is indirect: the sender hopes that the receiver will incorporate the information he receives in his decision-making. We relate these results to the evidence on the effect on firm performance of introducing innovative Human Resources Management (HRM) practices (Ichniowski and Shaw, 1997).

In the third and last part of the paper we ask which agents are most influential overall and we uncover connections with concepts used in sociology and computer science. The global influence of an agent is the aggregate effect that a marginal change in the agent’s local state has on other agents’ actions. In our setting global influence is an equilibrium...
variable, which is in turn jointly determined by three other equilibrium phenomena: active communication, passive communication and decision-making.

In recent years, a particular graph-theoretic measure of influence has become extremely prominent. Following the key economic reference in this area (Palacios-Huerta and Volij 2004), we refer to it as the Invariant Method. The influence of node $i$ is defined as a sum of the influences of the other nodes each of which is weighted by the strength of the directed link between it and node $i$. As this definition applies to all nodes, we have a fixed point problem, whose solution corresponds to the minimal positive eigenvector of the directed link matrix. The Invariant Method underpins the PageRank algorithm used in the Google search engine (Page et al ?) and it is used by the more sophisticated scientific impact factor analyses (cite). It is also attractive at a theoretical level: Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2004) show that it is the only graph-theoretic measure that satisfies a number of natural axioms. Economists have recently begun to use to study supply networks and the transmission of volatility (Acemoglu et al) and to analyze email communication patterns among sets of workers (Palacios-Huerta and Prat 2010).\footnote{This measure is also known as Katz centrality (Katz 1953). Although Leo Katz deserves the credit, we refer to it as Invariant Method to avoid potential confusion with another centrality index which sometimes bears Katz’s name too (Jackson, 2010, Chapter 2). We return to these distinctions in more detail in Section 5.}

We provide the first game-theoretic microfoundation of the Invariant Method. In the quadratic setting we study, each agent cares about adaptation (fitting his action to his own local state) and coordination (fitting his action to other agents’ actions). We show that, as the coordination motive becomes more and more important, the vector of global influences defined above tends to the vector of Invariant Method indices (with a correction factor when some agents’ interaction coefficients are larger in aggregate).

This can be seen as an approximation result. In a game where coordination is much more important than adaptation, the relative global influence of every agent is well approximated by his Invariant Method index. Given the simplicity of the Invariant Method, our result is useful for characterizing the asymptotic properties of the games we study.

We use our result to study influence in hierarchical structures. Weber’s top-down view of optimal bureaucracies came into question when empirical studies started showing that, in the presence of conflicts of interest, the most influential members of an organization are often found at mid-level rather than at the top. Armed with the asymptotic correspondence between influence and Invariant Method, we first show that the Weberian view holds in a regular hierarchy, namely one where exogenous interaction patterns repeat themselves at every level. In the equilibrium of our communication game, a superior and his subordinates invest in reciprocal communication. Because of the tree-like nature of the hierarchy, this implies that the global influence of an agent is larger, the higher the agent is in the organization. However, Weber’s monotonicity breaks down when there are groups of agents with stronger ties. In that case, as Dalton predicted, the most influential members of the organization are the top people within their “clique”. The complementarity between interaction, communication, and influence mean that the head of the clique is more influential not only towards his subordinates, but also towards his superior. This corresponds to Dalton’s observation that the most influential agents are often low-level managers in charge of well-defined processes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 presents the first main result of the paper: the equilibrium characterization theorem. Section 4 uses the characterization theorem for comparative statics and welfare analysis, with an emphasis on the role of complementarities, both between communication and decisions, and between active and passive communication. Section 5 reports the second main result, the asymptotic equivalence between agent’s influence and the Invariant Method index, and applies it to Dalton’s hierarchies. Section 6 concludes by relating our work to the existing literature in organizational economics and network economics and by suggesting future avenues of research. All proofs are in Appendix.

Also available is a Supplementary Material section with an array of robustness checks and additional results: alternative timeline, equilibrium uniqueness, ban on communication between certain links, broadcasting (as opposed to pairwise communication), corner solutions, and additional comparative statics. These extensions are referenced in the text in informal terms and proven formally in the supplementary section.

2 Model

Consider a set of \( n \) agents. Agent \( i \) faces a local state of the world

\[
\theta_i \sim \mathcal{N}(0, s_i),
\]

where \( s_i \) denotes the precision of \( \theta_i \), i.e. \( s_i = 1/\text{Var}(\theta_i) \). The local states of different agents are mutually independent. Agent \( i \) observes only \( \theta_i \).

All agents engage in, pairwise, communication activity.\(^7\) Agent \( i \) receives message \( y_{ij} \) from agent \( j \), such that

\[
y_{ij} = \theta_j + \varepsilon_{ij} + \eta_{ij},
\]

where \( \varepsilon_{ij} \) and \( \eta_{ij} \) are two normally distributed noise terms

\[
\varepsilon_{ij} \sim \mathcal{N}(0, r_{ij}), \quad (1)
\]

\[
\eta_{ij} \sim \mathcal{N}(0, p_{ij}), \quad (2)
\]

and \( r_{ij} \) (resp. \( p_{ij} \)) is the precision of \( \varepsilon_{ij} \) (resp. \( \eta_{ij} \)). We interpret \( \varepsilon_{ij} \) as the noise associated with passive communication (listening to a presentation, reading a report, visiting a plant, appointing a liaison officer) and \( \eta_{ij} \) as the noise associated with active communication (preparing a presentation, writing a report, hosting a visit, hosting a liaison officer).

Agent \( i \) chooses how much to invest in speaking with and listening to other players. Namely, he selects:

- The precision of the active communication part of all the signals he sends: \( (r_{ji})_{j \neq i} \), for which he incurs cost \( k_r^2 \sum_{j \neq i} r_{ji} \), where \( k_r \geq 0 \) is a parameter.

\(^7\)We assume that there exist channels to engage in communication among any two members inside the organization, and hence that all these channels are potentially used. While we believe this makes sense in a setup to analyze organizations, it is an strict assumption when dealing with other social arrangements, such as friendship networks. In Appendix E we show that in this last case linearity of equilibrium would be preserved and hence a similar analysis could be performed.
The precision of the passive communication part of all the signals he receives, \( (p_{ij})_{j \neq i} \), for which he incurs cost \( k_p^2 \sum_{j \neq i} p_{ij} \), where \( k_p \geq 0 \) is a parameter (\( p \) is mnemonics for passive).

We also assume that each precision term is bounded below by a very small number \( \xi \): \( r_{ji} \geq \xi, p_{ij} \geq \xi \). This avoids dominated equilibria where \( i \) does not speak to \( j \) because he does not expect \( j \) to listen and vice versa.\(^8\)

After observing the local state \( \theta_i \) and the vector of signals \( (y_{ij})_{j \neq i} \), agent \( i \) chooses an action \( a_i \in (-\infty, \infty) \).

This setup contains two implicit assumptions. First, agents do not observe the communication intensities chosen by other agents directly (i.e. the agent does not see how much effort the others put into writing their reports or into reading his reports; the opportunity cost of sending/hosting a particular liaison officer is unobservable). Second, when engaging in active communication, the agents cannot manipulate the signal they send (the report may be more or less clear but it cannot contain lies; the liaison officer cannot be bribed). While costly signaling and strategic misrepresentation are important aspects of organizational economics, the present paper must restrict attention to direct and non-manipulable information flows in order to keep the analysis tractable.

The payoff of agent \( i \) is quadratic:

\[
    u_i = - \left( d_{ii} (a_i - \theta_i)^2 + \sum_{j \neq i} d_{ij} (a_i - a_j)^2 + k_r^2 \sum_{j \neq i} r_{ji} + k_p^2 \sum_{j \neq i} p_{ij} \right),
\]

where the term \( d_{ii} \) measures the importance of tailoring \( i \)'s action to the local state and the term \( d_{ij} \) represents the interaction between the action taken by agent \( i \) and the action taken by agent \( j \). For the rest of the paper we assume that the interaction terms are positive (\( d_{ij} \geq 0 \) for all \( i \) and all \( j \)). However, all of our results are valid, as stated, if some – or even all – of the interaction terms are negative, as long as the \( d_{ii} \)'s are positive and sufficiently large.\(^9\)

For now, we study a game where agents invest in communication before observing their local state. Namely, the timeline is:

1. Agents simultaneously select their active and passive communication intensity vectors \( (r_{ji})_{j \neq i} \) and \( (p_{ij})_{j \neq i} \).
2. Agents observe their local state of the world \( \theta_i \).
3. Agents receive signals from other agents \( (y_{ij})_{j \neq i} \).
4. Agents select their actions \( a_i \).

\(^8\)A natural question is whether in this model speaking and listening are strategic complements. The answer to this question is not straightforward at this stage and we postpone it to the discussion that follows the main result: Theorem 1 on page 10).

\(^9\)In our notation, whenever a variable has two agent indices, such as \( y_{ij} \) or \( d_{ij} \), the first index denotes the agent that is “directly affected”, such as the receiver of a signal or the owner of the payoff.
We refer this game as \( \Gamma (D, k, s) \), where \( D = (d_{ij})_{i,j}, \ k = (k_r, k_p) \) and \( s = (s_i)_{i} \).

One can think of a different timing, in which agents invest in communication \textit{after} observing their local state, in which case stages 1 and 2 in the timeline above are inverted. Under this alternative timing, the investment in active and passive communication may depend on agents’ local states. For the rest, the game is identical and we denote it with \( \Gamma_\theta (D, k, s) \). (the notation is mnemonics for the fact that communication intensities are chosen after the \( \theta \) is observed). In the next section, we will discuss an equivalence result between these two versions of the game.

The two main assumptions of our model – quadratic payoffs and normal distribution of signals – are standard in the organizational economics literature inspired by team theory (Marschak and Radner 1972).\(^{10}\) They are usually justified as limiting results. Quadratic payoffs can be thought as second-order local approximation of any differentiable utility function.\(^ {11}\) In our case, the normal distribution of signals can be seen, with the use of the central limit theorem, as the limiting distribution in a scenario where information comes from many small and independent binary pieces of information that are transmitted satisfactorily, or otherwise are meaningless, with some probability and where the receiver averages all the pieces he receives from a sender.

3 Communication and Decisions in Equilibrium

In this section we study how agents invest in communication and make decisions in equilibrium. Before stating the formal result, it is useful to provide a semi-formal discussion of the equilibrium structure. As mentioned in the introduction, this game has a complex array of interaction effects.

The game is solved by backward induction. In the second stage, agents know their own communication intensities and have a conjecture about other agents’ intensities. On the basis of this, they use the signals they receive to choose their actions. Given the linear-quadratic structure of the game, it is easy to see that the optimal action for agent \( i \) is given by

\[
D_i a^*_i(y_i) = d_{ii} \theta_i + \sum_{j \neq i} d_{ij} E[a^*_j | y_i]
\]

In what follows we denote the sum of his interaction parameters for agent \( i \) with

\[
D_i = \sum_{j=1}^{n} d_{ij},
\]

and the normalized interaction parameter between \( i \) and \( j \) as

\[
\omega_{ij} = \frac{d_{ij}}{D_i}.
\]

\(^{10}\)See Garicano and Prat (2011) for a survey.

\(^{11}\)While we focus in the paper on a specific form of quadratic games, with a particular adaptation-coordination structure, our results can easily be extended to any quadratic utility function where, as below in text, the cross-effects in individual actions would determine the interaction matrix we use.
The first-order condition (4) is thus
\[ a^*_i(y_i) = \omega_{ii}\theta_i + \sum_{j \neq i} \omega_{ij} \mathbb{E}[a^*_j | y_j] \]  
which contains a directly observable term \((\theta_i)\) and a first-order expectation\(.(the \ other \ agents' \ actions)\)

Combining the first-order conditions of the form (5) generates iterated expectations. For instance, one additional round yields
\[ a^*_i(y_i) = \omega_{ii}\theta_i + \sum_{j \neq i} \omega_{ij} \mathbb{E}\left[ \omega_{jj}\theta_j + \sum_{k \neq j} \omega_{jk} \mathbb{E}[a^*_k | y_j] | y_i \right] \]  
which contains a directly observable term \((\theta_i)\), a first-order expectation on the other agents' local states, and a second-order expectation\(.(the \ other \ agents' \ actions)\). The good news is that expectations on other agents’ local states can be represented in a simple linear form, for any order. For instance, the first-order expectation term of \(i\) on \(j\)’s state is
\[ i \rightarrow j : \ \omega_{ij} \mathbb{E}[\omega_{jj}\theta_j | y_i] = \omega_{jj} \mathbb{E}\left[ \omega_{jj}\theta_j + \sum_{k \neq j} \omega_{jk} \mathbb{E}[a^*_k | y_j] | y_i \right] \times \frac{p_{ij} + r_{ij}}{s_j + p_{ij} + r_{ij}} \times y_{ij} \]  
second order coord. concerninformation extraction

The information extraction ratio is the classical formula for the expected value of an unobserved normally distributed variable \((the \ local \ state \ \theta_j \ in \ this \ case)\) given an observed normally distributed signal \((the \ signal \ from \ j \ to \ i, \ y_{ij})\). The ratio is decreasing in the precision of the local state, \(s_j\), and increasing in the precision of the signal, the sum of the speaking investment \(r_{ij}\) and the listening investment \(p_{ij}\).

In the next round, the second-order expectation term of \(i\) on \(k\)’s state, mediated by \(j\)’s signal, is
\[ i \rightarrow j \rightarrow k : \ \omega_{ij}\omega_{jk} \mathbb{E}[\omega_{kk}\theta_k | y_j] | y_i] = \omega_{kk} \mathbb{E}\left[ \omega_{kk}\theta_k + \sum_{l \neq k} \omega_{kl} \mathbb{E}[a^*_l | y_k] | y_i \right] \times \frac{p_{ij} + r_{ij}}{s_j + p_{ij} + r_{ij}} \times s_k + p_{jk} + r_{jk} \times y_{ik} \]  
third order coord. concerninfo. extr. about \(k\)

and so on...

In the proof of Theorem 1 we show that expectations converge and we can always find an equilibrium of the form
\[ a^*_i(y_i) = b_{ii}\theta_i + \sum_{j \neq i} b_{ij} y_{ij} \]  
Furthermore the \(b\)-coefficients are unique and they can be characterized in a relatively simple way as a function of the the communication intensities that are chosen in the first stage, the \(p\)'s and the \(r\)'s.

With these conditions in mind, we can now move to the first stage of the game, where agents make communication investments. Recall that agent \(i\)'s loss, net of communication costs, is given by
\[ d_{ii} (a_i - \theta_i)^2 + \sum_{j \neq i} d_{ij} (a_i - a_j)^2 \]  

If communication is poor, agent $i$ suffers in two ways: his own action $a_i$ contains an additional noise and the other agents’ actions, the $a_j$'s, contain additional noises. By 7, we can write

$$Var(a_i) = b_{ii}Var(\theta_i) + \sum_{j \neq i} b_{ij}Var(y_{ij}),$$

which, combined with (8), implies that the marginal benefit of an investment in passive communication $p_{ij}$ yields expected marginal benefit $D_i b_{ij}^2$ and a marginal investment in active communication $r_{ji}$ yields $d_{ij} b_{ji}^2$. Given our assumptions on communication costs, equilibrium communication intensities must be given by

$$p_{ij} = \frac{\sqrt{D_i b_{ij}}}{k_p} \quad \text{and} \quad r_{ji} = \frac{\sqrt{d_{ij} b_{ji}}}{k_r}. \quad (9)$$

Now, as shown in the proof, we can close the analysis by plugging equilibrium intensities in the second stage decision coefficient $b$'s. To provide a complete characterization, we introduce one last piece of notation:: for any pair of individuals $i$ and $j$ we define

$$h_{ij} = \begin{cases} 
\omega_{jj} & \text{if } i = j \\
-s_j \left( \frac{k_p}{\sqrt{D_i}} + \frac{k_r}{\sqrt{d_{ji}}} \right), & \text{otherwise.}
\end{cases}$$

Then we can show:

**Theorem 1** For any $(D, s)$, if $k_r$ and $k_p$ are sufficiently low, the game $\Gamma(D, k, s)$ has a unique pure-strategy equilibrium:

(i) Decisions are given by

$$b_j = (I - \Omega)^{-1} \cdot h_j \quad \text{for all } j;$$

(ii) Active communication is

$$r_{ij} = \frac{\sqrt{d_{ji} b_{ij}}}{k_r} \quad \text{for all } i \neq j;$$

(iii) Passive communication is

$$p_{ij} = \frac{\sqrt{D_i b_{ij}}}{k_p} \quad \text{for all } i \neq j$$

The theorem offers a simple equilibrium characterization. Conditions (ii) and (iii) correspond to (9) and express each communication intensity as a linear function of just one decision coefficient.

Condition (i) is based on a characterization of $b$ that is particularly tractable because:
(a) It does not depend on communication intensities (it only depends on primitives); (b) It can be split into $n$ systems of equations, one for each agent; (c) It is linear; (d) It uses a coefficient matrix that is the same for all $n$ agents.
While system (i) does not contain $r$ and $p$, one should not think that it captures only decision considerations. As the presence of communication parameters $k_r$ and $k_p$ indicates, (i) also embodies communication considerations. Specifically, each subsystem in condition (i) determines all the coefficients $(b_{ij})_{i=1,...,n}$ that relate to decisions taken by the $n$ agents with respect to information originating from a certain agent $j$: namely, the signal $y_{ij}$ if $i \neq j$ and the local state $\theta_j$ if $i = j$.

The matrix $(I - \Omega)^{-1}$ admits a simple interpretation. Since $\Omega$ is, by definition, a contraction we can write

$$(I - \Omega)^{-1} = I + \Omega + \Omega^2 + \Omega^3 + \cdots = \sum_{l \geq 0} \Omega^l$$

And the entries of the powers of this matrix gather all higher-order coordination concerns: the entry $ij$ of $\Omega^l$ is the sum of all products of normalized coordination concerns of chains of all possible chains of $l$ connected agents that start on $i$ and finish on $j$; hence, the entry $ij$ of $(I - \Omega)^{-1}$ is equal to the sum of all direct and indirect coordination concerns derived from all chains, of any length, that start on $i$ and finish on $j$.

Under this light, the coefficients in the linear equilibrium actions can be interpreted as follows: each coefficient $b_{ij}$ is a weighted average of the coordination concerns of $i$ versus all other agents, in such a way that the weight assigned to the coordination concern of $i$ versus $j$ is positive, while the rest of weights are negative. The positive weight of the coordination concern versus $j$ is larger when $d_{jj}/D_j$ is large, namely, when his adaptation concern is large compared to his coordination concerns. That shows a natural effect: if $j$’s adaptation concern is strong, $j$’s action is going to be close to his local, private, information; knowing this, agent $i$ reacts by increasing his weight in the message he receives from $j$, and this reaction is stronger the more he cares to coordinate (directly, or because other individuals he cares about want to coordinate with $j$) with $j$. On the other hand, each other weight is negative and are directly proportional to $s_j$, the precision of the common prior about $j$’s local information. The weights decrease, and therefore $b_{ij}$ decreases, when $s_j$ is larger because the incentives to communicate with $j$ lower down if the prior about $j$’s information is more precise.

The matrix $(I - \Omega)^{-1}$ is the same for all subsystems because the propagation of interaction effects across agents goes through the same payoff matrix: a change in any part of $j$’s decision function affects $i$ through coefficient $d_{ij}$.

A number of remarks are in order:

1. There is an asymmetry between (i) and (ii): investment in active communication depends on one interaction parameter ($d_{ji}$) while investment in passive communication depends on the sum of all parameters ($D_i$). This asymmetry reflects a difference in the individual benefit of learning from others and the individual benefit of informing others. This strategic asymmetry between listening and speaking will be discussed at length in section 4.2.

2. What happens if, instead of assuming that communication investments are made before learning the local states, we assume the opposite? Recall that we defined $\Gamma_\theta(D, k, s)$ as a game that is identical to $\Gamma(D, k, s)$ except that the order of the first
two stages is reversed. In $\Gamma_\theta$, agents invest after they observe their $\theta$. In general we would expect the set of equilibria to be different because the incentive of agents to invest in active and passive communication may depend on the value of their local states. This in turn could create a signaling issue. However, we can prove that Game $\Gamma_\theta (D, k, s)$ has a perfect Bayesian equilibrium that corresponds to the pure-strategy equilibrium of $\Gamma (D, k, s)$. The intuition for this result has to do with the assumption that payoff functions are quadratic. The choice of $a_i$ does of course depend on the value of $\theta_i$. However, the marginal benefit of additional information is the same whether the agent knows the actual value his local state, as in $\Gamma_\theta$, or only its expected value, as in $\Gamma$. Strange signaling outcomes are also prevented by use of a probability distribution with a full-support. This result is stated and proven in section 1 of the Supplementary Material.

3. Is the equilibrium in theorem 1 unique? First, the assumption that communication intensities are bounded below by $\xi$ rather than zero prevents the existence of equilibria based on pure mis-coordination. Second, there could be non-linear equilibria. In the equilibrium that we describe the actions of agents are linear functions of the signals they receive. Within this class, it is immediate to see that our equilibrium is unique. This is a common assumption in the literature that uses the normal-quadratic approach, but, while there are no known counterexamples, it is not obvious to show that only linear equilibria are possible (e.g. Angeletos and Pavan (2009), Dewan and Myatt (2008)). In section 2 we consider a truncated version of our game, where agents’ action are bounded below and above. We show that this game has a unique equilibrium and that such equilibrium tends to ours as the bound goes to infinity.

4. Theorem 1 requires that $k_r$ and $k_p$ are sufficiently low. If this condition fails, the non-negativity constraint on communication intensities may be violated. In that case, the equilibrium involves corner solutions, whereby some or all of the $p$’s and $r$’s are equal to the minimal value $\xi$. This possibility is explored in section 5 of the Supplementary Material. However, for any $(D, s)$, there always exist values of $k_p$ and $k_r$ that are sufficiently low to guarantee an interior solution.

5. A characterization similar to theorem 1 obtains even under different assumptions on the structure of communication costs. For instance, rather than having pairwise communication, we could imagine that the agents “broadcast” their signals. Thus, each agent sustains the cost of active communication only once. This possibility is explored in section 4 of the Supplementary Material section.

6. One may also think that in reality communication can only occur between certain nodes. Namely, information transmissions is impossible on certain edges of the graphs. Our equilibrium characterization can be modified to accommodate this additional constraint (section ?? of the Supplementary Material).

4 Complementarities in Communication and Influence

As it became apparent in the equilibrium characterization result, there are strategic complementarities between active communication, passive communication and decision-making.
This section builds on Theorem 1 to explore two aspects of these complementarities. It first studies indirect effects of the interaction parameters on communication and decisions, namely what happens to $b_{ij}$, $r_{ij}$, and $p_{ij}$ when $d_{ij}$ stays constant but other interaction parameters change. As we shall see, there are subtle non-monotonic effects. The second part of the section focuses on inefficiencies arising from the complementarity between communication and decision-making. In particular, we will see that underinvestment in active communication is particularly acute and we will argue that in real organizations, this form of inefficiency is contrasted by management practices that encourage active communication.

### 4.1 Indirect Effects

As we mentioned earlier, how Alice influences Bob does not only depend on the direct interaction between the Alice and Bob, but potentially on all the interactions among agents. Let us first deal with the direct effects, which go exactly as one would expect. Agents direct their communication efforts toward agents with which they have higher interaction parameters. Formally:

**Proposition 2** Starting from a symmetric interaction matrix,\footnote{A symmetric interaction matrix is one in which} an increase in $d_{ij}$ compensated by an equal decrease in $d_{ik}$ (where $i$, $k$, and $j$ are distinct integers) leads to an increase in $b_{ji}$, $r_{ji}$, $p_{ji}$ and a decrease in $b_{ki}$, $r_{ki}$, $p_{ki}$, while other variables are unchanged.

When we slightly perturb a symmetric situation, in which all pairwise interaction coefficients coincide, and slightly increase the coordination motive of agent $i$ with respect to agent $j$, counterbalanced by a decrease of same magnitude in the coordination motive of agent $i$ with respect to agent $k$, the comparative statics are clear: agent $j$, resp. $k$, cares more (resp. less) about the information received from agent $i$ in the action he undertakes, he pays more (resp. less) attention to this information, and agent $i$ is going to put more (resp. less) effort in communicating accurately his local information.

Instead the analysis of indirect effects is less straightforward. The following example is the simplest way to illustrate the kind of non-monotonic effects that can arise. Consider three agents with the following interaction matrix

$$D = \begin{bmatrix} d & q & \frac{1}{q} \\ q & d & \frac{1}{q} \\ 1 & 1 & d \end{bmatrix} \text{ with } q \geq 1$$

When $q = 1$, the three agents are symmetric. As $q$ increases, a “clique” – to borrow a term used by labor sociologists (Dalton 1959) – forms between the first two agents to the exclusion of the first.

What happens when the clique becomes stronger? As clique members care less about the outsider, communication and influence from the outside to is reduced. The effect on
communication and influence in the other direction is instead monotonic. First, there is an *clique insularity effect*: the clique members care less about the outsider, and hence they invest less in talking to him: active communication variables $r_{13}$ and $r_{23}$ decrease (figure 1a). Second, the outsider is affected by the *clique reinforcement effect*. As the clique members communicate and coordinate more with each other, the local state of one clique member also affect the actions of the others. The outsider more interested in learning local states of clique members and invests in passive communication, at least for low values of $q$ (figure 1b). When $q$ is sufficiently high, the insularity effect must dominate. As clique members talk less and less to the outsider, the outsiders begins to invest less in listening. Therefore, the overall pattern of influence is monotonic (figure 1c).

It is also interesting to note that the ratio between active and passive communication is decreasing in $q$ throughout, confirming that the presence of a stronger clique causes an increasing imbalance between the desire of outsiders to obtain information and the willingness of the clique to provide it.\(^{13}\)

\(^{13}\)The plot uses the following parameters: $d = 5, s_1 = s_2 = s_3, k_p = k_r = 0.01$.

\(^{14}\)Cliques can damage the agents that are excluded from them. Section 3 if the Supplementary Material presents a three-agent example where a player is better off if communication between the other two players is prohibited.
1a: Active Communication by the Clique ($r_{13}/r_{23}$)

1b: Passive Communication by the Outsider ($p_{13}/p_{23}$)

1c: Influence of a Clique Member on the Outsider ($b_{13}/b_{23}$)
4.2 Underinvestment

The presence of complementarities among agents is likely to lead to inefficiently low investment in communication. To verify this claim, we must first define the “efficient” benchmark, and there are two candidates. One can compare the equilibrium outcome to the outcome that would arise if communication intensities were chosen by a planner, while decision functions were still delegated to agents. Or one can use as a benchmark the case where the planner is also responsible for choosing decision functions. Here, we analyze the first case, as we are particularly interested in inefficiencies that derive from underinvestment in communication.

Reconsider the symmetric-information static game \( \tilde{\Gamma} (D, k, s) \). Keep the same payoff functions \( u_i \) defined in (3), but now assume that each agent \( i \) solves

\[
\max \left\{ b_{ij} \right\}_{j=1} \mathbb{E} [u_i]
\]

while a planner solves

\[
\max \left\{ v_{ij} \right\}_{i,j}, \left\{ c_{ij} \right\}_{i,j} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \mathbb{E} [u_i]
\]

The planner moves first, but – as in the rest of the paper – we assume that agents do not observe communication investments directly.\(^{15}\) Call this new game \( \Gamma^* (D, k, s) \).

We can offer an equilibrium characterization that mirrors the one of Theorem 1:

**Proposition 3** The decision network and communication network that arise in equilibrium are given by:

\[
\begin{align*}
    b_{ij}^* & = (I - \Omega)^{-1} \cdot h_{ij}^* \quad \text{for all } j \\
    r_{ij}^* & = \sqrt{\sum_{k=1}^{n} d_{ik} + \sum_{k \neq i} d_{ki} b_{ij}^* / k_r} \quad \text{for all } i \neq j \\
    p_{ij}^* & = \sqrt{\sum_{k=1}^{n} d_{ik} + \sum_{k \neq i} d_{ki} b_{ij}^* / k_p} \quad \text{for all } i \neq j
\end{align*}
\]

with

\[
h_{ij}^* = \begin{cases} 
    \omega_{jj} & \text{if } i = j \\
    -s_j \frac{k_p + k_r}{\sqrt{D_i + \sum_{k \neq j} d_{kj}}} & \text{otherwise}
\end{cases}
\]

Communication creates positive externalities that players do not internalize in the non-cooperative game. Comparing Proposition 3 with Theorem 1, we see that there are two

\(^{15}\) In another conceivable version of the planner’s problem communication investments could be publicly observable. This will generate an additional discrepancy between the baseline game and the planner’s problem.
channels that generate inefficiency. first, for any given vector of decision coefficients $b$, communication intensity vectors $\hat{r}$ and $\hat{p}$ are larger in the planner’s solution, namely, for any given pattern of influence, agents under-invest in communication. Second, the $h_{ij}^*$ are smaller in the planner’s solution, meaning that there is an additional feedback effect that goes through influence. In the planner’s solution, agents expect communication intensities to be higher and hence they are more influenced by signals they receive. As both effects go in the same directions, this proves the following:

**Proposition 4** In the equilibrium of $\Gamma^* (D, k, s)$ all the decision coefficients and communication intensities are larger than in the equilibrium of $\Gamma(D, k, s)$.

Now that we know that communication investment is too low, we can ask whether underinvestment is more of a problem for active or for passive communication. Namely, for any directed link between two agents, is the ratio $r_{ij}/p_{ij}$ higher in the baseline case or when the planner chooses communication intensities? From Proposition 3 and Theorem 1, we see that:

**Proposition 5** In the planner’s solution the active/passive ratio ratio depends only on relative cost

$$\frac{r_{ij}}{p_{ij}} = \frac{k_p}{k_r}.$$

Instead, in the non-cooperative solution of the ratio is

$$\frac{r_{ij}}{p_{ij}} = \frac{k_p}{k_r} \sqrt{\frac{d_{ji}}{D_i}}.$$

In general, we should expect $D_i > d_{ji}$. For instance, if the problem is symmetric ($d_{ij} = \bar{d}Q$ for all $i \neq j$ and $d_{ii} = (1 - (n - 1) \bar{d}) Q$), we have

$$\gamma_{ij} = \bar{d} \quad \text{for all } i \neq j.$$

Consider the case in which active and passive communication are equally costly, i.e. $k_p = k_r$. As $\bar{d} < \frac{1}{n-1}$, this means that the ratio between active and passive communication is bounded above by $\frac{1}{n-1}$, implying that: (i) it is smaller than 1; (ii) it becomes lower as $n$ increases. The only case where passive communication does not have an intrinsic advantage is when there are only two agents. Conversely, as the number of agents increases, the ratio tends to zero.

As we mentioned after Theorem 1, there is strategic asymmetry between active and passive communication, which favors passive communication. We should now offer a more precise intuition for this result. consider two agents, $i$ and $j$, and focus on communication

\[16\text{Only in the case that agent } i \text{ is particularly prominent and the interaction coefficient } d_{ji} \text{ for another agent } j \text{ is larger than the sum of interaction coefficients } D_i \text{ that affect agent } i, \text{ active communication can be relatively more intensive than passive communication.}\]
from $j$ to $i$, both $i$ listening ($p_{ij}$) and $j$ speaking ($r_{ij}$). The payoffs of the two agents, net of communication costs, are given by

$$u_i = -d_{ii}(a_i - \theta_i)^2 - \sum_{k \neq i} d_{ik}(a_i - a_k)^2$$

$$u_j = -d_{jj}(a_j - \theta_j)^2 - \sum_{k \neq j} d_{jk}(a_j - a_k)^2$$

The signal that $i$ receives from $j$, $y_{ij}$, affects $i$'s action. As our equilibrium is linear,

$$\frac{da_{ij}}{dy_{ij}} = b_{ij}.$$ 

An increase in the precision of the signal $y_{ij}$ increases the precision of the action $a_{ij}$, which in turn is beneficial to our risk-averse agents because it eliminates unnecessary noise in the decision. However, the expressions for $u_i$ and $u_j$ show that this effect is asymmetric. For the receiver $i$, the effect is quite direct as it involves his action $a_i$ directly, and it affects all the terms of his payoff:

$$\frac{du_i}{dy_{ij}} = D_i b_{ij}.$$ 

Instead, for the sender $j$ the effect is less direct as it does not involve his action $a_j$ directly but just the receiver’s action:

$$\frac{du_i}{dy_{ij}} = d_{ji} b_{ij}.$$ 

The asymmetry captures the idea that passive communication has a more immediate use than active communication because the receiver can control the action directly, while the sender must reply on the receiver’s decision.

Our results imply that organizations – and in particular firms – should look for direct and indirect ways to incentivize communication, and in particular active communication. Indeed, companies often boast about their culture of internal communication. Many management methods introduce protocols that require workers to set aside time to communicating with other agents. A case in point is Quality Function Deployment (QDF), a quality management method that originated in Japan and is now widely used across the world (Akao 1990). There is direct evidence that QFD operates by increasing communication intensity beyond hierarchical lines (Griffin and Hauser 1992). Another example of a structured way to encourage communication is provided by the use of “quality circles” in Total Quality Management (TQM).

It is interesting to note that management methods such as the above cited QFD place a great emphasis on giving a voice to all team members, encouraging them to communicate their information independent of their hierarchical position. In our set-up, this can be seen as an attempt to reduce the cost of active communication, which, has we have just seen, would be particularly useful to the company, especially if it is a large one.

Ichniowski and Shaw’s (1997) influential study of the effect of the adoption of human resources management (HRM) practices finds a positive effect of setting up meetings between managers and workers. Ichniowski et al (2005) considers in particular the role of communication and show that the successful adoption of innovative (and performance-enhancing)
HRM practices requires investing in workers’ connective capital. The latter, however, comes at a cost: “these investments in connective capital can be costly – involving higher training, screening, and information sharing costs, and potentially higher wages.” Thus it appears that moving towards the planner’s solution requires the organization to invest in a set of tools and practices that encourage employees to communicate.

The result that underinvestment in active communication is more severe than underinvestment in passive communication depends on our assumption that communication has a pairwise nature. In our set-up, there are no economies of scale in sending signals to multiple agents or receiving signals from multiple agents. Phone calls and site visits are good examples of pairwise costs. However, other communication modes display economies of scale on the active side. The cost of sending an email or updating a website is almost independent from the number of recipients or readers. However such economies of scale are mostly absent on the passive side. As one expects, this would re-adjust the balance between active and passive communication.17 This observation does not invalidate the result that there is a tendency to underinvest in active communication; it just implies that the tendency can be offset by strong economies of scale in active, but not passive, communication.

5 How Influential Is an Agent?

In this section, we use the characterization in Theorem 1 to measure the overall influence of agents on their peers. Influence has so far only been discussed in bilateral terms: how much does agent $i$ influences agent $j$? We now ask how influential an agent is with respect to all other agents. The global influence of agent $i$ will capture the marginal effect of a change in $i$’s local state on the other agents. The assumption that local states are independent guarantees that influence is purely due to communication and coordination, and not to spurious correlation between actions due to correlation between states.

The global influence of agent $k$, that we denote by $I_k$, is

$$I_k = \sum_{j=1}^{n} b_{jk} \quad k = 1, \ldots, n$$

In words, the global influence of agent $k$ corresponds to the sum of the expected effects of a change on the agent’s local state on all actions (including the agent’s own action). The average action of the group conditional on the values of $\hat{\theta} = (\theta_1, \ldots, \theta_n)$ is equal to$^{18}$

$$E[\frac{1}{n} \sum_{k} b_{jk} \hat{y}_{jk}] = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{k} \sum_{j=1}^{n} b_{jk} \theta_k = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{k} \sum_{j=1}^{n} I_k \theta_k$$

Our notion of influence is an equilibrium concept. It depends on the communication investment and decision strategy that the players in our game choose. In this section we will first show that our game-theoretic concepts is linked to an influential axiomatic measure of

$^{17}$In section 4 of the Supplementary Material, we modify the baseline model to allow for economies of scale on the active communication side and we show that the ratio between active and passive communication is approximately one.

$^{18}$We define $y_{ii} = \theta_i$ for all $i$. 

19
centrality: the Invariant Method. We then illustrate, through an example inspired by Dalton (1959), how this correspondence can be used to understand and measure organizational phenomena.

5.1 Invariant Method

There are numerous ways of measuring social influence. In recent years, a particular index—often referred to as the Invariant Method—has gained prominence in a number of fields. At a theoretical level, Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2004) show that this is the only centrality measure that satisfies four axioms: invariance to reference intensity, weak homogeneity, weak consistency, and invariance to splitting of nodes. At a practical level, the Invariant Method is at the core of Google’s PageRank algorithm, where it is used to measure the importance of websites by looking at the frequency of links from other websites. The method is also used by a newer generation of impact factors, like Eigenfactor.com.19

Given a network described by an $n$-square adjacency matrix $G$, let $\tilde{G}$ be the normalized version of the matrix, where all the $g_{ii}$’s are set to zero and every element $\tilde{g}_{ij}$ is defined as

$$\tilde{g}_{ij} = \frac{g_{ij}}{\sum_{k \neq i} g_{ik}}$$

The Invariant Method index is defined as the smallest left eigenvector of matrix $\tilde{G}$, namely the smallest strictly positive vector $\iota$ that solves

$$\iota = \tilde{G}^{'}\iota$$

Since $\tilde{G}$ is by definition an stochastic matrix its largest eigenvalue is equal to 1, and therefore 1 is also the largest eigenvalue of $\Gamma^{'}$. The Perron-Frobenius Theorem ensures then that there exists a non-negative eigenvector of $\Gamma^{'}$ associated to this eigenvalue. The invariant centrality vector is just a normalization of this vector. Note that the vector can always be normalized so that its elements sum up to one. From now on, we always use this normalization.

Hence, one way of understanding this definition is to see $\tilde{G}$ as a Markov transition matrix and $\iota$ as its ergodic state. Imagine an object that bounces probabilistically from one node to the other according to $\tilde{G}$: the value of $\iota_i$ denotes the percentage of time that the object spends on average in node $i$.

Another way of understanding the Invariant Method is to think of the “importance” of node $i$ as defined by a weighted sum of the other nodes’ “importances,” where the weights are given by the $g$’s, namely

$$\iota_i = \sum_{j \neq i} \tilde{g}_{ji} \iota_j$$

In other words, node $i$ “receives” a percentage $\tilde{g}_{ji}$ of the importance of node $j$. If we repeat this exercise for all nodes, we obtain the system (10). Thus, $\iota$ is the fixed-point of this importance-distribution procedure.

19We refer to this centrality notion as the Invariant Method to be consistent with Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2004). This notion is related to Katz centrality (Katz 1953). See Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2004) and Jackson (2010) for a discussion of centrality measures.
To connect the Invariant Method to our game, fix $D$, $s$, $k_r$ and $k_p$, and define the payoff function:

$$u_i(a) = -\left(d_{ii}(a_i - \theta_i)^2 + \frac{1}{t} \sum_{j \neq i} d_{ij}(a_i - a_j)^2 + t^2 k_r^2 \sum_{j \neq i} r_{ji} + t^2 k_p^2 \sum_{j \neq i} p_{ij}\right),$$

where $t \in (0, \infty)$.

For every value of the parameter $t$ we have a well-defined instance of our game, which we can call $G(D, s, k_r, k_p, t)$. A decrease in $t$ has two effects: it reduces the relative importance of adaptation over coordination, and it reduces the cost of communication (even faster).

For every $(D, s, k_r, k_p)$, we have a definition of:

- Global influence. For every $t > 0$, Theorem 1 provides to a unique characterization of the equilibrium in communication and decisions, which in turn results in a unique vector of global influences. We let $I_i(t)$ denote the global influence of agent $i$ when the parameter has value $t$.

- Invariant Method index. Let $\Gamma$ be the matrix with entries $\gamma_{ii} = 0$ for all $i$, and $\gamma_{ij} = \frac{d_{ij}}{d_{ik} + d_{ki}}$, and, based on the definition of Invariant Method above, define. Based on the discussion above, the invariant-method index of agent $i$ is $\iota_i$, defined as the $i$-th component of the vector that solves:

$$\iota = \Gamma \iota$$

and that satisfies $\sum_j \iota_j = 1$. Note that this definition only makes use of the interaction matrix $D$, not of $s$, $k_r$, and $k_p$.

The two notions are related by the following:

**Theorem 6** As $t \to 0$, the relative global influence of agents converges to the ratio of invariant-method indices weighted by an adaptation vs coordination ratio. Namely, for any $i$ and $j$,

$$\lim_{t \to 0} \frac{I_i(t)}{I_j(t)} = \frac{\iota_i}{\iota_j} \frac{d_{ii}}{d_{jj}} \frac{D_{-i}}{D_{-j}}$$

In particular, if $d_{ii} = d_{jj}$ and $D_{-i} = D_{-j}$ for all $i, j \in N$, then we obtain that

$$\lim_{t \to 0} \frac{I_i(t)}{I_j(t)} = \frac{\iota_i}{\iota_j}$$

A number of remarks are in order:

- The proof, reported in the appendix, consists of five steps. First, we show that the global influence of an agent $I_i(t)$ can be written as weighted sum of the Bonacich centrality indices of all the agents (more about this below), where the weight on agent $i$ is positive and the weights on all the other agents are negative. This first step is inspired by Ballester, Calvo-Armengol and Zenou’s (2006) result on network games
with linear-quadratic utilities, but extends the framework to asymmetric information and endogenous communication. The second step—the most technically demanding—shows that \( \lim_{t \to 0} I_i(t) \) exists and it is different from zero: there is thus a discontinuity a zero (more about that below). Third, we show the actual statement of the theorem. Finally, we check that the non-negativity constraints on \( r \) and \( p \), which we abtracted from in the rest of the proof, are actually satisfied in the limit, thanks to the fact that the communication cost tends to zero fast.

- There are two related but distinct families of centrality measures. One, which we call Invariant Method, was defined above.\(^{20}\) Such index is sometimes referred to as Katz centrality. The other measure, which we refer to as ‘Bonacich centrality,’ is based on counting the number of paths that reach a certain node.\(^{21}\) Our paper establishes an asymptotic link between these two measures, but of course it relies on the particular underlying game that we are using and on the way we take limits. An interesting question, outside the scope of the present paper, is whether general connections can be established between the two families of measures. Our focus is mainly on the Invariant Method as it is quite intuitive and widely used.

- When \( t = 0 \), \( I_i(t) \) is not well-defined. That is because when \( t = 0 \) Theorem 1 cannot be used for two reasons. First, if all adaptation terms \( d_{ii} \)'s are zero, the matrix \( (I - \Omega) \) is singular and \( b \)'s are not well-defined, which captures the fact that agents who care only about coordination can achieve their goals by agreeing to select all the same arbitrary action independent of the realization of local states. Second, if \( k_r \) and \( k_p \) are zero, the expressions in (ii) and (iii) of Theorem 1 are not well defined, because the agents would choose infinite precisions.

- The precision of agent \( i \)'s state, \( s_i \), does not appear in Theorem 6. This is because \( I_i \) is defined as the marginal effect of an increase in \( i \)'s state on all other agents actions. Of course, the average influence of an agent on other agents will be greater if the precision \( s_i \) is low.

- Theorem 6 can be understood as an approximation result. When agents are much more interested in coordinating with other agents than adapting to their own state, relative influence can be approximated by a weighted version of the Invariant Method index. To see this, suppose that we are given a particular game \( G(D, k, s) \). Use the the elements of the form \( d_{ii} \) in the interaction matrix \( D \) to build a vector \( q \). Define \( \tilde{D} \)

\[^{20}\]The Invariant Method can be extended in various ways. One of the most common is to introduce a ‘damping factor’ \( \kappa \). Then the relation

\[ t_i = \sum_{j \neq i} \tilde{g}_{ij}t_j \]

becomes

\[ t_i = (1 - \kappa) \frac{1}{n} + \kappa \sum_{j \neq i} \tilde{g}_{ij}t_j. \]

In our case, \( \kappa = 1 \).

\[^{21}\]See Jackson (2010, Chapter 2) for a discussion of these two families of measures and for more bibliographical references. Confusingly, Bonacich worked on both families of measures and his name is associated with both.
as $D$ when all elements of the diagonal are set to zero. The game can now be written as $G(q, \tilde{D}, k, s)$ and the influence of agent $i$ is $I_i(q, \tilde{D}, k, s)$. The Theorem says that, if $q$ is sufficiently small and $k$ is even smaller, then relative global influence is approximately equal to the ratio of Invariant Method indices:

$$\frac{I_i(q, \tilde{D}, k, s)}{I_j(q, \tilde{D}, k, s)} \sim \frac{\iota_i(\tilde{D})}{\iota_j(\tilde{D})}$$

To illustrate the point about approximation, consider the following numerical example. Suppose that $s_1 = s_2 = s_3 = s_4$, and that the interaction matrix is given by:

$$D = \begin{bmatrix} q & 1 & 2 & 4 \\ 1 & q & 2 & 4 \\ 1 & 2 & q & 4 \\ 1 & 2 & 4 & q \end{bmatrix}$$

As this example satisfies the condition that $d_{ii}$ and $D_{-i}$ are constant across agents, we can use the simplified version of Theorem 1. Also suppose that $k_r = k_p = 0.001q^2$. For every positive value of $q$, one can use Theorem 1 to compute the communication-based global influence of each agent. The relative influence is depicted in Figure 2 below as $I_i / (I_1 + I_2 + I_3 + I_4)$.

The Invariant Method indices can be easily computed from $D$:

$$\iota_1 = 0.125, \iota_2 = 0.208, \iota_3 = 0.303, \iota_4 = 0.363.$$  

Figure 2 compares the Invariant Method indices and the global influences for positive values of $q$. As Theorem 6 predicts, when $q$ tends to zero, the relative global influences tend to the Invariant Method indices. One can also see that the Invariant Method index is a good approximation even for relatively large values of $q$, in fact values that are larger than any of the other interaction parameters.\(^{22}\)

\[^{22}\text{It is interesting to note that other simple graph-theoretic measures would not perform as well. Take for instance one of the simplest measures of the value of a node, the (relative) in-degree, namely the sum of the strength of interactions from other agents toward a particular agent (divided by the total strength of interaction over the graph):}

$$ID_i = \frac{\sum_j d_{ij}}{\sum_{i,j} d_{ij}}$$

The result would be

$$ID_1 = 0.107; ID_2 = 0.178; ID_3 = 0.285; ID_4 = 0.428,$$

which is a much worse approximation for all values of $q$ on the range.
5.2 Influence in Hierarchical Structure

Because of its extreme tractability, the Invariant Method allows us to obtain simple predictions on which agents will be more influential. Instead of trying to characterize the comparative statics of the whole game, we can focus our attention on the Invariant Method indices, which are computed on coordination parameters \((d_{ij})_{i \neq j}\) only. As proven in theorem 1, these predictions are only approximately correct and the validity of the approximation depends on how strong the coordination motive is vis a vis the adaptation motive.

The range of applications is virtually boundless. One natural question, which we can use to illustrate the scope of the theorem, has to do with influence in hierarchies. According to Weber, efficient bureaucracies take the form of hierarchies where naturally influence emanates from the top. Dalton (1959) famously showed that the Weberian view was at odds with extensive evidence from a US chemical plant. His top managers appear to be less influential than mid-managers. The latter form “cliques” with workers and exert the actual control on production: these arrangements are often motivated by personal goals, but they also help make the firm run smoothly. While these issues are complex and deserve a much more systematic treatment (Gibbons 2003), our set-up yields a simple benchmark result on when we should expect middle managers to be more influential than top managers. We
first show that hierarchies show an intrinsic bias toward making top agents in higher tiers more influential. We then give an example of what has to happen in order for this bias to be overcome.

Consider a set of agents grouped into $K$ levels. At level 0, there is one agent. An agent at level $k$ has $s \geq 2$ subordinates at level $k-1$. Every agent reports to exactly one superior. The agents at level $K$ have no subordinates. If $i$ is a subordinate of $j$, then $d_{ij}$, then we assume that $d_{ij} = 1$ (a normalization) and $d_{ji} = a$. We call the problem we have just defined a regular hierarchy – because it looks the same at every level, except the top and the bottom.

Dalton’s non-monotonic influence cannot occur in a regular hierarchy:\footnote{For any other two agents, we assume $d_{ij} = 0$. For a generic game, the presence of zero interaction coefficients could lead to binding non-negativity constraints. However, in the asymptotic case under consideration, the cost of communication becomes a negligible fraction of the coordination gains. As we show in the proof of Theorem 6, nonnegativity constraints are not binding in the limit.}

**Proposition 7** For any $s \geq 2$ and any $2 \leq k \leq K - 1$, the ratio between the influence of an agent and his superior is

$$I_{k+1} = a.\tag{23}$$

In a regular hierarchy Dalton’s anomaly cannot arise: global influence is monotonic in the agent’s level – increasing if $a > 1$ and decreasing if $a < 1$. Given that superiors have many subordinates, but subordinates have only one superior, the natural assumption is that $a < 1$. In fact, one might assume that an agent cares as much about his superior as the set of his subordinates: $as = 1$. In that case, the influence ratio is the reciprocal of the span:

$$I_{k+1} = \frac{1}{s}I_k.\tag{24}$$

To understand the economic intuition behind this result, go back to the non-cooperative communication and influence game. In equilibrium, agents invest in communication mostly along hierarchical lines. Agents will also invest in communicating laterally and skipping levels (e.g. to coordinate with his superior’s action, an agent wants to know his superior’s superior’s state). However, these investments are much lower. Hence, influence too follows hierarchical lines: the local state of a superior affects her subordinates’ decisions and the local states of inferiors affect their superior’s action. However, one superior affects many subordinates while one subordinate only affects one superior. This multiplier effect determines monotonicity in influence.

To find a situation à la Dalton where influence is non-monotonic, we abandon the assumption that the hierarchy is regular. For instance, we can assume that interaction terms

\footnote{This ratio does not apply at the top and at the bottom. At the bottom, monotonicity holds a fortiori. At the top, there is a potential problem because the agent at level 0 interacts with only $s$ agents and hence he is at a disadvantage. For the top two levels,

$$\frac{I_1}{I_0} = a + \frac{1}{s}.$$}

The assumption that an agent cares equally about his superior and the set of his subordinates ($as = 1$) guarantees monotonicity at the top.
are stronger at lower levels than at higher levels. Suppose that $K = 3$ and $s = 2$. First, consider a regular hierarchy where $d_{ij} = 1$ and $d_{ji} = \frac{1}{2}$ for all superior-subordinate pairs. The proposition above is confirmed: the Invariant Method indices increase monotonically with the agent’s rank:

\[
I_0 = I_1 = \frac{8}{48} \\
I_2 = \frac{4}{48} \\
I_3 = \frac{1}{48}
\]

Now modify the hierarchy above, by assuming that, if $i$ belongs to $k = 3$ and $j$ belongs to $k = 2$, $d_{ij} = 4$ and $d_{ji} = 2$. For this irregular hierarchy, the Invariant Method yields:

\[
I_0 = I_1 = \frac{4}{48} \\
I_2 = \frac{5}{48} \\
I_3 = \frac{2}{48}
\]

Hence, now agents at tier 2 are more influential than agents in the top two tiers.

What breaks the Weberian influence monotonicity in this example is that the two bottom levels have strong ties to each other. They invest a lot in communicating with each other and they influence each other. These strong ties do not extend to the top two levels and agents at the two bottom level are not very influenced by the local states of top managers. In Dalton’s language each level-2 manager with his two level-3 workers constitutes a vertical symbiotic clique: a two-way tie between an officer and his subordinates that represents the “most common and enduring clique in large structures” (Dalton, 1959, p.59).

The results in this section – both the proposition and the counterexample – are approximations that were obtained by looking only at coordination coefficients of the form $d_{ij}$, with $i \neq j$. The analysis was much simpler than if we had tried to operate directly on the equilibrium of the non-cooperative game. But we also know that the approximations are valid, at least locally. For values of the adaptation coefficients $d_{ii}$ and the communication parameters $k$ that are sufficiently low, Theorem 1 guarantees that the relations that we have uncovered for Invariant Method indices are reflected in similar relations for global influence.

6 Related Literature and Conclusions

We conclude with a discussion of the related literature and possible future lines of research.

This paper makes two original contributions. It is the first to analyze costly micro-founded communication among an arbitrary set of agents. While it does so under a set of specialized assumptions, the results can be used to understand a number of phenomena in organizational economics. The second contribution is that it provides a first game-theoretic microfoundation of the Invariant Method index.

Our contribution relates to two strands of literature: organizational economics and the economics of networks.
In the first strand of literature, there are a number of papers which study endogenous communication in a variety of settings. Our approach to multi-person decision making under asymmetric information, as well as our normal-quadratic formulation, is inspired by Marschak and Radner’s (1972) team theory. Some recent papers (Dessein and Santos 2006, Alonso et al. 2007, Rantakari 2007, Dessein et al 2006) explore decentralized decision making within organizations. Besides sharing their normal-quadratic set-up, we are also interested in the tradeoff between adaptation and coordination. We are closest to Dessein and Santos (2006), who analyze the role of endogenous communication. In their model, an agent can send a signal about his local state to the other agent, and the precision of the signal is endogenous. They show the existence of complementarities between communication, adaptation, and job description: in particular, when communication costs decrease, the organization is more likely to adopt a new set of organizational practices that include broader tasks and more adaptation. The present paper is complementary to this literature: while it abstracts from a number of organizational dimensions, it provides a general framework to study endogenous information flows, which allows to draw a number of lessons on what communication networks we should expect to observe in a variety of complex organizational architectures.

The present work is also close to Dewatripont and Tirole (2005), who analyze a model of endogenous costly communication between a sender and a receiver. As in our model, both active and passive communication are endogenous and costly, and there are positive externalities (it takes two to communicate). Dewatripont and Tirole’s communication model has a number of features that are absent here, such as the presence of signaling and the possibility of sending “cues” – information about the sender’s credibility. Obviously, our contribution is to extend endogenous communication to complex architectures. While our representation of pairwise communication is simpler, we believe it still captures Dewatripont and Tirole’s insight about moral hazard in communication. For instance, their comparative statics results on congruence find a partial parallel in our Proposition ??.

Our work is also related to Van Zandt (2004), a model of endogenous costly communication where several agents can transmit information at the same time. This leads to screening costs on the part of receivers and the potential for “information overload”. Van Zandt examines possible mechanisms for reducing overload – an important problem in modern organizations. Our paper abstracts from information overload, by assuming that receivers do not face a screening problem (they can always choose not to listen to a particular sender).

Following the seminal work of Radner (1993), the literature of organizational economics has also studied the role of networks in minimizing human limitations in information processing. The works of Bolton and Dewatripont (1994), Van Zandt (1999a), Garicano (2000), Guimerà et al. (2003), and Dodds et al. (2003) highlight the importance of hierarchies, and more general network structures, to diminish the costs related to processing information that flows through the network of contacts. This literature is surveyed by Van Zandt (1999b) and Ioannides (2003). Our work is complementary to this one, and analyzes how individual payoff complementarities shape both the network structure of communication and the equilibrium actions.

25 One technical difference is that Dessein and Santos’ (2006) signals are either fully informative or uninformative, and precision is defined as the probability that the signal is informative. Here, instead, signals are normally distributed and the precision is the reciprocal of the variance.
Cremer, Garicano, and Prat (2007) formalize Arrow’s (1974) idea of coding: the medium of communication used by a group of people (the organizational language) is endogenous and it determines communication costs. For analytical tractability, in the present model the communication medium is not modeled explicitly but it is represented by a communication cost function.²⁶

Related work can also be found in political economy. Dewan and Myatt (2007) analyze the role of communication in the interplay of leaders and activists in political parties. Leaders are heterogeneous in two different skills: their ability to interpret which is the correct policy to promote, and the clarity of communication of his ideas to the activists. Activists seek to advocate for the correct policy by listening with different intensities to the party leaders. The authors show that, generally, clarity in communication is the leader’s ability that induces higher influence on activists’ opinion. Their interpretation of communication is close to the one we propose in our work: in a bayesian game with quadratic payoff functions and normally distributed signals, that represent the messages send and received, agents can affect the precision of these signals. On the other hand, the communication protocols and, therefore, the strategic effects of communication are different in the two models, as well as the questions that are analyzed.

In the second strand of literature – network economics – the closest contribution is Calvó-Armengol and de Martí (2009), which considers a normal-quadratic team-theoretical set-up and studies the effect of communication among agents. The authors provide a full characterization of the decision functions and the equilibrium payoffs given a communication structure. Calvó-Armengol and de Martí also study what the best communication structure is when the overall number of links among agents is bounded: they provide sufficient conditions for the optimal communication network to be a star or the maximum aggregate span network. However, the only choice between two nodes is no communication or full communication, so the kind of communication intensity analysis that we perform here is absent.

Morris and Shin (2007) also consider a normal-quadratic setup. In their model, with a continuum of agents, they allow for partial communication among predetermined groups. They analyze the welfare effects of public and semi-public information (derived from partial communication), complementing their previous analysis on the value of public information (Morris and Shin, 2002).

This paper also adopts a normal-quadratic specification, close to the one in Calvó-Armengol and de Martí. The key innovation here is of course that communication is endogenous. We also move away from a team-theoretical framework (now a special case, when all agents belong to the same team), we introduce the idea of communication intensity and we distinguish between active and passive communication.²⁷

Hagenbach and Koessler (2008) and Galeotti, Ghiglino and Squintani (2009) also con-

---
²⁷The literature of information sharing in oligopoly has also considered a normal-quadratic setup. See, for example, Vives (1994), Gal-Or (1985, 1986), and Raith (1996). Vives (1999) surveys this literature. While the setup in these papers bears some resemblance with our one, there are several differences in the analysis, both because communication is public and hence there is no network component and because the focus is quite different (industry competition rather than organization economics).
sider, as we do, strategic endogenous communication in a network game. However, their focus is on costless, non verifiable information (cheap talk) when agents may have biases as in Crawford and Sobel (1982). Our set-up is different in that we focus on costly and verifiable information. The kind of issues we ask is thus entirely different (and complementary). 28

With regards to the literature on the formation of (communication) networks, Bloch and Dutta (2007) study the creation of communication networks with endogenous link strength. In their model, agents have a fixed resource, for example time, and have to decide how to allocate it to create connections with others. The benefits of a connection depends on the exposure decisions of both agents involved in it. Furthermore, in the spirit of the connections model introduced in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), an agent obtains benefits of indirect connections through the more reliable path connecting them with each one of the agents in the society. In their setup, both the equilibrium and the efficient networks are star-shaped, i.e., with one agent connected to all the rest of the population and all the rest connected only to this center.

Rogers (2007) analyzes another network formation game in which all agents have a limited resource available to spend building links with the rest of agents, but differs with the work of Bloch and Dutta in the structure of benefits. In Rogers (2007) the utility of an agent depends on the utility of each other agent with which he is directly connected. This recursive definition of utilities generates indirect effects that spread through indirect connections of any length. The author analyzes two games, one in which the dependency expresses that each agent gives utility to his connections, and another one in which the dependency expresses that each agent receives utility from his connections. In both cases, the Nash equilibria are characterized.

Our paper is also linked with the growing literature on games played in a network, in which players' payoffs are intimately related to the geometry of relations among them. 29 Ballester et al. (2006) analyze a class of complete information games with quadratic payoffs and pairwise dependent strategic complementarities. They show that in the equilibrium of these games the effort exerted by each agent strongly depends on his position of the network of relations. In particular, this effort is proportional to his Katz-Bonacich centrality measure (Bonacich, 1987), that measures his prominence derived from the direct and indirect connections in which he is involved. While our setup differs in a number of ways with theirs one, we also establish a close connection of individual decisions with the Katz-Bonacich centrality measure.

Chwe (2000) studies a collective action problem with communication. In particular, agents are connected in a network and they communicate to their neighbours their willingness to participate in an activity. The analysis provides a neat picture of how the network shapes individual decisions and helps or precludes coordination. Our work also analyzes a coordination game with incomplete information and communication, but in our case the

28 A point of overlap with Hagenbach and Koessler (2008) is their result that, when information is fully verifiable, agents will want to communicate all they know. This corresponds to our set-up when communication costs go to zero.

29 We analyze an incomplete information game played in a network. However, as usual in the literature, we assume full knowledge by all players on the realized network structure. For some facts about network games with incomplete information on the network structure we refer the interested reader to Galeotti et al. (2007).
sources of incomplete information and the specification of the coordination game are different and communication is endogenous.

Goyal and Galeotti (2008) is among the few works that analyze, as we do, at the same time the network formation process and the play of a game that depends on the network formed. The authors study a game in which payoffs depend on the, costly, information they acquire and gather from their neighbours in a network of relations. The analysis of this game in a fixed network is performed in Bramoullé and Kranton (2008), in which a set of varied possible equilibria are presented. The novelty in Goyal and Galeotti is that they allow agents to choose their connections. They show that the introduction of endogenous network structures induce a simpler core-periphery structure in the equilibrium formed. In particular, equilibrium networks show a core-periphery pattern in which a set of few individuals are highly connected with a high number of poorly connected agents. While their setup is different from ours, we share Goyal and Galeotti's goal of studying endogenous network formation (in our case, the formation of communication networks) and games played on networks (in our case, the choice of actions at the last stage) in a unified framework.

The present paper is a step towards modeling equilibrium endogenous costly information flows among multiple agents, but much work remains to be done. Of course, it would be interesting to know what happens beyond the normal-quadratic set-up – and to show under what conditions the normal-quadratic is a good approximation of other settings. Other communication structures are explored in the Supplementary Material section (broadcasting and alternative communication protocols). However, it would be interesting to take a more general approach and perform comparative statics on communication modes, for instance asking how communication and influence change when the communication technology changes.

Does our model have the potential to be used for empirical work? What kind of data could identify the model? Suppose that we observe the information flows among nodes of a network (e.g. what amount of resources each firm spends for liaising with other firms) but not the underlying interaction matrix, communication cost parameters, local state uncertainty, or decision functions. The potential for identification is there. If the number of agents is at least four, Theorem 1 supplies a number restrictions that is at least as large as the number of primitive variables to be estimated.\footnote{\textsuperscript{30}The Theorem consists of system of $n (3n - 2)$ equations in $2n^2 + n + 2$ variables ($b's$, $d's$, $s's$, and $k's$). There are at least as many equations as variables if $n \geq 4$.}

A similar identification potential exists in the other formulation of the problem, which is explored in the Appendix. This observation, although preliminary, appears to indicate that data on information flows could be a fruitful avenue for investigating organizations empirically, if combined with a model – not necessarily the present one – of endogenous communication in network games (Garicano and Prat 2011).

Finally, we have considered and static setup and, although this seems a natural starting point for our inquir, it would be interesting to analyze dynamic communication protocols in a similar environment. Information would then come from direct communication and from learning of the past activity of some, or all, agents in the organization. This relates to a recent literature on social learning in networks (see for example, Bala and Goyal, 1998}
and Acemoglu et al., 2008) and we plan to pursue this analysis in future research.

7 Appendix A. Proofs [We need to separate the proof of the Equivalence result from the proof of the equilibrium result]

Proof of Theorem 1:
Agent $i$’s payoff gross of communication costs is given by

$$u_i = - \left( d_{ii} (a_i - \theta_i)^2 + \sum_{j \neq i} d_{ij} (a_i - a_j)^2 \right)$$

As is well-known for quadratic games, the action that maximizes $i$’s expected payoff is

$$a_i = d_{ii} \theta_i + \sum_{j \neq i} d_{ij} E[a_j].$$

In the conjectured equilibrium, in the second stage of the game agent $i$ knows that he has chosen $(\tilde{r}_{ji})_{j \neq i}$ and $(\tilde{p}_{ij})_{j \neq i}$ (which may be different from the equilibrium values). He assumes that the other agents have chosen communication intensities according to the equilibrium values and that they will choose actions according to the equilibrium linear strategies.

His payoff gross of communication costs is given by. The optimal action is then

$$a_i = d_{ii} \theta_i + \sum_{j \neq i} d_{ij} E[a_j]$$

The solution to this classical signal extraction problem is a linear function

$$a_i = b_{ii} \theta_i + \sum_{j \neq i} b_{ij} y_{ij}$$

where coefficients are defined by

$$D_i \tilde{b}_{ii} = d_{ii} + \sum_{j \neq i} d_{ij} b_{ji}$$

$$D_i \tilde{b}_{ij} = \frac{r_{ij} \tilde{p}_{ij}}{s_j r_{ij} + s_j \tilde{p}_{ij} + r_{ij} \tilde{p}_{ij}} \sum_{k \neq i} d_{ik} b_{kj} \text{ for all } j \neq i$$

Now consider the first stage of the game. While precisions yield more compact final expressions, the first part of this proof is more readable if we use variances. We denote by $\sigma_i = 1/s_i$ the variance of $\theta_i$, $\rho_{ij} = 1/r_{ij}$ the variance of $\varepsilon_{ij}$, and $\pi_{ij} = 1/p_{ij}$ the variance of
Given the strategies to be used in the second stage:

\[
-u_i = d_{ii} \left( \left( \tilde{b}_{ii} - 1 \right) \theta_i + \sum_{k \neq i} \tilde{b}_{ik} (\theta_k + \varepsilon_{ik} + \eta_{ik}) \right)^2
+ \sum_{j \neq i} d_{ij} \left( \sum_k \left( \tilde{b}_{ik} - b_{jk} \right) \theta_k + \sum_{k \neq i} \tilde{b}_{ik} \varepsilon_{ik} + \sum_{k \neq i} \tilde{b}_{ik} \eta_{ik} - \sum_{k \neq j} b_{jk} \varepsilon_{jk} - \sum_{k \neq j} b_{jk} \eta_{jk} \right)^2
+ \sum_{j \neq i} k_r^2 \left( \frac{1}{\rho_{ji}} \right) + \sum_{j \neq i} k_p^2 \left( \frac{1}{\pi_{ij}} \right)
\]

which can be re-written as

\[
-u_i = d_{ii} \left( \left( \tilde{b}_{ii} - 1 \right) \theta_i + \sum_{k \neq i} \tilde{b}_{ik} (\theta_k + \varepsilon_{ik} + \eta_{ik}) \right)^2
+ \sum_{j \neq i} d_{ij} \left( \sum_k \left( \tilde{b}_{ik} - b_{jk} \right) \theta_k + \sum_{k \neq i} \tilde{b}_{ik} \varepsilon_{ik} + \sum_{k \neq i} \tilde{b}_{ik} \eta_{ik} - \sum_{k \neq j} b_{jk} \varepsilon_{jk} - \sum_{k \neq j} b_{jk} \eta_{jk} \right)^2
+ \sum_{j \neq i} k_r^2 \left( \frac{1}{\rho_{ji}} \right) + \sum_{j \neq i} k_p^2 \left( \frac{1}{\pi_{ij}} \right)
\]

The expected payoff of \( i \) is:

\[
-E[u_i] = d_{ii} \left( \tilde{b}_{ii} - 1 \right)^2 \sigma_i + \sum_{k \neq i} 2 \tilde{b}_{ik}^2 (\sigma_k + \rho_{ik} + \pi_{ik})
+ \sum_{j \neq i} d_{ij} \left( \sum_k \left( \tilde{b}_{ik} - b_{jk} \right)^2 \sigma_k + \sum_{k \neq i} \tilde{b}_{ik}^2 (\rho_{ik} + \pi_{ik}) + \sum_{k \neq j} b_{jk}^2 (\rho_{jk} + \pi_{jk}) \right)
+ k_r^2 \sum_{j \neq i} \frac{1}{\rho_{ji}} + k_p^2 \sum_{j \neq i} \frac{1}{\pi_{ij}}.
\]

By the Envelope Theorem, we can disregard effects of the form \( d\tilde{b}_{ik}/d\rho_{ik} \). The first-order conditions are:

\[
\frac{\partial E[u_i]}{\partial \rho_{ji}} = d_{ij} \tilde{b}_{ij}^2 + k_r^2 \left( \frac{1}{\rho_{ji}} \right)^2 = 0 \quad (14)
\]

\[
\frac{\partial E[u_i]}{\partial \pi_{ij}} = D_i \tilde{b}_{ij}^2 + k_p^2 \left( \frac{1}{\pi_{ij}} \right)^2 = 0. \quad (15)
\]
Now replace precisions in (14) and (15) and combine them with (11) and (12) for all agents to obtain a system of equations which characterize the equilibrium:

\[ D_i b_{ii} = d_{ii} + \sum_{j \neq i} d_{ij} b_{ji} \quad \text{for all } i \]  \hfill (16)

\[ D_i b_{ij} = \frac{r_{ij} p_{ij}}{s_j r_{ij} + s_j p_{ij} + r_{ij} p_{ij}} \sum_{k \neq i} d_{ik} b_{kj} \quad \text{for all } i, j \neq i \]  \hfill (17)

\[ \frac{\sqrt{d_{ji}} b_{ij}}{k_p} = r_{ij} \quad \text{for all } i, j \neq i \]  \hfill (18)

\[ \frac{\sqrt{D_i b_{ij}}}{k_p} = p_{ij} \quad \text{for all } i, j \neq i \]  \hfill (19)

Restrict attention on a particular \(i\). Plugging (18) and (19) into (17), we obtain

\[ \left( s_j k_p \sqrt{d_{ji}} b_{ij} + s_j k_r \sqrt{D_i b_{ij}} + \sqrt{d_{ji}} \sqrt{D_i b_{ij}^2} \right) D_i b_{ij} = \sqrt{d_{ji}} \sqrt{D_i b_{ij}^2} \sum_{k \neq i} d_{ik} b_{kj} \quad \text{for all } j \neq i \]

which simplifies to

\[ \left( s_j \frac{k_p}{\sqrt{D_i}} + s_j \frac{k_r}{\sqrt{d_{ji}}} + b_{ij} \right) D_i = \sum_{k \neq i} d_{ik} b_{kj} \quad \text{for all } j \neq i \]

and can be re-written as

\[ b_{ij} - \sum_{k \neq i} \frac{d_{ik}}{D_i} b_{kj} = -s_j \left( \frac{k_p}{\sqrt{D_i}} + \frac{k_r}{\sqrt{d_{ji}}} \right) \quad \text{for all } j \neq i. \]  \hfill (20)

Also note that (16) can be re-written as

\[ b_{ii} - \sum_{k \neq i} \frac{d_{ik}}{D_i} b_{ki} = \frac{d_{ii}}{D_i} \]  \hfill (21)

Using the definitions of \( \omega_{ij} \) and \( h_{ij} \), the system composed of (20) and (21) becomes

\[ b_{ii} - \sum_{k \neq i} \omega_{ik} b_{ki} = h_{ii} \]

\[ b_{ij} - \sum_{k \neq i} \omega_{ik} b_{kj} = h_{ij} \quad \text{for all } j \neq i \]

which in matrix notation corresponds to:

\[ (I - \Omega) \ b_{j} = h_{j} , \]

with solution

\[ b_{j} = (I - \Omega)^{-1} \cdot h_{j} . \]

The last expression, combined with (18) and (19), constitutes the statement of the theorem.
Proof of Proposition 2:

Let $M = (I - \Omega)^{-1}$, and let $a$ denote the increase (resp. decrease) in $d_{ij}$ (resp. $d_{ik}$). We have

$$\frac{d}{da} b_i = \frac{d}{da} M \cdot h_i + M \cdot \frac{d}{da} h_i$$

Note that

$$\frac{d}{da} M = \frac{d}{da} (I - \Omega)^{-1}$$

$$= - (I - \Omega)^{-1} \frac{d}{da} (I - \Omega) (I - \Omega)^{-1}$$

$$= \left( (I - \Omega)^{-1} \right)^T \frac{d}{da} (I - \Omega)^{-1}$$

We will evaluate the effect of a change of $d_{ij}$ and $d_{ik}$ starting from a symmetric situation, namely $d_{ij} = d$ for all $i$ and $j$ and $s_i = s$ for all $i$. Then we have

$$I - \Omega = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & -\omega & \cdots & -\omega \\ -\omega & \ddots & \ddots & \vdots \\ \vdots & \ddots & \ddots & -\omega \\ -\omega & \cdots & -\omega & 1 \end{bmatrix}$$

with inverse

$$M = K \begin{bmatrix} 1 - (n - 1) \omega & \omega & \cdots & \omega \\ \omega & \ddots & \ddots & \vdots \\ \vdots & \ddots & \ddots & \omega \\ \omega & \cdots & \omega & 1 - (n - 1) \omega \end{bmatrix}$$

where $K$ is a constant that depends on $w$. We also have

$$h_{ji} = \begin{cases} 1 - (n - 1) \omega & \text{if } i = j \\ -s \left( \frac{k_p}{\sqrt{a_d}} + \frac{k_v}{\sqrt{d_{ji}}} \right) & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

We have

$$\frac{d}{da} M = \begin{bmatrix} 1 - (n - 1) \omega & \cdots & \omega \\ \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ \omega & \cdots & 1 - (n - 1) \omega \end{bmatrix} \frac{d}{da} \Omega = \begin{bmatrix} 1 - (n - 1) \omega & \cdots & \omega \\ \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ \omega & \cdots & 1 - (n - 1) \omega \end{bmatrix}$$

But note that $\frac{d}{da} \Omega$ contains zeros everywhere except a 1 in $ij$ and a -1 in $ik$. Hence it is easy to see that $\frac{d}{da} M = 0$. Thus $\frac{d}{da} b_i = M \cdot \frac{d}{da} h_i$. Now note that $\frac{d}{da} h = 0$ everywhere except for

$$\frac{d}{da} h_{ji} = -s \frac{d}{da} \left( \frac{k_p}{\sqrt{d_{ji}}} + \frac{k_v}{\sqrt{d_{ji}}} \right) = dh > 0$$

$$\frac{d}{da} h_{ki} = -s \frac{d}{da} \left( \frac{k_p}{\sqrt{d_{ki}}} + \frac{k_v}{\sqrt{d_{ki}}} \right) = -dh$$
Then note that
\[
\frac{d}{da} b_i = \begin{bmatrix}
1 - (n - 1) \omega & \cdots & \omega \\
\vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\
\omega & \cdots & 1 - (n - 1) \omega
\end{bmatrix} \cdot \frac{d}{da} h_i
\]
\[
= \begin{cases}
0 & \text{if } (1 - nw) dh \\
(1 - nw) dh & \text{for } b_{ji} \\
- (1 - nw) dh & \text{for } b_{ki}
\end{cases}
\]

So the only b’s that change are \(b_{ji}\) (up) and \(b_{ki}\) (down). All the others are unaffected.

The only communication intensities to be affected are
\[
r_{ji} = \frac{\sqrt{d_{ij} b_{ji}}}{k_r}
\]
\[
r_{ki} = \frac{\sqrt{d_{ik} b_{ki}}}{k_r}
\]
\[
p_{ji} = \frac{\sqrt{D b_{ji}}}{k_p}
\]
\[
p_{ki} = \frac{\sqrt{D b_{ki}}}{k_p}
\]

**Proof of Proposition 3:**

The agents’ best responses in the second round, given communication intensities and other agents’ strategies are the same as in the baseline case, namely (16) and (17). Instead, of course, the first-order condition for communication intensities given the b’s has changed. The planner solves:
\[
- \frac{\partial}{\partial \rho_{ji}} \sum_{k=1}^{n} E[u_k] = \left( \sum_{k=1}^{n} d_{ik} + n \sum_{k \neq i} d_{ki} \right) (b_{ji}^*)^2 - k_r \left( \frac{1}{\rho_{ji}} \right)^2 = 0
\]
\[
- \frac{\partial}{\partial \pi_{ij}} \sum_{k=1}^{n} E[u_k] = \left( \sum_{k=1}^{n} d_{ik} + n \sum_{k \neq i} d_{ki} \right) (b_{ij}^*)^2 - k_p \left( \frac{1}{\pi_{ij}} \right)^2 = 0
\]

which can be re-written as
\[
r_{ij}^* = \sqrt{\sum_{k=1}^{n} d_{ik} + \sum_{k \neq i} b_{ij}^* \frac{d_{ki}}{k_r}} \quad \text{for all } i \neq j
\]
\[
p_{ij}^* = \sqrt{\sum_{k=1}^{n} d_{ik} + \sum_{k \neq i} b_{ij}^* \frac{d_{ki}}{k_p}} \quad \text{for all } i \neq j
\]

The values of \(h^*\) are obtained by replacing \(p^*\) and \(r^*\) in (16) and (17).
Proof of Proposition 4:
We have that $h^*_{ji} > h_{ji}$ for all $j \neq i$ and that $h^*_{ii} = h_{ii}$. This immediately implies that $b^*_{ji} > b_{ji}$ for all $i, j$ and, therefore, that $r^*_{ij} > r_{ij}$ and $p^*_{ij} > p_{ij}$ for all $i, j$ because $\sum_{k=1}^{n} d_{ik} + \sum_{k \neq i} d_{ki} > d_{ji}$ and $\sum_{k=1}^{n} d_{ik} + \sum_{k \neq i} d_{ki} > D_i$.

Proof of Theorem 6
The proof consists of five steps.

Step One
Bonacich Centrality, developed in sociology (Bonacich 1987) and applied to economics by Ballester et al (2006) is defined as follows. Consider a network described by an $n$-square adjacency matrix $G$, where $g_{ij} \in [0, 1]$ measures the strength of the path from $i$ to $j$. For any positive scalar $a$ (sufficiently low), define the matrix

$$M(G, a) = (I - aG)^{-1}.$$ 

Each element $m_{ij}$ of the matrix $M$ can be interpreted as a weighted sum of the paths – direct or indirect – leading from node $i$ to node $j$. The parameter $a$ is a decay parameter that may put a lower weight on less direct effects. Let $m_{ij}(G, a)$ be the $ij$ element of $M$.

The Bonacich centrality measure of node $i$ is defined as

$$\beta_i(G, a) = \sum_{j=1}^{n} m_{ij}(G, a).$$

The centrality of node $i$ is determined by the weighted sum of paths to all nodes that begin in $i$.

Global influence and Bonacich centrality are connected by the following result:31

Lemma 8 The global influence of agent $i$ can be expressed as a weighted sum of all the agents’ Bonacich centrality measures, computed on $\Omega'$ with decay factor one, where the weights are given by the $h_{.i}$

$$I_i = \sum_{j=1}^{n} \beta_j(\Omega', 1) h_{ji}.$$ 

The influence of agent $i$ is a sum of weighted Bonacich measures, where the weights on the agent’s own measure is positive (because $h_{ii} = \omega_{ii}$) while all the other weights are negative. Hence, an agent’s global influence depends positively on the centrality of that agent and negatively on the centrality of all other agents.

31 Compared to Ballester, Calvo-Armengol, and Zenou’s (2006) Theorem 1, there are three differences. First, their result is based on symmetric information, while ours is based on asymmetric information and endogenous communication. Second, their measure is a Bonacich index, while our is a weighted sum of Bonacich indices. Third, their decay rate varies according to the model, while ours is always one. For all these reasons, it is not easy to establish an intuitive connection between the two results.
Proof. From Theorem 1, we know that, for all $i$,

$$b_i = (I - \Omega)^{-1} \cdot h_i.$$

We can write

$$
\begin{bmatrix}
  b_{1i} \\
  \vdots \\
  b_{ni}
\end{bmatrix} = 
\begin{bmatrix}
  (I - \Omega)^{-1}_{11} & \cdots & (I - \Omega)^{-1}_{1n} \\
  \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\
  (I - \Omega)^{-1}_{n1} & \cdots & (I - \Omega)^{-1}_{nn}
\end{bmatrix} \cdot 
\begin{bmatrix}
  h_{1i} \\
  \vdots \\
  h_{ni}
\end{bmatrix}
$$

so that

$$I_i = \sum_{k=1}^{n} b_{ki} = \sum_{k=1}^{n} \sum_{j=1}^{n} h_{ji} (I - \Omega)^{-1}_{jk} = \sum_{j=1}^{n} \left( \sum_{k=1}^{n} (I - \Omega)^{-1}_{jk} \right) h_{ji}.$$

If we define the $G$ matrix in the Bonacich measure to be the transpose of the $\Omega$ matrix used in Theorem 1 and we let $a = 1$, we have

$$M (G, a) = M (\Omega', 1) = [I - \Omega']^{-1} = (I - \Omega)^{-1}'$$

and hence

$$\sum_{k=1}^{n} (I - \Omega)^{-1}_{jk}' = \beta_j (\Omega', 1),$$

so that

$$I_i = \sum_{j=1}^{n} \beta_j (\Omega', 1) h_{ji}.$$

\section*{Step Two}

For any given $t$ the matrix $\Omega(t)$ is equal to

$$\Omega (t) = 
\begin{bmatrix}
  0 & \frac{d_{12}}{td_{11} + \sum_{j \neq 2} d_{1j}} & \cdots & \frac{d_{1n}}{td_{11} + \sum_{j \neq n} d_{1j}} \\
  \frac{d_{21}}{td_{22} + \sum_{j \neq 2} d_{2j}} & 0 & \cdots & \frac{d_{2n}}{td_{22} + \sum_{j \neq n} d_{2j}} \\
  \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\
  \frac{d_{n1}}{td_{nn} + \sum_{j \neq n} d_{nj}} & \frac{d_{n2}}{td_{nn} + \sum_{j \neq n} d_{nj}} & \cdots & 0
\end{bmatrix}$$

Note that $\Omega(1) = \Omega$ and $\Omega(0) = \Gamma$. 

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For any \( t > 0 \) the Bonacich centrality vector associated to \( \Omega(t) \), that we denote \( \beta(t) \), is the solution to the system

\[
(I - \Omega'(t)) \beta(t) = 1
\]

Note that the Bonacich centrality measure is well-defined iff the determinant of \( (I - \Omega'(t))^{-1} \) is different than 0, and in such a case the solution to the previous system is

\[
\beta(t) = (I - \Omega'(t))^{-1} 1
\]

The Invariant Method influence vector is related to the system

\[
(I - \Omega'(0)) x = 0
\]

Let \( E \) be the set of solutions to this system. Since the largest eigenvalue of \( \Omega'(0) \) is equal to 1 the set \( E \) is equal to the eigenspace of this largest eigenvalue. The Invariant Method influence vector, that we denote \( \iota \) is the only element in this eigenspace that satisfies the additional normalization condition \( \sum_{i=1}^{n} \iota_i = 1 \).

We are going to prove the following result:

**Lemma 9** The limit of \( t\beta(t) \) as \( t \) tends to 0 is a strictly positive vector, i.e. all its entries are non-negative and at least one of them is strictly positive.

**Proof.** Let \( D_{-i} = \sum_{j \neq i} d_{ij} \) and \( D_i(t) = td_{ii}^0 + D_{-i} \). Define \( \hat{\Omega}(t) \) as the matrix with entries \( \hat{\omega}_{ij}(t) = \frac{d_{ij}}{D_i(t)} \) for all \( i, j \). (The difference with respect to \( \Omega(t) \) is that it includes the elements \( \frac{td_{ii}^0}{D_i(t)} \) in the diagonal.) Note that, by definition, \( \hat{\Omega}(t) \) is a stochastic matrix for all \( t \). Also define \( \text{Diag}(t) \) as the diagonal matrix \( \text{diag}(\frac{D_1(t)}{d_{11}^0}, \ldots, \frac{D_n(t)}{d_{nn}^0}) \). It immediately follows that

\[
\Omega(t) = \hat{\Omega}(t) - t \text{Diag}^{-1}(t)
\]

Hence, we obtain that

\[
I - \Omega(t) = I - \hat{\Omega}(t) + t \text{Diag}^{-1}(t)
\]

\[
= (I + t \text{Diag}^{-1}(t)) I - \hat{\Omega}(t)
\]

\[
= (I + t \text{Diag}^{-1}(t)) \cdot \left( I - (I + t \text{Diag}^{-1}(t))^{-1} \hat{\Omega}(t) \right)
\]

Therefore, we obtain that

\[
(I - \Omega(t))^{-1} = \left( I - (I + t \text{Diag}^{-1}(t))^{-1} \hat{\Omega}(t) \right)^{-1} \cdot (I + t \text{Diag}^{-1}(t))^{-1}
\]

The matrix \( (I + t \text{Diag}^{-1}(t))^{-1} \) is again a diagonal matrix, with entries equal to

\[
\left( I + t \text{Diag}^{-1}(t) \right)_{ii}^{-1} = \frac{1}{1 + \frac{td_{ii}^0}{D_i(t)}} = \frac{td_{ii}^0 + D_{-i}}{2td_{ii}^0 + D_{-i}}
\]

Each of these diagonal entries tend to 1 when \( t \) tends to 0. The matrix \( (I + t \text{Diag}^{-1}(t))^{-1} \hat{\Omega} \) is bounded from below (entry by entry) by \( \left( \min_i \frac{td_{ii}^0 + D_{-i}}{2td_{ii}^0 + D_{-i}} \right) \hat{\Omega} \)
and it is bounded from above by \( \left( \max_i \frac{t d_{ii}^0 + D_{-i}}{2 t d_{ii}^0 + D_{-i}} \right) \hat{\Omega} \). Since all these matrices are non-negative, this implies that

\[
\left( \mathbf{I} - (\mathbf{I} + t \text{Diag}^{-1}(t))^{-1} \hat{\Omega} \right)^{-1} = \sum_{k \geq 0} \left[ (\mathbf{I} + t \text{Diag}^{-1}(t))^{-1} \hat{\Omega}(t) \right]^k
\]

is bounded from below by

\[
\sum_{k \geq 0} \left( \min_i \frac{t d_{ii}^0 + D_{-i}}{2 t d_{ii}^0 + D_{-i}} \right)^k \left( \hat{\Omega}(t) \right)^k
\]

and bounded from above by

\[
\sum_{k \geq 0} \left( \max_i \frac{t d_{ii}^0 + D_{-i}}{2 t d_{ii}^0 + D_{-i}} \right)^k \left( \hat{\Omega}(t) \right)^k
\]

Remember that we want to show that the limit of \( t (\mathbf{I} - \hat{\Omega}'(t))^{-1} \mathbf{1} \) as \( t \) tends to 0 is a strictly positive vector (meaning that all its entries are non-negative and at least one entry is strictly positive). An alternative expression of this vector is

\[
t (\mathbf{I} + t \text{Diag}^{-1}(t))^{-1} \cdot \left( \mathbf{I} - \hat{\Omega}'(t) (\mathbf{I} + t \text{Diag}^{-1}(t))^{-1} \right)^{-1} \mathbf{1}
\]

We have proved before that \((\mathbf{I} + t \text{Diag}^{-1}(t))^{-1}\) tends to the identity matrix, so we have to focus on the limit of

\[
 t \cdot \left( \mathbf{I} - \hat{\Omega}'(t) (\mathbf{I} + t \text{Diag}^{-1}(t))^{-1} \right)^{-1} \mathbf{1}
\]

We have

\[
t \left( \sum_{k \geq 0} \left( \min_i \frac{t d_{ii}^0 + D_{-i}}{2 t d_{ii}^0 + D_{-i}} \right)^k \hat{\Omega}^k \right) \mathbf{1} \leq \leq t \cdot \left( \mathbf{I} - (\mathbf{I} + t \text{Diag}^{-1}(t))^{-1} \hat{\Omega} \right)^{-1} \mathbf{1} \leq t \left( \sum_{k \geq 0} \left( \max_i \frac{t d_{ii}^0 + D_{-i}}{2 t d_{ii}^0 + D_{-i}} \right)^k \hat{\Omega}^k \right) \mathbf{1}
\]

Since \( \hat{\Omega} \) is stochastic, we know that \( \hat{\Omega}^k \mathbf{1} = \mathbf{1} \) for all \( k \geq 0 \). Therefore

\[
t \left( \frac{1}{1 - \frac{t d_{min}^0 + D_{min}}{2 t d_{min}^0 + D_{-min}}} \right) \mathbf{1} \leq t \cdot \left( \mathbf{I} - (\mathbf{I} + t \text{Diag}^{-1}(t))^{-1} \hat{\Omega} \right)^{-1} \mathbf{1} \leq t \left( \frac{1}{1 - \frac{t d_{max}^0 + D_{max}}{2 t d_{max}^0 + D_{-max}}} \right) \mathbf{1}
\]

where we define \( D_{\text{min}} \) and \( d_{\text{min}}^0 \) (resp. max) as the values of \( D_{-i^*} \) and \( d_{i^*}^0 \) for the \( i^* \) that minimizes (resp. maximizes) \( \frac{t d_{ii}^0 + D_{-i}}{2 t d_{ii}^0 + D_{-i}} \). If we pre-multiply all vectors by \( \mathbf{1}' \) and take limits we get that

\[
n \frac{D_{\text{min}}}{d_{\text{min}}^0} \leq \lim_{t \to 0} t \mathbf{1}' \cdot \left( \mathbf{I} - (\mathbf{I} + t \text{Diag}^{-1}(t))^{-1} \hat{\Omega} \right)^{-1} \mathbf{1} \leq n \frac{D_{\text{max}}}{d_{\text{max}}^0}
\]

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Given an square matrix \( X = (x_{ij}) \) we have that \( \mathbf{1}' \cdot X \cdot \mathbf{1} = \sum_{i,j} x_{ij} = \sum_{i,j} x_{ij} = \mathbf{1}' \cdot X' \cdot \mathbf{1} \).

Therefore the argument above shows that the limit of \( t^2 \mathbf{1}' \mathbf{1} = \sum_{i,j} x_{ij} = \mathbf{1}' \cdot X' \cdot \mathbf{1} \) as \( t \) tends to 0 is also bounded from below by the \( n \frac{D_{\min}}{d_{\min}} \) and from above by \( n \frac{D_{\max}}{d_{\max}} \). This means that the limit of \( t \mathbf{1}' (I - \hat{\Omega}' (I + t \text{Diag}^{-1}(t))^{-1}) \mathbf{1} \) is a strictly positive matrix and therefore the limit of \( t \cdot \hat{\Omega}' (I - (I + t \text{Diag}^{-1}(t))^{-1})^{-1} \mathbf{1} \) is a strictly positive vector, as we wanted to show. (We are assuming here that \( D_{\min} \) is strictly positive; otherwise, the equilibrium of the game would entail no communication). \( \blacksquare \)

Step Three

Lemma 10 The limit of \( t \beta(t) \) as \( t \) tends to 0 is proportional to the Invariant Method index.

Proof. Now define

\[ S_0 = \{ t \in \mathbb{R} \text{ s.t. } \det (I - \Omega'(t)) = 0 \} \]

Note that \( 0 \in S_0 \).

We know from the previous lemma that \( \lim_{t \to 0} t \beta(t) \) exists and is a well-defined strictly positive vector. By definition, \( t \beta(t) \) satisfies

\[ (I - \Omega'(t)) t \beta(t) = t \mathbf{1} \]

for all \( t \in \mathbb{R} \setminus S_0 \). We can take limits at both sides of this equation to obtain

\[ (I - \Omega'(0)) \left( \lim_{t \to 0} \hat{\beta}(t) \right) = 0 \]

This means that the limit vector \( \lim_{t \to 0} \beta(t) \) satisfies the condition that characterizes the set \( E \), and therefore is proportional to the invariant vector. \( \blacksquare \)

Step Four

From Lemma 8, we know that

\[ \mathcal{I}_i = \sum_{j=1}^{n} \beta_j (\Omega', 1) h_{ji} \]

By applying the definition of \( h_{ji} \) and the result in Step Two, we see that

\[ \lim_{t \to 0} \mathcal{I}_i = \lim_{t \to 0} \beta_i(t) \omega_{ii}(t) \]

We also have

\[ \lim_{t \to 0} \beta_i(t) \omega_{ii}(t) = \lim_{t \to 0} \beta_i(t) \frac{td_{ii}}{td_{ii} + D_{-i}} = \lim_{t \to 0} \beta_i(t) \lim_{t \to 0} \frac{d_{ii}}{td_{ii} + D_{-i}} = \left( \lim_{t \to 0} \beta_i(t) \right) \frac{d_{ii}}{D_{-i}} \]

We can now apply Lemma 3 to get the result:

\[ \lim_{t \to 0} \frac{\mathcal{I}_i(t)}{\mathcal{I}_j(t)} = \left( \lim_{t \to 0} \beta_i(t) \right) \frac{d_{ii}}{d_{jj}} \frac{D_{-j}}{D_{-i}} = \frac{t_i}{t_j} \frac{d_{ii}}{D_{-i}} \frac{d_{jj}}{D_{-j}} \]
Step Five

Theorem 1 requires that communication costs are sufficiently low in order to have an interior solution. In the previous four steps we operated under the assumption that non-negativity constraints are not binding. In this last step we vindicate that assumption by showing that when \( t \) approaches 0 we don’t hit any boundary in the actions and communication intensities decisions.

Lemma 11 If the non-negativity constraints on \( b_i, r_{-i} \) and \( p_{-i} \) are not binding for \( t = 1 \), then they are not binding for any \( 0 < t < t \), for some \( \tilde{t} \in (0, 1) \).

Proof. Consider

\[
\tilde{u}_i(a) = -\left( d_{ii} (a_i - \theta_i)^2 + \frac{1}{\tilde{t}} \sum_{j \neq i} d_{ij} (a_i - a_j)^2 + tk_r^2 \sum_{j \neq i} r_{ji} + tk_p^2 \sum_{j \neq i} p_{ij} \right)
\]

To prove that \( b_i,s \) does not hit a boundary condition just note that when \( t \) tends to 0 the vectors \( h_i(t) \) converge to a non-negative vector for all \( i \). Since if \( d_{jk} > 0 \) for all \( j \neq k \) the matrix \((I - \Omega(t))^{-1}\) is strictly positive for all \( t \in (0, 1) \), the vector \((I - \Omega(t))^{-1}h_j(t)\) is non-negative if \( t \) is close to 0.

To prove interiority of active communication decisions, we can rewrite \( r_{ij} \) for each \( i, j \) with \( i \neq j \) as

\[
r_{ij}(t) = \frac{\sqrt{d_{ji}}}{k_r} b_{ij}
\]

\[
= (I - \Omega(t))_{ij}^{-1} \frac{\sqrt{d_{ji}} d_{jj}}{k_r D_j} - s_j \sum_{l \neq j} (I - \Omega(t))_{il}^{-1} \left( \frac{k_p}{k_r} \sqrt{\frac{d_{ji}}{D_j}} + 1 \right)
\]

\[
= (I - \Omega(t))_{ij}^{-1} \left[ \frac{\sqrt{d_{ji}} d_{jj}}{k_r D_j} - s_j \sum_{l \neq j} (I - \Omega(t))_{il}^{-1} \left( \frac{k_p}{k_r} \sqrt{\frac{d_{ji}}{D_j}} + 1 \right) \right]
\]

The first element \((I - \Omega(t))_{ij}^{-1}\) tends to \(+\infty\) when \( t \) tends to 0. If \( \gamma \) is sufficiently large, the first term in the expression in brackets is positive and tends to infinity as \( t \) tends to 0, while the second term in brackets, which is negative, is bounded below. The latter is due to the following equality:

\[
\lim_{t \to 0} \frac{(I - \Omega(t))_{ij}^{-1}}{(I - \Omega(t))_{ij}^{-1}} = \lim_{t \to 0} \frac{t(I - \Omega(t))_{ij}^{-1}}{t(I - \Omega(t))_{ij}^{-1}}
\]

This ratio is positive and bounded as a consequence of Lemma 9 and the fact that \((I - \Omega(t))^{-1}\) is a non-negative matrix, and all its entries grow at the same rate if \( d_{ij} > 0 \) for all \( i \neq j \).

Altogether, this proves that \( r_{ij}(t) \) tends to \(+\infty\) when \( t \) tends to 0. A similar argument applies for the case of passive communication. This finishes the proof of the Theorem. ■
References


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1 Equilibrium Equivalence

In the baseline version of the game, $\Gamma(D, k, s)$, agents invest in communication before they learn the value of their local state. In the alternative timeline, $\Gamma_\theta(D, k, s)$, mentioned at the end of section 3, agents choose communication intensities after they observe their local states. In this section, we show that both versions of the game have the same perfect Bayesian equilibrium.

From Theorem 1 we know that the baseline game $\Gamma(D, k, s)$ has an equilibrium in linear decision functions

$$a_i = b_{ii} \theta_i + \sum_{j \neq i} b_{ij} y_{ij}$$

we now show that the alternative version $\Gamma_\theta(D, k, s)$ has the exact same equilibrium:

**Theorem 12** The games $\Gamma(D, k, s)$ and $\Gamma_\theta(D, k, s)$ have the same equilibrium in linear strategies

**Proof.** We are going to show that the both games have perfect Bayesian equilibria which satisfy the same four sets of conditions, which in turn correspond to the ones used in the proof of Theorem 1:

$$D_i b_{ii} = d_{ii} + \sum_{j \neq i} d_{ij} b_{ji} \quad \text{for all } i \quad (22)$$

$$D_i b_{ij} = \frac{r_{ij} p_{ij}}{s_j r_{ij} + s_j p_{ij} + r_{ij} p_{ij}} \sum_{k \neq i} d_{ik} b_{kj} \quad \text{for all } i, j \neq i \quad (23)$$

$$\frac{\sqrt{d_{ij} b_{ij}}}{k_r} = r_{ij} \quad \text{for all } i, j \neq i \quad (24)$$

$$\frac{\sqrt{D_i b_{ij}}}{k_p} = p_{ij} \quad \text{for all } i, j \neq i \quad (25)$$

First, note that the second stage is identical in the two versions of the game. Agent $i$ knows that he has chosen $(r_{ji})_{j \neq i}$ and $(p_{ij})_{j \neq i}$ (which may be different from the equilibrium values). He assumes that the other agents have chosen communication intensities according to the equilibrium values and that they will choose actions according to the equilibrium linear strategies. The first-order conditions are therefore still given by (11) and (12), which yield (22) and (23).

The only difference in the first stage is that $i$ chooses $(\tilde{r}_{ji})_{j \neq i}$ and $(\tilde{p}_{ij})_{j \neq i}$ after observing
\[ -E[u_i] = d_{ii} \left( \left( \tilde{b}_{ii} - 1 \right)^2 \theta_i^2 + \frac{1}{2} \sum_{k \neq i} \tilde{b}_{ik}^2 (\sigma_k + \rho_k + \pi_{ik}) \right) \]

\[ + \sum_{j \neq i} d_{ij} \left( \sum_k (b_{ik} - b_{jk})^2 \sigma_k + \sum_{k \neq i} \tilde{b}_{ik}^2 (\rho_k + \pi_{ik}) + \sum_{k \neq j} b_{jk}^2 (\rho_{jk} + \pi_{jk}) \right) \]

\[ + k_i^2 \left( \frac{1}{\rho_{ji}} + k_j^2 \sum_{j \neq i} \frac{1}{\pi_{ij}} \right). \]

The only difference is that the term \( \left( \tilde{b}_{ii} - 1 \right)^2 \sigma_i \) is now \( \left( \tilde{b}_{ii} - 1 \right)^2 \theta_i^2 \). But it easy to see that this does not affect the first-order conditions for communication intensities as that term is separate from \((\tilde{r}_{ji})_{j \neq i}\) and \((\tilde{p}_{ij})_{j \neq i}\). Hence the first-order conditions are unchanged, as in (24) and (25).

This equivalence rests on two assumptions. One is that agents’ payoffs are linear-quadratic. While agent \( i \)'s incentive to coordinate with other agents depends on his local state of the world \( \theta_i \), his incentive to reduce the variance of the actions of the other agents does not. But, as the following proof shows, it is the latter only that is affected by unilateral deviations in communication investments. The other is that signals have full support. While the normality assumption may not be essential, it is important that the support of \( y_{ij} \) does not depend on communication investment. If it did, a deviation from the equilibrium communication investment could be detectable, and costly signaling may unavoidable in equilibrium.

The question about uniqueness, which we mentioned for game \( \Gamma(D, k, s) \) and which we discuss in section 2 of the Supplementary Material, is present here as well.

## 2 Uniqueness

One may wonder about the importance of the restriction to linear equilibria. Do \( \Gamma(D, k, s) \) and \( \Gamma_\theta (D, k, s) \) have equilibria where agents use strategies that are not linear in their signals? A similar question has arisen in other games with quadratic payoff functions, such as Morris and Shin (2002), Angeletos and Pavan (2007, 2009), Dewan and Myatt (2008), and Calvó-Armengol and de Martí (2009).

Uniqueness in the team-theoretic setting is proven in Marschak-Radner (1972, Theorem 5).

Calvó-Armengol and de Martí (2009) show that Marschak-Radner’s line of proof extends to a strategic setting if the game admits a potential. Unfortunately, this does not apply to the game at hand (\( \Gamma(D, k, s) \) has a potential only in the special case where \( d_{ij} = d_{ji} \) for all pairs \( ij \)).

Angeletos and Pavan (2009) prove uniqueness by showing that in their economy the set of equilibria corresponds to the set of efficient allocations. A similar argument is used by Hellwig and Veldkamp (2008).

Dewan and Myatt (2008) prove uniqueness by restricting attention to strategies with non-explosive higher-order expectations.
For our game we can prove the following uniqueness result. Consider $\Gamma(D,k,s)$ but assume that local states and actions are bounded above and below. Namely assume that $a_i \in [-\bar{a}, \bar{a}]$ and $\theta_i$ is distributed as a truncated normal distribution on $[-k\bar{a}, k\bar{a}]$, where $k < 1$. Call this new game $\Gamma^a(D,k,s)$. We can show that, as the bound $\bar{a}$ goes to infinity, the set of equilibria of the game $\Gamma^a(D,k,s)$ contains (at most) one equilibrium and that this equilibrium corresponds to the linear equilibrium that we study here.

Consider the following variation of our game:

- payoffs are the same as before
- local information is bounded: $\theta_i \in [-\bar{\theta}, \bar{\theta}]$, with $\bar{\theta} \in \mathbb{R}$, follows a truncated normal distribution with mean 0 and precision $s$.
- the set of possible actions is bounded. In particular, $a_i \in [-\bar{a}, \bar{a}]$ for all $i$, where $\bar{a} = c\bar{\theta}$, for some $c \geq 1$. Note that this implies that $[-\bar{\theta}, \bar{\theta}] \subseteq [-\bar{a}, \bar{a}]$.
- communication reports are defined as in text and, thus, are unbounded: $y_{ij} = \theta_i + \varepsilon_{ij} + \eta_{ij}$ with
  \[
  \varepsilon_{ij} \sim \mathcal{N}(0, r_{ij}) \\
  \eta_{ij} \sim \mathcal{N}(0, p_{ij})
  \]

Observe that as $\bar{\theta} \to +\infty$ we converge to our initial specification of the model.

We define the following expectation operators: $E_i[\cdot] = E[\cdot | \theta_i, \{y_{ij}\}_{j \neq i}]$ for every $i \in \{1, \ldots, n\}$.

**Lemma 13** For any action profile $(a_1, \ldots, a_n)$ we have that $\omega_i \theta_i + \sum_{j \neq i} \omega_{ij} E_i[a_j] \in [-\bar{a}, \bar{a}]$ for all $i$.

**Proof.** Just note that $E_i[a_j] \in [-\bar{a}, \bar{a}]$ for all $i, j$. Since $\theta_i \in [-\bar{\theta}, \bar{\theta}] \subseteq [-\bar{a}, \bar{a}]$, the linear combination $\omega_i \theta_i + \sum_{j \neq i} \omega_{ij} E_i[a_j]$ must be in $[-\bar{a}, \bar{a}]$. $\blacksquare$

**Lemma 14** The matrix $\Omega$ with off-diagonal entries equal to $\omega_{ij}$ and diagonal entries equal to 0 is a contraction.

**Proof.** Gerschgorin theorem says that all eigenvalues of a matrix $M$ are in the union of the following sets

$$
F_i = \left\{ \lambda \mid |\lambda - m_{ii}| \leq \sum_{j \neq i} |m_{ij}| \right\}.
$$

In our case, $\omega_{ii} = 0$ and $\sum_{j \neq i} |\omega_{ij}| = 1 - \frac{d_{ii}}{d_i}$, and hence all eigenvalues have absolute value smaller than 1. This is the necessary and sufficient condition for $\Omega$ being a contraction. $\blacksquare$

---

32 See, for example, Patel and Read (1996).
**Proposition 15** Given $\theta, \bar{a}$, and $(r_{ij}, p_{ij})_{i,j}$ the game in which agents choose actions $\{a_i\}$ has a unique equilibrium.

**Proof.** Expected payoffs are

$$-E_i [u_i] = d_{ii} (a_i - \theta_i)^2 + \sum_{j \neq i} d_{ij} (a_i^2 - 2a_i E[a_j] + E[a_j^2]) - k_r \sum_{j \neq i} r_{ji} - k_p \sum_{j \neq i} p_{ij}.$$ 

Therefore, first order conditions with respect to actions are

$$-\frac{\partial E_i [u_i]}{\partial a_i} = 2d_{ii} (a_i - \theta_i) + 2 \sum_{j \neq i} d_{ij} (a_i - E_i [a_j]) = 0.$$ 

Given information sets $\{y_i\}_i$ individual actions satisfy Kuhn-Tucker’s conditions. Thus, for each $i \in \{1, \ldots, n\}$ either

$$a_i = \omega_{ii} \theta_i + \sum_{j \neq i} \omega_{ij} E_i [a_j]$$

or

$$a_i \in \{-\bar{a}, \bar{a}\}.$$ 

More precisely:

$$BR_i (a_{-i}) = \begin{cases} 
\omega_{ii} \theta_i + \sum_{j \neq i} \omega_{ij} E_i [a_j] & \text{if } \omega_{ii} \theta_1 + \sum_{j \neq i} \omega_{ij} E_i [a_j] \in [-\bar{a}, \bar{a}] \\
\bar{a} & \text{if } \omega_{ii} \theta_1 + \sum_{j \neq i} \omega_{ij} E_i [a_j] > \bar{a} \\
-\bar{a} & \text{if } \omega_{ii} \theta_1 + \sum_{j \neq i} \omega_{ij} E_i [a_j] < -\bar{a}
\end{cases}$$

We can make use of Lemma 13 to show that, indeed,

$$BR_i (a_{-i}) = \omega_{ii} \theta_i + \sum_{j \neq i} \omega_{ij} E_i [a_j] \quad \text{for all } i.$$ 

Hence, equilibrium conditions become

$$a_i^* = \omega_{ii} \theta_i + \sum_{j \neq i} \omega_{ij} E_i [a_j] \quad i = 1, \ldots, n. \quad (26)$$

Nesting these conditions we get

$$a_i^* = \omega_{ii} \theta_i + \sum_{j \neq i} \omega_{ij} E_i \left[ \omega_{jj} \theta_j + \sum_{k \neq j} \omega_{jk} E_j [a_k^*] \right] = \omega_{ii} \theta_i + \sum_{j \neq i} \omega_{ij} \omega_{jj} E_i [\theta_j] + \sum_{j \neq i} \sum_{k \neq j} \omega_{ij} \omega_{jk} E_i E_j [a_k^*]$$

(27)

The last term in this expression allows for a new level of nestedness that we obtain plugging (26) in (27):

$$a_i^* = \omega_{ii} \theta_i + \sum_{j \neq i} \omega_{ij} \omega_{jj} E_i [\theta_j] + \sum_{j \neq i} \sum_{k \neq j} \omega_{ij} \omega_{jk} \omega_{kk} E_i E_j [\theta_k] + \sum_{j \neq i} \sum_{k \neq j} \sum_{s \neq k} \omega_{ij} \omega_{jk} \omega_{ks} E_i E_j E_k [a_k^*]$$

expectations on primitives  
strategic interdependence
We are going to show this in two steps: (i) first, we are going to show that the limit when \( l \rightarrow +\infty \) of expectations on primitives is bounded above and below; this ensures that the expression of expectations on primitives is well-defined at the limit; (ii) second, we are going to show that the expression of strategic interdependencies vanishes when \( l \rightarrow +\infty \).

The proof of both steps relies on Lemma 14.

To prove (i), first note that all expectations \( E_i [\theta_k], E_i E_j [\theta_k], \ldots, E_i E_1 \cdots E_i [\theta_k] \) are bounded above by \( \bar{\theta} \) and bounded below by \( -\bar{\theta} \). Then, the expression

\[
\sum_{k \neq i} \omega_{ik} \omega_{kk} E_i [\theta_k] + \sum_{j \neq i, k \neq j} \omega_{ij} \omega_{jk} \omega_{kk} E_i E_j [\theta_k] + \cdots + \sum_{i_1} \cdots \sum_{i_l \neq i, k \neq i} \omega_{i_1 i_1} \cdots \omega_{i_l k} \omega_{kk} E_{i_1} \cdots E_{i_l} [\theta_k]
\]

is bounded above by

\[
\bar{\theta} \left( \sum_{k \neq i} \omega_{ik} \omega_{kk} + \sum_{j \neq i, k \neq j} \omega_{ij} \omega_{jk} \omega_{kk} + \cdots + \sum_{i_1} \cdots \sum_{i_l \neq i, k \neq i} \omega_{i_1 i_1} \cdots \omega_{i_l k} \omega_{kk} \right)
\]

and bounded below by

\[
-\bar{\theta} \left( \sum_{k \neq i} \omega_{ik} \omega_{kk} + \sum_{j \neq i, k \neq j} \omega_{ij} \omega_{jk} \omega_{kk} + \cdots + \sum_{i_1} \cdots \sum_{i_l \neq i, k \neq i} \omega_{i_1 i_1} \cdots \omega_{i_l k} \omega_{kk} \right).
\]

We can apply now the following result: the entry \((i, j)\) of \( \Omega^l \), that we denote \( \omega_{ij}^l \), is equal to \( \sum_{i_1} \cdots \sum_{i_{l-1}} \omega_{i_1 i_1} \omega_{i_1 i_2} \cdots \omega_{i_{l-2} i_{l-1}} \omega_{i_{l-1} i} \). Hence

\[
\sum_{k \neq i} \omega_{ik} \omega_{kk} + \sum_{j \neq i, k \neq j} \omega_{ij} \omega_{jk} \omega_{kk} + \cdots + \sum_{i_1} \cdots \sum_{i_l \neq i, k \neq i} \omega_{i_1 i_1} \cdots \omega_{i_l k} \omega_{kk} = \omega_{kk} \sum_{j=1}^l \omega_{ij}^l
\]

where, \( i_1, \ldots, i_l \) are indices that run from 1 to \( n \).
The element \( \sum_{j=1}^{l} \omega_{ik}^{[j]} \) is the \((i, k)\) entry of the matrix \( \sum_{1 \leq j \leq l} \Omega^{j} \). A sufficient condition for the infinite sum \( \sum_{j \geq 1} \Omega^{j} \) to converge is that \( \Omega \) is a contraction. Thus, by Lemma 14, \( \omega_{kk} \sum_{j=1}^{l} \omega_{ik}^{[j]} \) is bounded when \( l \to +\infty \) and hence the expression of expectations on primitives is bounded too. This proves (i).

To prove (ii), first note that, trivially, \( E_l E_i \cdots E_k [a_{s}^{*}] \) is bounded above by \( \bar{a} \) and below by \(-\bar{a}\). Hence the expression

\[
\sum_{i_1} \cdots \sum_{i_l} \sum_{k \neq i_1 \ldots s \neq k} \omega_{i, i_1} \cdots \omega_{i, i_k} \omega_{k} E_i E_i \cdots E_k [a_{s}^{*}]
\]

is bounded above by

\[
\bar{a} \sum_{i_1} \cdots \sum_{i_l} \sum_{k \neq i_1 \ldots s \neq k} \omega_{i, i_1} \cdots \omega_{i, i_k} \omega_{k}
\]

and below by

\[
-\bar{a} \sum_{i_1} \cdots \sum_{i_l} \sum_{k \neq i_1 \ldots s \neq k} \omega_{i, i_1} \cdots \omega_{i, i_k} \omega_{k}.
\]

Then, since \( \sum_{i_1} \cdots \sum_{i_l} \sum_{k \neq i_1} \sum_{s \neq k} \omega_{i, i_1} \cdots \omega_{i, i_k} \omega_{k} = \sum_{s \neq k} \omega_{s}^{[l+1]} \) and \( \omega_{s}^{[l+1]} \to 0 \) when \( l \to \infty \) for all \( s = 1, \ldots, n \),\(^{33}\) we can ensure that \( \sum_{s} \omega_{s}^{[l+1]} \to 0 \) when \( l \to \infty \). Therefore, the upper and lower bounds of the strategic interdependencies term tend to 0 when \( l \to \infty \). This proves (ii).

Note that this proof does not require normality in our structure of communication reports. Any other information structure would do not change the uniqueness result. Of course, it would change the shape of this equilibrium.

**Proposition 16** The unique equilibrium of the game when \( \bar{\theta} \to +\infty \) (and, therefore, \( \bar{a} \to +\infty \) too) is linear.

**Proof.** The previous proposition states that the equilibrium for any given \( \bar{\theta} \) and \( \bar{a} \) is given by

\[
a_{i}^{*} = \lim_{l \to +\infty} \left\{ \omega_{i, i} \theta_{i} + \sum_{k \neq i} \omega_{i, k} \omega_{k} E_i [\theta_k] + \cdots + \sum_{i_1} \cdots \sum_{i_l} \sum_{k \neq i_1 \ldots s \neq k} \omega_{i, i_1} \cdots \omega_{i, i_k} \omega_{k} E_i E_i \cdots E_i [\theta_k] \right\}.
\]

\( (30) \)

We have to compute explicitly the expectations in the previous expression when \( \bar{\theta} \to +\infty \). Observe that when \( \theta \to +\infty \) all \( \theta_i \)s probability distributions tend to the normal distribution with mean 0 and precision \( s \). Bayesian updating with normal distributions takes a simple linear form. To be more precise, in our setup, since the mean of all prior distributions is equal to 0, we have that

\[
E_i [\theta_j] = \alpha_{ij} y_{ij} \quad \text{for all } i \neq j
\]

\[
E_i [y_{jk}] = \beta_{ijk} y_{ik} \quad \text{for all } k \neq i \neq j \neq k
\]

\(^{33}\)This is, precisely, because \( \sum_{i \geq 1} \Omega^{i} \) converges.
with \( \alpha_{ij} \in [0, 1] \) and \( \beta_{ijk} \in [0, 1] \) being constants that depend on the precisions \( (r_{ij}, p_{ij})_{i,j} \) that are chosen at the first stage of the game. Observe that this immediately implies that also higher-order expectations \( E_i E_i \cdots E_i \theta_k \) are linear in \( \{ y_{ij} \}_{j \neq i} \). In particular, \( E_i E_i \cdots E_i \theta_k = \varphi_{ik}^{[l]} y_{ik} \) where \( \varphi_{ik}^{[l]} \) is a product of one \( \alpha \) (in particular, of \( \alpha_{i,k} \)) and \( l \) different \( \beta \)s. Note that \( \varphi_{ik}^{[l]} \in [0, 1] \) for all \( i, k, l \). Therefore

\[
a_i^* = \omega_{ii} \theta_i + \sum_k \omega_{kk} \sum_{l=1}^{\infty} \varphi_{ik}^{[l]} \omega_{ik}^{[l]} y_{ik} \quad \text{for all } i. \tag{31}
\]

To show that this expression is well-defined we proceed in a similar way than in the proof of Proposition 15. The expression \( \sum_{l=1}^{\infty} \varphi_{ik}^{[l]} \omega_{ik}^{[l]} \) is weighted below by 0 and above by \( \sum_{l=1}^{\infty} \varphi_{ik}^{[l]} \omega_{ik}^{[l]} \). This last infinite sum is the entry \((i, k)\) of the matrix \( \sum_{l=1}^{\infty} \Omega^l \) that is well-defined because \( \Omega \) is a contraction. Thus, we conclude that the expression in (31) is well-defined for all players and linear in \( (\theta_i, \{ y_{ij} \}_{j \neq i}) \) for each \( i \in \{1, \ldots, n\} \). ■

3 Precluding Communication and Transfers

In this appendix we want to show up a possible strategic effect due to indirect interactions between agents. Besides direct communication, another possible tool an agent could use for his own purpose could be trying to exclude some possible ways of communication. For example, an agent can inhibit a communication channel by paying some monetary transfer to the agents that would be involved in it. With the use of a simple three-agent numerical example we show that this incentive exists.

Consider an organization formed by three agents with interaction matrix

\[
D = \begin{pmatrix}
0.3 & 0.3 & 1 \\
0.3 & 0.3 & 1 \\
1 & 100 & 1
\end{pmatrix}
\]

and such that \( s_i = 0.1 \) for all \( i, k_r = k_r = 0.01 \). Agents 1 and 2 occupy an equivalent position inside the organization, and they want primarily to coordinate with agent 3. Instead, agent 3 shows a severe coordination motive with agent 2, compared with any other payoff externality.

When considering unrestricted communication, as we do in text, the final utilities of each agent are

\[
u_1 = -7.0346, u_2 = -3.5932, u_3 = -17.789.
\]

If, instead, we consider a setup with inhibited communication in which agents 1 and 2 can not communicate with each other, some algebra shows that agents’ utilities under this communication restriction are

\[
u_1 = -11.446, u_2 = -6.1297, u_3 = -16.267.
\]

Comparing utilities in both cases, one immediately observes that agent 3 benefits from inhibited communication in the communication lines among agents 1 and 2, while this two agents end up in a worst situation. This suggests that there is room in this model to analyze monetary transfers among agents to limit information transmission. Of course, this would rise up other strategic considerations, such as the enforcement of the possible agreements reached, something that would possibly displace the focus and aim of our analysis.
4 Broadcasting

In our baseline game, communication is essentially bilateral. In particular, investment in active communication are link-specifics. While this is true in certain circumstances, in other cases there may be economies of scale in active communication. Here we consider the polar opposite, where the investment in active communication that an agent makes affects all his links equally.

Each agent chooses a unique $r_i$, a common precision for active communication with the rest of individuals. This can be understood as an approximation to the analysis of broadcasting. Agents exert the same effort in actively communicating with every else but can freely choose to which messages they want to pay more attention. This could be the case of e-mail lists, where the sender is allowed to send a unique message to the organization as a whole, and it is at the discretion of each one of the receivers to attend to it. In our model, when the agent chooses the precision $r_i$, he determines the possible ambiguity in the message: if the signal is very precise, everybody is going to receive essentially the same common signal; if the signal is very noisy, the receiver needs to exert a high effort to decode this message.

Before proceeding to present and prove the characterization of the equilibrium in the broadcasting case we need to introduce additional notation. Given a vector $\lambda_i$, Let

$$g_{ji}(\lambda_i) = \begin{cases} 
\omega_{ii} & \text{if } i = j \\
-s_i \left( \frac{k_p}{\sqrt{D_j}} + \frac{k_r}{\lambda_{ij}} \right) & \text{otherwise}
\end{cases}$$

With this notation in mind, we can prove a variant of Theorem 1 for the broadcasting case:

**Proposition 17** For any $(D, s)$, if $k_r$ and $k_p$ are sufficiently low, the game $\Gamma(D, k, s)$ has a unique pure-strategy equilibrium:

(i) Decisions are given by

$$b_j = (I - \Omega)^{-1} \cdot g_j(\lambda_j) \quad \text{for all } j;$$

where $\lambda_j$ is an endogenously determined vector with positives entries that satisfy \mbox{$\sum_{k \neq j} d_{jk} b_{kj}^2 = \lambda_{ij} b_{ij}^2$}.

(ii) Active communication is

$$r_i = \frac{\lambda_{ij} b_{ij}}{k_r} \quad \text{for all } j;$$

(iii) Passive communication is

$$p_{ij} = \frac{\sqrt{D_j} b_{ij}}{k_p} \quad \text{for all } i \neq j.$$
Proof. If agent \( i \) chooses a unique \( \rho_i \), the set of first-order conditions is equal to

\[
\frac{1}{2} \frac{\partial E[u_i]}{\partial b_{ii}} = d_{ii} (b_{ii} - 1) \sigma_i + \sum_{k \neq i} d_{ij} (b_{ii} - b_{ji}) \sigma_i = 0
\]

\[
\frac{1}{2} \frac{\partial E[u_i]}{\partial b_{ij}} = d_{ii} b_{ij} (\sigma_j + \varphi_j + \pi_{ij}) + \sum_{k \neq i} d_{ik} ((b_{ij} - b_{kj}) \sigma_j + b_{ij} \rho_j + b_{ij} \pi_{ij}) = 0
\]

\[
- \frac{\partial E[u_i]}{\partial \rho_i} = \sum_{j \neq i} d_{ij} b_{ji}^2 + c' \left( \frac{1}{\rho_i} \right) = 0
\]

\[
- \frac{\partial E[u_i]}{\partial \pi_{ij}} = D_i b_{ij}^2 + c' \left( \frac{1}{\pi_{ij}} \right) = 0.
\]

This set of first-order conditions is equivalent to

\[
D_i b_{ii} = d_{ii} + \sum_{k \neq i} d_{ij} b_{ji}
\]

\[
D_i b_{ij} = \frac{\sigma_j}{\sigma_j + \rho_j + \pi_{ij}} \sum_{k \neq i} d_{ik} b_{kj}
\]

\[
\sqrt{\sum_{k \neq i} d_{ik} b_{ki}^2} = r_i
\]

\[
\frac{\sqrt{D_i b_{ij}}}{k_p} = p_{ij}
\]

Since

\[
\frac{r_j p_{ij}}{s_j r_j + s_j p_{ij} + r_j p_{ij}} = \frac{\sigma_j}{\sigma_j + \rho_j + \pi_{ij}} \sum_{k \neq i} d_{ik} b_{kj}
\]

condition (33) becomes

\[
D_i b_{ij} = \frac{r_j p_{ij}}{s_j r_j + s_j p_{ij} + r_j p_{ij}} \sum_{k \neq i} d_{ik} b_{kj}
\]

By permuting \( i \) and \( j \) in this last expression, we get

\[
D_j b_{ji} = \frac{r_i p_{ji}}{s_i r_i + s_i p_{ji} + r_i p_{ji}} \sum_{k \neq i} d_{jk} b_{ki}
\]

Since

\[
\sqrt{\sum_{k \neq i} d_{ik} b_{ki}^2} = r_i
\]

we can define an endogenous value \( \lambda_{ji} \) such that \( \sqrt{\sum_{k \neq i} d_{ik} b_{ki}^2} = \lambda_{ji} b_{ji} \) for each \( j \neq i \). In particular, it is the unique positive number such that \( \sum_{k \neq i} d_{ik} b_{ki}^2 = \lambda_{ji}^2 b_{ji}^2 \). Then, the first order condition associated to \( \rho_i \) can be rewritten as

\[
\frac{\lambda_{jj} b_{ji}}{k_r} = r_i
\]
for any \( j \neq i \). Plugging this expression and (35) in (36), we get that

\[
 b_{ji} - \sum_{k \neq i} w_{jk} b_{ki} = -s_i \left( \frac{k_p}{\sqrt{D_j}} + \frac{k_r}{\lambda_{ji}} \right) \quad \text{for all } i
\]

or, equivalently, in matrix form

\[
 b_i = (I - \Omega)^{-1} \cdot g(\lambda_i)
\]

Observe that the main difference of the equilibrium action in the broadcasting case compared with the one in Theorem 1 is the change from the vector \( h \) to the vector \( g(\lambda_i) \). The matrix that relates these vectors with the equilibrium actions \( b \) remains the same in both cases.

A natural question that arises with the analysis of this new communication protocol is whether we should expect that agents engage in more active communication than before or not. The following result gives us an answer in terms of the ratio of passive versus active communication already considered in a previous section.

**Proposition 18** In the symmetric case, in which \( d_{ij} = \tilde{d}Q \) for all \( i \neq j \) and \( d_{ii} = (1 - (n - 1)\tilde{d}) \tilde{Q} \), for some \( \tilde{Q} > 0 \), the ratio of passive versus active communication is

\[
 \frac{k_p}{k_r} \sqrt{\frac{(n-1)}{Q} \gamma_{ij}}.
\]

**Proof.** Because of symmetry, for all pairwise different \( i, j, k \) we have that \( b_{ji} = b_{ki} = b^* \). Therefore,

\[
 \lambda_{ji} = \sqrt{\sum_{k \neq i} d_{ik}} = \sqrt{(n-1) \tilde{d}Q}
\]

This implies that

\[
 \frac{\sqrt{(n-1) \tilde{d}Q} b^*}{k_r} = r_i
\]

\[
 \frac{\sqrt{Q} b^*}{k_p} = p_{ij}
\]

The ratio between active and passive communication in this case is

\[
 \frac{r_i}{p_{ij}} = \frac{k_p}{k_r} \sqrt{\frac{(n-1) \tilde{d}Q}{Q}} = \frac{k_p}{k_r} \sqrt{\frac{(n-1) \tilde{d}}{\tilde{Q} \gamma_{ij}}}
\]

Again, when active and passive communication are equally costly, i.e. \( k_p = k_r \), the upper bound for this ratio is 1. Observe also, that the ratio in the case of broadcasting does not necessarily decreases when \( n \) increases. When \( \tilde{d} = \frac{1}{n} \), we obtain that the ratio of active versus passive communication is \( \sqrt{(n-1)/n} \), that increases and tends to 1 when \( n \) increases. In clear contrast with the case of pairwise communication, active and passive communication are almost equal when there are enough agents.
5 Corner Solutions

It is natural to assume that communication intensities cannot be negative. In fact, we assume a small but positive lower bound $\xi$, to prevent equilibria based on coordination failure. The equilibrium characterization in Theorem 1 rests on the assumption that the communication cost parameters, $k_p$ and $k_r$, are sufficiently low to guarantee that the lower bound $\xi$ is non-binding and the equilibrium can be described by unconstrained first-order conditions.

This section allows some or all of the lower-bound constraints to be binding. As one would expect, the solution of the unconstrained case can be extended with Kuhn-Tucker conditions. The resulting set of conditions is more complex than the baseline case, but still tractable—a fact that we illustrate through a numerical example.

We have to include formally in the analysis the inequality constraints

\[ p_{ij} \geq \xi \quad \text{for all } i \neq j \]
\[ r_{ij} \geq \xi \quad \text{for all } i \neq j \]

The relevant terms in the Lagrangian that incorporates $i$’s ex-ante expected utility and the restrictions are:

\[ \hat{u}_i = -D_i \sum_{j \neq i} b_{ij}^2 p_{ij} - \sum_{j \neq i} d_{ij} b_{ij}^2 p_{ji} - k_p^2 \sum_{j \neq i} p_{ij} - k_r^2 \sum_{j \neq i} r_{ji} - \sum_{j \neq i} \lambda_{ij} (\xi - p_{ij}) - \sum_{j \neq i} \mu_{ij} (\xi - r_{ji}) \]

\[ = -D_i \sum_{j \neq i} b_{ij}^2 \left( \frac{1}{s_j} \right) - \sum_{j \neq i} d_{ij} b_{ji}^2 \left( \frac{1}{s_i} \right) - k_p^2 \sum_{j \neq i} p_{ij} - k_r^2 \sum_{j \neq i} r_{ji} - \sum_{j \neq i} \lambda_{ij} (\xi - p_{ij}) - \sum_{j \neq i} \mu_{ij} (\xi - r_{ji}) \]

where $\lambda_{ij}$ and $\mu_{ij}$ are the multipliers for the constraint that involve $p_{ij}$ and $r_{ij}$, respectively. It follows from the Kuhn-Tucker conditions that

\[ D_i b_{ij}^2 \frac{1}{\xi^2} \leq k_p^2 \]

whenever $p_{ij}^* = \xi$, and

\[ d_{ij} b_{ji}^2 \frac{1}{\xi^2} \leq k_r^2 \]

whenever $r_{ij}^* = \xi$. Otherwise both inequalities become equalities, and we are in the case considered in the main text, where all communication precisions are strictly larger than $\xi$. We provide below sufficient conditions for this latter case.

For each channel, from individual $j$ to individual $i$, there are four different possibilities depending on whether $p_{ij}$ and/or $r_{ij}$ are greater or equal than $\xi$. However, first-order conditions at the second stage of the game determine that, in any case, the system of equations that relates the $b$s is given by

\[ b_{ik} = \frac{p_{ik} r_{ik}}{p_{ik} r_{ik} + s_i p_{ik} + s_k r_{ik}} \sum_{j \neq i} \omega_{ij} b_{jk} \]

First of all, we are going to check that the relation between $b$s that results from the four different combinations of active and passive communication is in all cases linear. We know it for the case where both precisions are strictly larger than $\xi$. 11
If \( p_{ik} = \xi \) and \( r_{ik} > \xi \) we have that
\[
b_{ik} = \frac{\xi \sqrt{\frac{d_{ki}}{k_p}} b_{ik}}{\xi \sqrt{\frac{d_{ki}}{k_p}} b_{ik} + s_i \xi + s_i \sqrt{\frac{d_{ki}}{k_p}} b_{ik}} \sum_{j \neq i} \omega_{ij} b_{jk}
\]
which after some rearrangement is equal to
\[
b_{ik} = -s_i \frac{\xi}{\xi + s_i \sqrt{D_{ki}}} + \frac{\xi}{\xi + s_i} \sum_{j \neq i} \omega_{ij} b_{jk}
\]
This again provides a linear relation.

When \( p_{ik} > \xi \) and \( r_{ik} = \xi \) we have that
\[
b_{ik} = \frac{\xi \sqrt{\frac{d_{ki}}{k_p}} b_{ik}}{\xi \sqrt{\frac{d_{ki}}{k_p}} b_{ik} + s_i \xi + s_i \sqrt{\frac{d_{ki}}{k_p}} b_{ik}} \sum_{j \neq i} \omega_{ij} b_{jk}
\]
which leads to
\[
b_{ik} = -s_i \frac{\xi}{\xi + s_i \sqrt{D_{ki}}} + \frac{\xi}{\xi + s_i} \sum_{j \neq i} \omega_{ij} b_{jk}
\]
Again, we end up with a linear relation between the \( b_k \) terms.

Finally, if both \( p_{ik} \) and \( r_{ik} \) are exactly equal to \( \xi \) then
\[
b_{ik} = \frac{\xi^2}{\xi^2 + 2 s_i \xi} \sum_{j \neq i} \omega_{ij} b_{jk}
\]
which is clearly linear in the entries \( b_k \).

We can gather all these different types of linear relations in a single compact matrix-form expression. Formally, to check for corner equilibria we have to proceed as follows:

- according to the four different combinations, we can distinguish four types of communication links: Bidirectional (where both precisions are strictly larger than \( \xi \)), Only Active (where just the active precision of the communication link is strictly larger than \( \xi \)), Only Passive (where just the passive precision of the communication link is strictly larger than \( \xi \)), and Mute (where both are equal to \( \xi \));

- after some rearrangement, if necessary and wlog, we can rewrite the system in blocks as follows:

\[
\begin{pmatrix}
    b_{kB} \\
    b_{kOA} \\
    b_{kOP} \\
    b_{kM}
\end{pmatrix} = 
\begin{pmatrix}
    I - \Omega_{B,B} & I - \Omega_{B,OA} & I - \Omega_{B,AO} & I - \Omega_{B,M} \\
    -\frac{\xi}{\xi + s_i} \Omega_{OA,B} & I - \frac{\xi}{\xi + s_i} \Omega_{OA,OA} & -\frac{\xi}{\xi + s_i} \Omega_{OA,OP} & -\frac{\xi}{\xi + s_i} \Omega_{OA,M} \\
    -\frac{\xi}{\xi + s_i} \Omega_{OP,B} & I - \frac{\xi}{\xi + s_i} \Omega_{OP,OA} & I - \frac{\xi}{\xi + s_i} \Omega_{OP,OP} & -\frac{\xi}{\xi + s_i} \Omega_{OP,M} \\
    -\frac{\xi^2}{\xi^2 + 2 s_i \xi} \Omega_{M,B} & -\frac{\xi^2}{\xi^2 + 2 s_i \xi} \Omega_{M,OA} & -\frac{\xi^2}{\xi^2 + 2 s_i \xi} \Omega_{M,OP} & I - \frac{\xi^2}{\xi^2 + 2 s_i \xi} \Omega_{M,M}
\end{pmatrix}
\]

where individuals are partitioned according to the communication decisions between themselves and individual \( k \). The entries of \( h_{ik} \) are the same ones as in the interior case considered in the main text for the Bidirectional, \( -s_i \frac{\xi}{\xi + s_i \sqrt{D_{ki}}} \) if the link is Only Active, \( -s_i \frac{\xi}{\xi + s_i \sqrt{D_{ki}}} \) if the link is Only Passive, and 0 if \( ij \) is Mute.
If the solution to the system satisfies the Kuhn-Tucker inequality conditions for Only Active, Only Passive and Mute we have presented above, then we have found a corner equilibrium.

We now provide an example of a network that generates a corner equilibrium.

Consider the following network

\[ \begin{array}{ccc}
1 & \leftrightarrow & 2 \\
2 & \leftrightarrow & 3 
\end{array} \]

where coordination concerns are given by \( d_{12} = d_{32} = \beta, d_{21} = d_{23} = \gamma, \) and \( d_{13} = d_{31} = 0. \) The adaptation concerns are \( d_{11} = d_{22} = d_{33} = 1. \) Intuitively, if Player 2 has strong interests in coordinating with the rest but Players 1 and 3 have little interest in coordinating with each other, it seems that there should exist an equilibrium where only Player 2 invests in passive communication and nobody else invests in communication, meaning that they fix all their communication decisions to \( \xi. \) Let’s see...

With regards to agent 2, start considering communication with 1: (the case with 3 would be symmetric) in this case 2 is passive and 3 is mute.

\[
\begin{pmatrix}
 b_{11} \\
 b_{21} \\
 b_{31}
\end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix}
 1 & \frac{-\beta}{1+\beta} & 0 \\
 \frac{-\xi}{\xi+\gamma} & 1 & \frac{-\xi}{\xi+\gamma} \\
 0 & \frac{-\xi^2}{\xi^2+2s\xi} & 1
\end{pmatrix}^{-1} \begin{pmatrix}
 \frac{1}{1+\beta}k_r \\
 -\frac{s}{\xi+\gamma} \sqrt{1+2\gamma} \\
 0
\end{pmatrix}
\]

If \( k_r = k_p = 1, \beta = 0.1, \gamma = 1, \xi = s = 0.5 \)

\[
\begin{pmatrix}
 b_{11} \\
 b_{21} \\
 b_{31}
\end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix}
 1 & \frac{-0.1}{1.1} & 0 \\
 \frac{-0.5}{1} & 1 & \frac{-0.5}{1} \\
 0 & -1 & 1
\end{pmatrix}^{-1} \begin{pmatrix}
 \frac{1}{2} \\
 \frac{1}{\sqrt{3}} \\
 0
\end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix}
 0.90976 \\
 7.3256 \times 10^{-3} \\
 2.2199 \times 10^{-4}
\end{pmatrix}
\]

Now for individual 2: in this case, nobody speaks or listens to him. All are mute. The system is very simple:

\[
\begin{pmatrix}
 b_{12} \\
 b_{22} \\
 b_{32}
\end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix}
 1 & \frac{-1}{1+2\gamma} & 0 \\
 \frac{-1}{3+1+\beta} & 1 & \frac{-1}{3+1+\beta} \\
 0 & -1 & 1
\end{pmatrix}^{-1} \begin{pmatrix}
 0 \\
 \frac{1}{1+2\gamma} \\
 0
\end{pmatrix}
\]

In the numerical case considered before, this becomes

\[
\begin{pmatrix}
 b_{12} \\
 b_{22} \\
 b_{32}
\end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix}
 1 & \frac{-0.1}{3.1} & 0 \\
 \frac{-1}{3} & 1 & \frac{-1}{3} \\
 0 & -1 & 1
\end{pmatrix}^{-1} \begin{pmatrix}
 0 \\
 \frac{1}{3} \\
 0
\end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix}
 1.0309 \times 10^{-2} \\
 0.34021 \\
 1.0309 \times 10^{-2}
\end{pmatrix}
\]

The case for Player 3 is symmetric to Player 1.
The inequality Kuhn-Tucker conditions are

\[ D_i b_{ij}^2 \frac{1}{\xi^2} \leq k_p^2 \quad \text{whenever } p_{ij}^* = \xi \]
\[ d_{ij} b_{ji}^2 \frac{1}{\xi^2} \leq k_r^2 \quad \text{whenever } r_{ji}^* = \xi \]

Given the numbers above, these are equivalent to

\[ D_i b_{ij}^2 \leq 0.25 \quad \text{whenever } p_{ij}^* = \xi \]
\[ d_{ij} b_{ji}^2 \leq 0.25 \quad \text{whenever } r_{ji}^* = \xi \]

In particular, these apply to \( p_{12} : \)

\[ 1.1 \left( 1.0309 \times 10^{-2} \right)^2 \leq 0.25 \]

(this one holds).

Also apply to \( p_{13} : \)

\[ 1.1 \left( 2.2199 \times 10^{-4} \right)^2 \leq 0.25 \]

(this one also holds)

It should not hold for agent 2:

\[ 3 \left( 0.90976 \right)^2 > 0.25 \]

(ok).

And apply to all active, since we are assuming the only communication larger than \( \xi \) is that 2 passively communicates with the others:

\[ d_{ij} b_{ji}^2 \frac{1}{\xi^2} \leq k_r^2 \]

With relations between 1 and 3 it is clear because \( d_{13} = d_{31} = 0 \). Between 1 and 2:
\[ r_{21} : 0.1 \left( 0.90976 \right)^2 \leq 0.25 \quad \text{(ok)} \]
\[ r_{12} : 1 \left( 1.0309 \times 10^{-2} \right) \leq 0.25 \quad \text{(ok)} \]

Therefore, all inequalities in the example above work and we get a case with a corner equilibrium.

6 Adaptation, Coordination, and Communication

At least since Marschak and Radner (1972), organizational economics has highlighted the tradeoff between adaptation and coordination. On the one hand, agents want to adapt to local information. On the other one, they want to coordinate with the rest of the agents. One of the advantages of the quadratic set-up adopted by most team-theoretic work is that the relative strength of coordination and adaptation is represented in a simple parametric way and can be used for comparative statics purposes (e.g. Dessein and Santos 2006).
A natural question in our setting is how communication investment varies with the relative importance of adaptation and coordination. As we shall see, the relation is monotonic: communication is maximal when the two concerns are balanced.

In our model, adaptation and coordination concerns are captured, respectively, by \(d_{ii}\) and \(d_{ij}\) (with \(i \neq j\)). We can thus analyze how different weights on these two concerns affect communication and influence. As we shall see, the relation is non-monotonic. Define \(d'_{ii} = \lambda d_{ii}\) and \(d'_{ij} = (2 - \lambda) d_{ij}\) for all \(j \neq i\). Observe that:

- If \(\lambda \to 0\) then \(d'_{ii} \to 0\) and \(d'_{ij} \to 2d_{ij} \geq 0\), and \(\frac{d'_{ij}}{d_{ij}} \to 0\). Coordination outweighs adaptation.
- if \(\lambda = 1\) we have the initial vector of \(i\)'s interaction terms \(d\).
- If \(\lambda \to 2\) we obtain \(d'_{ii} = 2d_{ii} > 0\) and \(d'_{ij} \to 0\), and \(\frac{d'_{ij}}{d_{ij}} \to +\infty\). Adaptation outweighs coordination.

**Proposition 19** If \(\lambda \to 0\) or \(\lambda \to 2\) agent \(i\) does not engage in active communication, and no agent passively communicates with him, i.e. \(r_{ji} = p_{ij} = \xi\) for all \(j\).

**Proof.** (i) If \(\lambda = 0\) then \(\omega_{ii} = 0\), and this immediately implies that we hit a boundary equilibrium in which \(b_{ji} = 0\) for all \(j\). This implies that agent \(i\) is not going to put effort in actively communicating with agent \(j\), and that agent \(j\) is not going to exert any kind of effort in passive communication to learn about agent \(i\)'s state of the world.

(ii) If \(\lambda \to 2\) the matrix \(\Omega\) tends to \(\Omega'\), where \(\Omega'\) is equal to \(\Omega\) except that row \(i\)'s entries in \(\Omega'\) are equal to 0. Also

\[
h'_{ji} = \begin{cases} \frac{w'_{ii} \to 1}{-s_i \left( \frac{k_e}{\sqrt{D_j}} + \frac{k_e}{\sqrt{d_{ij}}} \right)} \to -\infty & \text{otherwise} \\
\end{cases}
\]

It is easy to see that the non-negative matrix \((I - \Omega')^{-1}\) satisfies that all entries in row \(i\) are also equal to 0, except for \((I - \Omega')^{-1}_{ii} = 1\). Hence, following our equilibrium characterization, the elements \(b'_{ji}\) in equilibrium actions would satisfy that, when \(\lambda \to 2\), \(b'_{ii} \to 1\) and \(b'_{ji} \to -\infty\) if \(j \neq i\). But this implies that we hit an equilibrium in the boundary that satisfies \(b'_{ji} = 0\) for all \(j \neq i\). Therefore, again there is neither passive communication by agent \(j\) nor active communication by agent \(i\).

The reasons why communication vanishes when we approach the two extreme situations is different in each case. When coordination motives outweigh the adaptation motive, communication engagement is null because there is a natural focal point that resolves coordination problems: agents, according to prior information, fix their actions to be 0. This trivially resolves coordination and does not affect the decision problem that right now is of negligible magnitude. Local information is unnecessary.

On the other hand, when adaptation outweighs coordination, agents primarily want to resolve their respective local decision problems. The obvious way is to fix their action close to the local information they possess. In this case, prior information is redundant.